IPO Survival in a Reputational Market (original) (raw)

2012, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting

We examine IPO survival in a 'reputational' market, the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), where principle-based regulation pivots on the role of a regulatory agent, the nominated advisor (Nomad) to the IPO company. We find that Nomad reputation has a significant impact on IPO survival. IPOs backed by reputable Nomads 'survive longer (by about two years) than those backed by other Nomads. We also find that survival rates of AIM IPOs are broadly comparable to those of North American IPOs. While these results are of obvious interest to various stakeholders of AIM firms, they also provide important lessons for market places modeled on AIM including the upper-tier of the US over-the-counter market (OTCQX), Italy's AIM Italia, and Japan's Tokyo AIM.

On the marketing of IPOs

Journal of Financial Economics, 2006

and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.

Reputation and Financial Intermediation: An Empirical Investigation of the Impact of IPO Mispricing on Underwriter Market Value

Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1997

This paper investigates the empirical significance of underwriter reputation capital by analyzing the impact of initial returns of IPOs on lead-underwriter market value. Consistent with reputation costs, overpriced offerings are associated with a decrease in lead-underwriter market value significantly in excess of estimated direct costs. For moderately underpriced offerings, however, underwriter wealth effects are positive. Consistent with higher reputation costs, these wealth effects are insignificant when the IPO underpricing is more extreme. In jointly managed offerings, it is lead-underwriters that are primarily affected by IPO initial performance.

A comparative analysis of IPO proceeds under alternative regulatory environments

Journal of Financial Economics, 1990

We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect of a uniform price restriction on the proceeds of an IPO. If regular institutional investors are, on average, at least as well informed as ordinary retail investors then our corrected version of Benveniste and Wilhelm's model shows that a uniform price restriction does not affect IPO proceeds.

The Effect of Underwriters' Reputationson Post-Deregulation IPO Pricing: Price Discovery Ability Versus Bargaining Power

Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 2009

This study empirically examines the role of underwriters' reputations on the IPO pricing process and its effect on subsequent initial returns. We analyzed 275 IPOs between July, 2002 and December, 2006. The reputation of each underwriters was analyzed based on the data reflecting their performances over the preceding three years. The analysis considered the following: number of offerings, the natural logarithm of average offering size, the relative offering size, the inverse of average underpricing ratio, and the ratio of refraining from undertaking a market stabilization activity or exercising a putback option. The logarithm of the underwriter's asset size and the composite index of the above six reputation variables are included in the variable we call "reputation." We find that underwriters with higher reputation exercise more bargaining power than either issuing firms or institutional investors in the offer price decision process. On the other hand, the underwriters' certification role is not sufficiently carried out to build a reputation on price discovery. We propose an incentive system that would encourage voluntary assessment of underwriters' competency, which can ultimately bolster their reputations in terms of their price discovery ability.

On the long-run performance of IPOs

1999

We propose that the long-run performance of IPOs is a function of pre-IPO factors, including managerial decisions and the firm's performance prior to going public. We relate long-run performance to a much richer set of explanatory factors than in the previous literature. Using a number of variables, we provide empirical evidence in support of this proposition. The manner in which a company is run before it is listed on the stock exchange gives a strong signal of how its shares will perform in its first few years of coming to the market. Using a UK data set, we find that the percentage of equity issued and the degree of multinationality are key predictors of IPO performance.

Firm and industry characteristics, long-term returns and survival of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) : a critical re-evaluation

2013

This study tracks IPOs from the time of their entry into the public domain up to at least six years post-listing. In the first part of this study, the post-listing performance of these firms relative to that of a set of control firms in event and calendar time is evaluated, using a fresh sample of 746 IPOs in the UK market over the period 1999-2006 and stepwise matching algorithms that select the matching firms from the general population on the basis of key firm risk factors that includes three new factors – pre-IPO performance, turnover growth and earnings yield – employing a refined matching technique and a battery of methods. Given that the majority of the studies in the literature find that IPOs are poor investments in the long-term, the findings in the first part suggest firstly, that investing in IPOs beyond the immediate after-market may not be a bad trading strategy since the relative after-market performance is dependent on the proportions in which the stocks are stacked i...

Underwriter Reputation and Short-run IPO Returns: A Re-evaluation for an Emerging Market

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2004

This study examines the effect of underwriter reputation on the initial-day IPO returns in an emerging market. It uses both a traditional and an extended model given the characteristics of the IPO market under analysis. The results from the traditional model indicate that underwriter reputation does not affect the initial day IPO returns. However, after controlling for factors that are important in determining the price of an IPO in an emerging market, a complex relationship between underwriter reputation measures and IPO returns is documented. Results in this paper indicate that it is not appropriate to extend the findings in the US to other markets without taking into account the unique characteristics of these markets.

Investment Banks as Information Providers in IPOs

2008

Financial intermediaries are known to have access to privileged in- formation on …rm value, potentially providing important services by revealing it to uninformed investors. An important issue that arises is whether Investment Banks have an incentive to distort prices by com- municating biased information on the …rms they are underwriting in IPOs. Reputation acquisition may mitigate this problem as interme- diaries may lose credibility by incorrectly forecasting the pro…tability of …rms. We argue that the introduction of reputation may not su¢ ce to eliminate all scope for misreporting, allowing less talented interme- diaries to pro…t from not revealing their private information to the market.

A Comparative Analysis of IPO Proceeds under Alternative Regulatory Regimes

1990

We clarify and reinterpret the results of Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) concerning the effect of a uniform price restriction on the proceeds of an IPO. If regular institutional investors are, on average, at least as well informed as ordinary retail investors then our corrected version of Benveniste and Wilhelm's model shows that a uniform price restriction does not affect IPO proceeds.

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IPO-mechanisms, monitoring and ownership structure 1 1 We would like to thank the referee, Larry Benveniste, and the editor, William Schwert, as well as Bruno Biais, Patrik Bolton, Susanne Espenlaub, Michael Fishman, Thierry Foucault, Gunther Franke, Julian Franks, Mark Grinblatt, Jean Jacque Laffont, Alexander Ljungqvist, Ernst Maug, Gerhard Orosel, Pegaret Pichler, Raguram Rajan, Jay Ritter, Ailsa Röell, Kristian Rydquist, Jean Tirole, Elu von Thadden, Ivo Welch, William Wilhelm, Joe Williams and Andrew Winton for helpful comments. This paper has been presented at the University of Alberta, Baruch College, the Free University of Brussels, the University of Gothenburg, HEC, the University of California, Irvine, the University of Lausanne, the London School of Economics, the University of Odense, Stockholm School of Economics, the University of British Columbia, UCLA, the University of Utah, the CEPR conferences in Tolouse and Gerzensee, the American Finance Association, the Western Fi

Journal of Financial Economics, 1998