Reincarnating the Identity Theory (original) (raw)
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Reincarnating the Identity Theory (2018)
The mind/brain identity theory is often thought to be of historical interest only, as it has allegedly been swept away by functionalism. After clarifying why and how the notion of identity implies that there is no genuine problem of explaining how the mental derives from something else, we point out that the identity theory is not necessarily a mind/brain identity theory. In fact, we propose an updated form of identity theory, or embodied identity theory, in which the identities concern not experiences and brain phenomena, but experiences and organism-environment interactions. Such an embodied identity theory retains the main ontological insight of its parent theory, and by invoking organism-environment interactions, it has powerful resources to motivate why the relevant identities hold, without posing further unsolvable problems. We argue that the classical multiple realization argument against identity theory is built on not recognizing that the main claim of the identity theory concerns the relation between experience and descriptions of experience, instead of being about relations between different descriptions of experience and we show how an embodied identity theory provides an appropriate platform for making this argument. We emphasize that the embodied identity theory we propose is not ontologically reductive, and does not disregard experience.
Experiences are Objects. Towards a Mind-object Identity Theory
Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia, 2016
Traditional mind-body identity theories maintain that consciousness is identical with neural activity. Consider an alternative identity theory – namely, a mind-object identity theory of consciousness (OBJECTBOUND). I suggest to take into consideration whether one's consciousness might be identical with the external object. The hypothesis is that, when I perceive a yellow banana, the thing that is one and the same with my consciousness of the yellow banana is the very yellow banana one can grab and eat, rather than the neural processes triggered by the banana. The bottom line is that one's conscious experience of an object is the object one experiences. First, I outline the main hypothesis and the relation between mind, body, and object. Eventually, I address a series of traditional obstacles such as hallucinations, illusions , and commonsensical assumptions.
Identity Reconsidered: taking a dual perspective on the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Despite functionalism's long reign in philosophy of mind, it has never fully managed to carry off the older idea that the mind-matter relation might be a relation, not of multiple realizability, but of strict identity. Nowadays, we see a resurgence of identity-theoretical proposals in the so-called E-approaches to cognition, and especially in enactive and radical enactive approaches. Here, it is claimed that assuming a strict identity between certain physical structures and phenomenal consciousness isn't merely a viable option, it is perhaps the only way to avoid the Hard Problem of Consciousness. This paper wants to argue that the Hard Problem of Consciousness is a pseudo-problem that should indeed be avoided, rather than solved, and that this can be done by adopting a specific version of identity theory, one which isn't neuro-centric and which also avoids collapsing into ontological reductionism. This version of identity theory is based on classic work by Herbert Feigl, who provides one of the most elaborated, yet at the same time most overlooked identity theories. Inspired by his work, I will defend, what I will call, a dual perspective theory. The theory will be contrasted with, on the one hand, neuro-centric and reductionist identity theories, and, on the other hand, with other mind-body relation proposals such as supervenience, neutral monism and dual aspect theory. To explain the idea of 'dual perspectives', I shall rely on some of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological insights.
The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal
2016
The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as the core of a scientific research programme, each of these logically irrefutable hypotheses can be tested rationally.
The materialist thesis that there is a type-type identity between certain mental phenomena and certain physical phenomena has encountered serious criticisms. This paper is to propose a revised form of mind-body identity theory which moves forward from the tokentoken identity theory and can stand the major criticism made against the type-type identity theory. In the ftrst part of the paper, through a very brief review of the issue I show what needs to be done; in the second part, I show how my solution avoids the difficulties that have troubled the type-type identity theory.
An Animalist ’ s Critique of Jeff McMahan ’ s Embodied Mind Account of Identity
2016
In the traditional psychological criterion, psychological continuity is essential for us to survive. Jeff McMahan establishes ‘the Embodied Mind Account of Identity’, critically examining the traditional psychological account. According to the Embodied Mind Account of Identity, the preservation of the capacity for consciousness created by certain areas of the cerebrum is indicative of the essence of human existence. A conscious being with that capacity is essential for us, while an organism losing it and surviving with only biological continuity is irrelevant to our lives. In this article, I refute McMahan’s Embodied Mind Account of Identity with the theory of Animalism. I affirm that we are essentially organisms sustained by life processing. The preservation of cerebral function is irrelevant to the essence of our existence. I reveal that the heart, lungs, and brain stem governing biological function produce the capacity for consciousness. Furthermore, I prove that the brain stem s...
The problem of Identity in the Identity Theory of Mind
The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory isstates and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by different thinkers in different periods. Hence, in this article I am going to find out only the problem of identity in the "Identity theory of mind".
Ricevuto il 28 luglio 2012, accettato il 14 dicembre 2012 █ Riassunto Pensare l'identità come sé e corpo. Contributi recenti da fenomenologia, studi cognitivi e neuroscienze -Recentemente la fenomenologia ha intrapreso un dialogo sempre più intenso con le scienze cognitive, le neuroscienze e la psicopatologia, i cui punti-cardine sono stati: la struttura della coscienza e degli atti di coscienza; le diverse forme di consapevolezza di sé; l'investigazione del sé e dei suoi disturbi; l'intersoggettività. Due volumi di recentemente pubblicazione attestano la prosperità di questo dibattito. Il primo -Body Memory, Metaphor, and Movement -verte sulla soggettività incarnata, rivolgendo particolare attenzione al fenomeno della memoria implicita del corpo e raccogliendo contributi provenienti dall'area fenomenologica, da quella delle scienze cognitive e delle terapie basate sull'embodiment. Il secondo -The Oxford Handbook of the Self -raccoglie contributi provenienti dalla ricerca fenomenologica, ma anche da quella cognitiva e psicopatologica, indagando il sé da prospettive diverse, come quella dell'esistenza corporea, della formazione dell'identità personale, dell'indagine metafisica, della dimensione morale e delle patologie del sé. In questa sede si intende passare criticamente in rassegna questi volumi, discutendone l'impatto teorico sulla corrente ricerca fenomenologica e cognitiva. PAROLE CHIAVE: Identità; Memoria corporea; Intersoggettività; Individualità; Processi cerebrali. █ Abstract In recent years, phenomenology has increasingly engaged in dialogue with the cognitive sciences, the neurosciences, and psychopathology. In particular, the foci of this debate are: the structure of consciousness and conscious acts, the different forms of self-awareness, inquiry concerning the self and its disturbances, and intersubjectivity. Two recent volumes bear witness to this flourishing debate. The first one -Body Memory, Metaphor, and Movement -deals with the issue of embodied subjectivity and is particularly concerned with the phenomenon of implicit body memory with a collection of contributions from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, and embodied therapies. The second one -The Oxford Handbook of the Self -brings together contributions from phenomenological, cognitive, and psychopathological research and addresses the topic of the Self from the diverse standpoints expressed by these areas of studies. The issue of the Self is analyzed with regard to various perspectives such as bodily existence, the formation of personal identity, metaphysical inquiry, the moral dimension and pathologies of the self. The essay aims to provide a critical assessment of these volumes and to discuss their theoretical impact on current phenomenological and cognitive research.
The realiser-realiser identity theory of mind
2021
In order to see what is the realiser-realiser identity theory, it is worth comparing it to more familiar proposals on the metaphysics of mind. This is the topic of the present chapter. First, I will discuss the notion of realisation in order to clarify what the realiser-realiser identity theory holds. Second, I will compare my view with the classic identity theory proposed by U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart. Third, I will compare my view with functionalism and other views known as a priori physicalism. I will be paying specific attention to a different proposal on the identity theory given by David Lewis and David Armstrong also known as Type-A physicalism. Fourth, I will compare my view with another proposal on the identity theory given by Brian Loar, Christopher Hill, Katalin Balog, Ned Block and others, and more generally, with the views known as a posteriori physicalism, also known as Type-B physicalism. Fifth, I will compare my view with classic dualism. At the end of this Chapter, I will present the plan of the thesis.