Metaphor, History, Consciousness: From Locke to Dennett (original) (raw)

Consciousness Demystified: A Wittgensteinian Critique of Dennett’s Project

Professor Dennett has recently embarked on what he considers a "demystifying philosophical investigation" with respect to the phenomena of consciousness. In essence the strategy he has employed is one of getting us to 'trade in' our ordinary intuitions so as to soften us up for the first phases of a full-fledged 'scientific' explanation of consciousness in terms of sub-personal systems and their ontogenetic origins. His hope is that, once we are freed from certain misleading metaphors about the mind we will be receptive to such an 'explanation'. In concentrating on this first stage of his treatment of consciousness phenomena I offer a critique of Dennett's project from a Wittgensteinian perspective. For Wittgenstein was also concerned to 'demystify' consciousness but his approach differed remarkably from Dennett's. And this ironic because in challenging our 'everyday' intuitions about consciousness the latter essentially regards himself as working within a Wittgensteinian framework. For example, he tells us that "My debt to Wittgenstein is large and long-standing" and he confesses that "what I am doing [is] a kind of redoing of Wittgenstein's attack on the 'objects' of conscious experience". I challenge the idea that the 'reductive character' of Dennett's project is in any way Wittgensteinian in spirit. I suggest that at a crucial point in their philosophy their views diverge significantly. That is to say, although they are good travelling companions up to an important cross-roads, in the end, their incompatible concerns take them in different directions. Furthermore, by reviewing Dennett's project of 'explaining' consciousness, we might begin to see some good reasons for preferring Wittgenstein's 'road less travelled'. Thus, although Dennett's account of consciousness is often given a centre stage in what follows, my ultimate aim is to throw light on the nature Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology by using Dennett as a foil. This should help us to see precisely how the former's approach differs importantly from those advanced by many of today's philosophers and cognitive scientists.

Lost the Plot? Reconstructing Dennett's Multiple Drafts Theory of Consciousness

Mind & Language, 1996

Abstract: In Consciousness Explained, Daniel Dennett presents the Multiple Drafts Theory of consciousness, a very brief, largely empirical theory of brain function. From these premises, he draws a number of quite radical conclusions—for example, the conclusion that conscious events have no determinate time of occurrence. The problem, as many readers have pointed out, is that there is little discernible route from the empirical premises to the philosophical conclusions. In this article, I try to reconstruct Dennett's argument, providing both the philosophical views behind the empirical premises, and the hidden empirical arguments behind the derivation of the philosophical conclusions.

Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy #9 Dennett’s Drafters

The mind-body problem is one of the great mysteries. How are my feelings and thoughts related to the nerve cells of my brain? This question not only concerns scientists and philosophers, but everyone… for your consciousness seems very much bound up with who you are. In his book Consciousness Explained Daniel C. Dennett defends his grand theory of consciousness. It is an extraordinary book, in virtue alone of being read by both philosophers and the general audience. In this book Dennett presents us his Multiple Drafts model of consciousness. The Multiple Drafts model is an explanation of how our consciousness works. However, Dennett not only wishes to sketch the mechanisms of our consciousness, he also wants to show new ways of thinking about resolutions to the traditional mysteries of consciousness. This entails a critique on, according to Dennett, the mainstream view of the nature of consciousness; a view he calls Cartesian materialism. Cartesian materialism holds the assumption that there is some sort of 'stage' to which experiences present themselves to a 'mind's eye', an internal viewer. Dennett calls this 'stage' the Cartesian Theater. He vehemently rejects this notion of consciousness as a Theater, for he thinks that this notion is illusionary and does not give us a correct picture of consciousness.

Formulating Consciousness: A Comparative Analysis of Searle's and Dennett's Theory of Consciousness

Talisik: Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy, 2017

This research will argue about which theory of mind between Searle's and Dennett's can better explain human consciousness. Initially, distinctions between dualism and materialism will be discussed ranging from substance dualism, property dualism, physicalism, and functionalism. In this part, the main issue that is tackled in various theories of mind is revealed. It is the missing connection between input stimulus (neuronal reactions) and behavioral disposition: consciousness. Then, the discussion will be more specific on Searle's biological naturalism and Dennett's multiple drafts model as the two attempted to answer the issue. The differences between them will be highlighted and will be analyzed according to their relation to their roots: dualism and materialism. The two theories will be examined on how each answer the questions on consciousness. It will be revealed in this research that consciousness can have different brands. Dennett's as one brand, operational consciousness, and Searle's as another, sui generis consciousness. It shall be concluded that Searle's theory of mind outweighs Dennett's if we take the two theories to answer what human consciousness is. This is due to two reasons: (1) Sufficiency of Explanation, where Searle has more comprehensively explained what consciousness is and (2) Pragmatic Picture of Reality, where Searle's theory can fit more in the social reality.

Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences, 2007

Can phenomenology contribute to the burgeoning science of consciousness? Dennett’s reply would probably be that it very much depends upon the type of phenomenology in question. In my paper I discuss the relation between Dennett’s heterophenomenology and the type of classical philosophical phenomenology that one can find in Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty. I will in particular be looking at Dennett’s criticism of classical phenomenology. How vulnerable is it to Dennett’s criticism, and how much of a challenge does his own alternative constitute? I will argue that there are some rather marked differences between these two approaches to consciousness, but as I also hope to make clear, Dennett’s own account of where the differences are located is off target and ultimately based on a somewhat flawed conception of what classical phenomenology amounts to.

A Tradition Ignored: A Review Essay of John Symons' On Dennett

Brain and Mind, 2001

Although Symons’ recent book, On Dennett (Wadsworth, 2002), provides scientists with a helpful, general introduction to Dennett’s thought, it presents a skewed version of the history of the philosophy of mind. In particular, the continental tradition is almost entirely ignored, if not glibly dismissed. As a result, the unwary reader of this book would never realize that Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl, like Dennett, offer a “middle ground” between naturalistic realism and naturalistic eliminativism. However, unlike Dennett, the respective positions of Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl are not ontologically indifferent, but instead, present a non-naturalistic form of realism that does not simultaneously invoke Cartesian dualism.

A Tradition Ignored: Review Essay of John Symons' On Dennett

Brain and Mind, 2001

Although Symons' recent book, On Dennett(Wadsworth, 2002), provides scientists with ahelpful, general introduction to Dennett'sthought, it presents a skewed version of thehistory of the philosophy of mind. Inparticular, the continental tradition is almostentirely ignored, if not glibly dismissed. As aresult, the unwary reader of this book wouldnever realize that Dilthey, Sartre and Husserl,like Dennett, offer a ``middle ground'' betweennaturalistic realism

Awareness, Mental Phenomena, and Consciousness A Synthesis of Dennett and Rosenthal

Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1996

Both Dennett and his critics believe that the invalidity of the famed Stalinist-Orwellian distinction is a consequence of his multiple drafts model of consciousness.(MDM) This is not so obvious, however, once we recognize that the question "how do you get experience out of meat?" actually fragments into at least three different questions. (1) How do we get a unified sense of self (out of meat)? (2)How do we get awareness (out of meat)? (3) How do we get mental phenomena (out of meat)? Dennett shows how the MDM has a radical and profound way of interrelating awareness and self in the latter chapters of Consciousness Explained. But the Stalinist-Orwellian distinction can be dissolved by analyzing the nature of mental phenomena, without making any reference to awareness or self or the MDM . This is because The Stalinist-0rwellian distinction rests on much the same category mistake (confusing of parts with wholes) which Ryle pointed out in his Concept of Mind. Once we recognize that a theory of awareness is trying to do something different from a theory of mental phenomena, we can see why Dennett and his critics frequently talked past each other, and how we can resolve these controversies by incorporating something like Rosenthal’s theory of higher order thoughts into the MDM. (Something he has come very close to doing already in his discussions of the Hunt the Thimble phenomenon) This would require, however, that Dennett abandon his principle of first person operationalism, and recognize that it is possible for us to be mistaken about our own internal states.