Power and weakness (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Question of Power: Europe versus America
Constellations, 2003
Robert Kagan's new book, Paradise and Power, 1 which expands upon his celebrated and influential article for the Policy Review last year, begins with a striking claim: Europeans and Americans do not merely fail to share a common view of the world; they live in different worlds. They differ over "the all-important question of power," over its efficacy, morality, and desirability. Europe is moving beyond power into a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Immanuel Kant's "perpetual peace." Meanwhile, the United States remains mired in history, exercising power in an anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable, and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. And so, to quote the sound-bite that has sold Kaganism to the masses, "Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus" (3). The contrast is, he admits, based on caricatures-but he makes the implicit assumption that, like successful caricatures, these are simplifications that capture the essentials of the originals. So Americans, when confronting real or potential adversaries, "generally favor policies of coercion rather than persuasion, emphasizing punitive sanctions over inducements to better behavior, the stick over the carrot": they want problems solved, threats eliminated and "increasingly tend toward unilateralism in international affairs" (4). Conversely, Europeans put the emphasis on "negotiation, diplomacy, and commercial ties, on international law over the use of force, on seduction over coercion, on multilateralism over unilateralism" (55). These opposing perspectives are however, he maintains, only recently formed, for "the modern European strategic culture represents a conscious rejection of the European past, a rejection of the evils of European Machtpolitik" (55): When the European great powers were strong, they believed in strength and martial glory. Now they see the world through the eyes of weaker powers. These very different points of view have naturally produced differing strategic judgments, differing assessments of threats and of the proper means of addressing them, different calculations of interest, and different perspectives of the value and meaning of international law and international institutions. (11)
The Future of US Global Power, 2013
Evidence for US primacy used to be less contestable. Financial and strategic support from the US notwithstanding, Europe and Japan required decades to rebound from the devastation of World War II. Their later economic "challenge" eventually would succumb to the US revolution in information and communication technology (ICT), in the one case, and a protracted economic stagnation in the other. While sleeping giants India and China had self-selected out of global capitalism, US-headquartered transnational corporations roamed the world uncontested even as US manufacturing exports boomed. Systemic defects spelled, first, implosion, then dissolution, for the US's main strategic rival, the former Soviet Union. As long as a looming threat from Islamist extremism remained beneath the radar, the Western state-centered international system appeared unassailable. The US seemed to straddle this world like a colossus-militarily, economically, politically and culturally. Yet the world, and the US's position within it, looks rather different today compared to 1950, 1991 and 2001. Do recent shifts in the global system's tectonic plates augur secular decline for the world's preeminent power? The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. To help situate the perspective advanced in this book, the section "The popular literature on 'decline' " provides an overview of today's controversy over US decline. The section "Globalization and global power" discusses the relationship between global power and globalization, and its implications for the nature and scope of US power today. Against this analytical and historical backdrop, the section "Maintaining primacy in a turbulent era" introduces the basic contours of the argument advanced in the book. The section "Structure of the book" concludes with a brief overview of the remaining chapters. The popular literature on US "decline" National "decline" for a preeminent global power refers to a (composite) reduction in economic dynamism, military prowess, political-cumdiplomatic clout and cultural impact. 1 Influencing the argument in this 11
The end of the Cold War altered the structure of the international world order. The bipolar structure that shaped the international agenda for more then fifty years was changed by the fact that only one superpower survived ushering in a unipolar age in modern international relations history. The power and primacy of the US was beyond doubt and Fukuyama was more than confident to announce 'the end of history as such.' According to Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War announced the beginning of the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government, which was led by the US. 1 Furthermore, French foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine, describes the US as a hyperpower; a predominant country in all categories of power. 2 However, the end of 20 th and beginning of the 21 st century brought new challenges to international politics. New actors and new issues were shaping the international agenda and the unipolar world had been challenged by the global "nonpolar" reality.
Europe v. America: The Transatlantic Divide over International Security
Europe v. America: The Transatlantic Divide over International Security Paper delivered to the Conference on New Security Agendas in Europe, organized by the Menzies Centre, London, and the Department of War Studies, King's College London, June 2004 Remy Davison School of Government University of Tasmania In the 1950s, Karl Deutsch wrote of a transatlantic ‘security community’ More recently, Barry Buzan (1983) emphasized the profound structural implications for the international system of a ‘fully-developed’ European Union. In the post-Cold War era, both intra-European and transatlantic divisions have emerged over key issues in international security, such as fighting terrorism, and intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many players in the new Europe of the post-Cold War era find themselves at significant variance with many of the security doctrines with which traditionally. These include a North Atlantic alliance; the development of Europe as a ‘third force’ in international politics; and a commitment to a wider, deeper process of European integration which sought to implement not only a single European market, but also common foreign, security and defence policies. A multi-track Europe has emerged, comprising proponents of American power; opponents of US unilateralism; and uncommitted neutrals. The newly-expanded EU from 2004 will include east European members of NATO, many of which supported US intervention in Iraq, cohabiting with ‘old Europe’ opponents of the American ‘hyperpower’, such as France and Germany. Russia, together with Germany, has also demonstrated a new willingness to act in opposition to American foreign policy. As Jean Dufourcq of the EU Military Committee argues, the transatlantic divide is ‘no longer a debatable issue; it is a reality that has resulted from a variety of convergent circumstances.’ (Dufourcq, 2004). In a global imbalance of power, three European states - Russia, Germany and France (together with China) - have developed a distinct preference for multilateral initiatives, with a view to ‘diluting’ American power via the development of a multipolar global order. Conversely, a number of the major ‘Anglo-Saxon’ powers - the UK and Australia - have supported the US’s anti-terrorist initiatives and pre-emption doctrines strongly. As a consequence of these divisions, the chasm between European and American security policy has rarely been as deep as it is at present. Has this chasm developed as a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration’s policies, such as NMD/TMD, the ‘war on terror’ and the American-led intervention in Iraq? Asman (2003) argues that ‘One of the most striking consequences of the Bush administration's foreign policy tenure has been the collapse of the Atlantic alliance - the current rift has been unprecedented in its scope, intensity, and, at times, pettiness.’ How profound is this rift between the transatlantic allies? What is the likely impact this division will have upon the international security architecture? This paper argues that the division over security policy in Europe represents a profound shift in the dynamics of the international system, as some of the major powers seek to redress the imbalance of a unipolar system dominated by American military power. The paper conjectures that this renewed struggle over the balance of power has not been in evidence since the Cold War.
Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 2003
The end of the brief "hot" war in Iraq and the accompanying transatlantic diplomatic conflict set the stage for a new and challenging period of US-European relations. The United States, its European allies and the international community more generally face complex and multifaceted rebuilding challenges: Iraq needs to be rebuilt after the war which removed Saddam Hussein's tyrannical regime from power; the transatlantic rift must be repaired; the United Nations needs to be rebuilt, and with it the core of international law regulating the use of force. Finally, the bond of trust between Washington and the rest of the world needs to be rebuilt with a special focus on the kind of role that the United States is going to play in the international system. Tackling this daunting agenda is hardly possible without reinventing the transatlantic partnership. To this purpose both sides need to pay more attention to the various power gaps that are weakening their bonds. Based on the notion of hard and soft power we identify three power gaps that need to be addressed. The first and probably best know is the hard power gap, which has been at the fore of the transatlantic agenda since NATO's intervention in the Balkans in the mid-90s. Put most simply, the hard power gap is the result of diverging threat assessments and spending patterns on both sides of the Atlantic. Most recently, NATO has undertaken enormous efforts to address specific European shortcomings. The European Union (EU) has introduced new capability provision mechanisms to achieve its Helsinki Headline Goal and some European countries have begun to increase their defense budgets. Furthermore, EU leaders have agreed to establish an agency for defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments that will help improve procurement efficiency. 2 Although far from being accomplished, the good news about the hard power gap is that it has been identified as a shortcoming. The same can not yet been said about the remaining two power gaps. Second there is a soft power gap. Soft power, according to Joseph Nye, is a nation's (or group of nations) ability to influence events based on cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions. 3 The soft power gap is not the result of a lack of capabilities on
Journal on Baltic Security, 2016
In times when the public, political and academic discourses flourish with contributions that deliberate on whether it is 'all quiet on NATO's Eastern flank', Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell are among a handful that dare advance a straightforward argument on the 'unquiet frontier' with their 2016 book 'The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and the Crisis of American Power'. The authors – one a renowned academic, the other a think-tanker – have successfully managed to address the topic from both academic and policy-oriented perspectives. The book dismantles the current US strategy in relation to its allies – but also vis-à-vis growing revisionist powers – and advocates for both continued US presence abroad as well as the strengthening of ties with US allies worldwide.