Field study of charitable giving reveals that reciprocity decays over time (original) (raw)
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Time-Inconsistent Charitable Giving
2016
We motivate this paper by presenting a puzzle. When we asked one group of subjects to give $5 to charity today, about 30% agree. When we asked a similar group the same question, but indicate their gift will be transacted in one week rather than today, giving increases by 50%. This suggests a classic time-inconsistency in charitable giving. It is a puzzle because classic discounting and models of temptation cannot capture major patterns in the data, though clearly the difference must have something to do with delay, but what? We conduct two new experiments to resolve the puzzle. Our explanation relies on the rich dynamics of social image signaling of pro-social behavior.
Experiments in both the lab and the field have gone some distance to proving that people are reciprocal agents, returning one good deed with another, even when it is disproportionately costly to do so. This finding is increasingly being applied to improve relationships between government and citizens, and to facilitate the smoother running of public services. We investigate the extent to which interventions intended to induce reciprocity work in the longer term, by asking participants to donate a comparatively large sum of money (£515 on average), to charity, after receiving a small gift (a packet of sweets). We find that people given a small packet of sweets by a volunteer are significantly more likely to donate to charity than those given a flier, and those not greeted by a volunteer. We find that our initial results replicate successfully on participants who were not treated in the initial experiment. Our principal contribution, however is to show that these effects fall by more than half the second time a participant receives a gift, although it remains of net financial benefit for the charit
Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation
Proceedings of The Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 2002
Darwinian evolution can explain human cooperative behaviour among non-kin by either direct or indirect reciprocity. In the latter case one does not expect a return for an altruistic act from the recipient as with direct reciprocity, but from another member of the social group. However, the widespread human behaviour of donating to poor people outside the social group, for example, to charity organizations, that are unlikely to reciprocate indirectly and thus are equivalent to defectors in the game is still an evolutionary puzzle. Here we show experimentally that donations made in public to a well-known relief organization resulted both in increased income (that the donors received from the members of their group) and in enhanced political reputation (they were elected to represent the interests of their group). Donations may thus function as an honest signal for one's social reliability.
Does Competition Affect Giving? An Experimental Study
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2005
We explore whether natural human competitiveness can be exploited to stimulate charitable giving in a controlled laboratory experiment involving three different treatments of a sequential "dictator game." Without disclosing the actual amounts given and kept, in each period players are publicly ranked-by the amount they give away, by the amount they keep for themselves, or spuriously. Our results are generally supportive of the hypothesis that competitive urges can encourage or frustrate altruistic behavior, depending on the competitive frame. We find some support for an alternative hypothesis that relative concerns are due to information-gathering rather than competition. JEL classification numbers: C91, D64
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2014
When people are the victims of greed or recipients of generosity, their first impulse is often to pay back that behavior in kind. What happens when people cannot reciprocate, but instead have the chance to be cruel or kind to someone entirely different-to pay it forward? In 5 experiments, participants received greedy, equal, or generous divisions of money or labor from an anonymous person and then divided additional resources with a new anonymous person. While equal treatment was paid forward in kind, greed was paid forward more than generosity. This asymmetry was driven by negative affect, such that a positive affect intervention disrupted the tendency to pay greed forward. Implications for models of generalized reciprocity are discussed.
The Long-Term Benefits of Human Generosity in Indirect Reciprocity
Current Biology, 2002
high (group means range from 38% to 79%). As a consequence, the mean image score of the players increased from the first round on and reached a total average of West Mains Road 3.39 (SE ϭ 0.31) at the end of the game. Whether or not the personal account was displayed did not significantly Edinburgh EH9 3JT Scotland influence the players' decisions (nested ANOVA including group as a factor, effect of displaying account: United Kingdom F 1,102 ϭ 0.31, p ϭ 0.57). The receivers' image score had an influence on the donors' decisions: in all 12 groups, receivers who got Summary something had on average a higher image score than receivers who got nothing ( ; repeated mea-Among the theories that have been proposed to exsures ANOVA, effect of giving or not giving: F 1,99 ϭ 35.0, plain the evolution of altruism [1-7] are direct reciprocp Ͻ 0.0001; interaction with group: F 11,99 ϭ 1.9, p ϭ 0.04).
Substitution Among Charitable Contributions: An Experimental Study
2010
Abstract The question of whether charitable gifts are complements or substitutes, and the extent to which charities are rivals, is unresolved in the economic literature. The answer is relevant to charities and policymakers, as well as to economic models of altruism. Identifying this using observational data is difficult: there is a lack of independent price variation and few observable shocks that can be claimed to specifically affect giving to one charity.
Paying it forward: Generalized reciprocity and the limits of generosity
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General
When people are the victims of greed or recipients of generosity, their first impulse is often to pay back that behavior in kind. What happens when people cannot reciprocate, but instead have the chance to be cruel or kind to someone entirely different-to pay it forward? In five experiments, participants received greedy, equal, or generous divisions of money or labor from an anonymous person, and then divided additional resources with a new anonymous person. While equal treatment was paid forward in kind, greed was paid forward more than generosity. This asymmetry was driven by negative affect, such that a positive affect intervention disrupted the tendency to pay greed forward. Implications for models of generalized reciprocity are discussed.
Motives for Giving: A Reanalysis of Two Classic Public Goods Experiments
Southern Economic Journal, 2010
In laboratory public goods experiments, subjects make decisions about how much of a fixed endowment to contribute to the production of a public good in a sequence of periods. The nature of subjects' responses to information about others' decisions can help distinguish between alternative motives for giving, such as altruism, warm glow, reciprocity and inequality aversion. In this paper we reanalyze two published experimental studies of public goods and focus on the nature individuals' responses to others' behavior. We find economically and statistically significant dynamic interactions among subjects. The dynamic patterns indicate support for reciprocity and inequality aversion motives, but little for altruism and warm glow. We also conclude that individual-level analysis of existing public goods data can provide more insightful, informative estimates of treatment effects on behavior. Finally, we cast doubt on the notion that random rematching of subjects can induce statistical or strategic independence across decision periods.