Sceptical Detachment or Loving Submission to the Good? Reason, Faith, and the Passions in Descartes (original) (raw)
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Dismissing doubts about Descartes: Cartesian meditation for epistemological crises
Dialectic: Volume XV | Issue 3 | Autumn 2021, 2021
In his essay "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science," Alasdair MacIntyre defines an epistemological crisis as when a schema for understanding the world suddenly fails to adequately do so in irremediable ways. MacIntyre critiques the work of Rene Descartes in his Meditations on First Philosophy as a disastrous attempt at addressing an epistemological crisis, due to Descartes’s impossible self-assigned task of doubting all beliefs until he uncovers a contextless first principle. This essay will argue that MacIntyre misunderstood Descartes’s project in the Meditations and was not able to fully appreciate his proposed solution to the epistemological crisis he faced. Understanding the Meditations through the interpretative lens of Descartes’s theological perspective, his rejection of Aristotelian scholasticism and his commitment to the new sciences of his time, provides a richer account of his project that MacIntyre fails to capture.
Descartes and the suspension of judgment – Considerations of Cartesian skepticism and epoché
In this paper I will argue that Descartes in the First and Second Meditation of the Meditations uses a very clear suspension of judgement or assent that in many ways resembles the epoché of the ancient scepticism, especially that of Pyrrhonistic variant. First I show how the Pyrrhonistic epoché works and what purpose it was used for. After that I show how this Cartesian epoché both resembles and differs from the ancient epoché. My main argument is that Descartes, when using the method of doubt, doesn’t really dismiss or abandon earlier knowledge or beliefs, as he is sometimes been viewed, but more likely doesn’t take any stance on them, suspending his judgment on the existence of the external world. I base my argument on my reading of Meditations, the “as it were sensing” -interpretation of Descartes’s use of method of doubt by John Carriero and the discussion of ancient sceptical influence on Descartes by Janet Broughton. My own main contribution here is to complement Carriero’s and Broughton’s views, since Carriero doesn’t compare Descartes to the ancient skeptics and Broughton doesn’t discuss “as it were sensing”. By this I am able to get a better picture of what Descartes was trying to do.
Tampere University Dissertations, 2021
I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? I approach the topic from both a historical and a text-based analysis, combining textual and contextual research. I examine Descartes’s skepticism against two main traditions in the historical analysis: philosophical skepticism and Aristotelian Scholasticism. I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is intended to oppose and upheave both Scholasticism and skepticism. The intended results of the work are not merely epistemological but also metaphysical and even ethical. Furthermore, these ambitions cannot be neatly distinguished but merge into each other. The third historical context against which the skeptical meditations are examined is the literary genre of meditative exercises, particularly from the 1500–1600’s, which, while religiously and spiritually oriented, likewise provided the practitioner with an enlightened understanding of self-knowledge and their cognitive place in the world on the way to closer spiritual proximity to God. I argue by this reading that the skepticism of the Meditations is an attentive, meditational cognitive exercise that is not merely instrumental and methodological but is to have a genuine and serious (psychologically real) effect on our thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a theoretical thought experiment but is to be seriously practiced as a transformative process of reorienting one’s cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, tranquil, and virtuous life. I offer a close reading in the textual analysis of the first three meditations of the Meditations. I argue that the meditative skepticism employed in the work does not reject the previous beliefs but suspends judgment on them, withdrawing assent until further evidence can be found. I introduce a new term into Descartes scholarship in this analysis, based on the terminology of ancient skepticism: Cartesian epochē (gr. epochē, suspension, withdrawal). Instead of rejecting previous beliefs or assenting to the probably false, the skeptical procedure of the Meditations is argued to emulate in important ways the suspension of judgment on equally balanced reasons in ancient Pyrrhonian skepticism. Novel interpretations are presented along the way of the will’s freedom, of the First Meditation’s skeptical scenarios, of the cogito, and of the vindication of metaphysical certainty, as well as a clarification of the Cartesian Circle problem. Reinterpreting the relation of Descartes’s skepticism to the preceding historical and literary traditions leads to a new look at the skeptical method itself. Presenting a new interpretation of skepticism in the Meditations leads at the same time to a new look at its relation to the historical context. The two research questions are, then, intrinsically tied together. My focus in the study is on the Meditations, but I also reference and discuss Descartes’s other philosophical works, as well as his correspondence, when necessary.
THE HIGHLIGHTS OF DESCARTES' EPISTEMOLOGY (AN INTRODUCTION
Roczniki Filozoficzne / Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy, 2020
JOURNAL ARTICLE THE HIGHLIGHTS OF DESCARTES’ EPISTEMOLOGY (AN INTRODUCTION) PRZEMYSŁAW GUT and ARKADIUSZ GUT Roczniki Filozoficzne / Annales de Philosophie / Annals of Philosophy Vol. 68, No. 2, Descartes’ Epistemology Special Issue (2020)
AN APPRAISAL OF DESCARTES' MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY.
Descartes’ disillusionment of the kind of knowledge he received from his predecessors, the scriptures and the senses made him set out his ingenious gigantic inquiry into the basis of not just acquiring certain knowledge but purifying the epistemic discipline by reining it from undue empirical infiltration; a discipline he felt had become toxic because of the uncritical and unscathed incursion of the traditional but paralyzed over-reliance on the information received from the senses. He was obsessed with the problem of intellectual certainty. Thus, the onerous task of building an edifice of knowledge that would be fortified enough that there will be no room for truths and doubts enveloped and led him to further seek to incarcerate as incriminating, the sensible data which was guilty of deception. Buttressing his reason for this, he opines thus: “…whatever I have accepted until now as most true has come to me through my senses. But occasionally I have found that they have deceived me, and it is unwise (as prudence dictates) to trust completely those who have deceived us even once… The Meditations on First Philosophy, evinces this Cartesian non-effaceable thesis. Being one of the most engaging collections of arguments in the history of philosophy, it was a masterpiece of Rene Descartes. It resembles in many ways St Ignatius of Loyola’s Spiritual exercises. It contains the most definitive and eloquent statements of Descartes’ philosophy. Throughout the meditations, Descartes’ primary concern was the undaunted search for epistemic certitude, but nevertheless, in the final three meditations he moves from the epistemological problem of certainty to metaphysical questions about reality. Here Descartes demonstrates the existence of God and the distinction between the human soul (i.e. mind) and body. The Meditations take the form of a challenging philosophical game. At each turn he produces a belief about which he is certain; then he uses his creative imagination to see if there is any way to see if he could be mistaken. The Meditations on First Philosophy is a vivid representation of Descartes’ thoughts.
Science and Scepticism in Descartes (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research)
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1997
Recent work on Descartes has drastically revised the traditional conception of Descartes as a paradigmatic rationalist and foundationalist. The traditional picture, familar from histories of philosophy and introductory lectures, is of a solitary meditator dedicated to the pursuit of certainty in a unified science via a rigourous process of logical deduction from indubitable first principles. But the Descartes that has emerged from recent studies strikes a more subtle balance between metaphysics, physics, epistemology and the philosophy of science. There is much to be praised in this revaluation, but a dangerous amount of over-compensation has gone on, particularly in the reinterpretation of the role of sceptical doubt in Descartes' thought. This reinterpretion plays down the epistemological reasons for worrying about scepticism, suggesting that Cartesian physics is what ultimately drives the introduction of scepticism in the First Meditation.
Descartes' Rationalist Epistemology
A Companion to Rationalism
Doubtless Descartes belongs in the rationalist tradition. Stating why is not so easy. He nowhere characterizes the view we call "rationalism," nor does he describe himself as a rationalist. His express commitment to a doctrine of innateness is suggestive though not sufficient, for some philosophers (e.g., Kant) accept such a doctrine while rejecting rationalism. Further suggestive is that he links innateness with the achievement of knowledge: We come to know them [innate truths] by the power of our own native intelligence, without any sensory experience. All geometrical truths are of this sort-not just the most obvious ones, but all the others, however abstruse they may appear. Hence, according to Plato, Socrates asks a slave-boy about the elements of geometry and thereby makes the boy able to dig out certain truths from his own mind which he had not previously recognized were there, thus attempting to establish the doctrine of reminiscence. Our knowledge of God is of this sort. (CSMK 222-3; AT 8b: 166-7) Clarifying a precise account of rationalism is not the aim of this chapter. I shall instead assume that we're on the rationalist track and attempt to develop central rationalist themes that figure prominently in Descartes' epistemology. The themes I develop center on methodist concerns. Distinguish two sorts of epistemological questions for which one might identify characteristic responses, including rationalist responses: What-questions (e.g., What particular propositions can be known?) How-questions (e.g., How are such propositions known?) Exemplary what-questions concern whether we can know, for example, the nature of being itself, or know necessary truths, or the nature of identity, causality, and so on. Exemplary how-questions concern the nature of knowledge itself, including how it differs from opinion, the origin of our ideas, the reliability of our ideas as a basis for judgment, and so on. Opinions vary about the proper direction of inquiry-about which sort of question should take precedence over the other in the process of discovery. Two broad camps have emerged. (Note that these camps do not map onto the rationalism-empiricism distinction.) According to the particularist camp, answers to A Companion to Rationalism Edited by Alan Nelson Copyright © 2005 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd lex newman 180 what-questions take precedence. Proper inquiry begins by identifying exemplary cases of particular propositions that we know. What counts as exemplary? According to G. E. Moore, "Here is a hand" is exemplary (while holding up your hand and looking at it). These exemplary cases are then used to help sort out better and worse answers to how-questions-the better answers will have it that the exemplary cases count as knowledge. The methodist camp reverses the order of inquiry. How-questions take precedence. Accordingly, we can only correctly identify a knowledge claim as exemplary if we have already sorted out answers to how-questions. A proper such sorting might indeed reveal that Moore's celebrated knowledge claim is not well founded. Descartes is a methodist par excellence. His methodist orientation is perhaps best explained in historical context. The early seventeenth century is entrenched in dogma. Centuries of Aristotelianism having prevailed, the philosophical world is captivated by ancient authorities and longstanding traditions. If the new mechanist philosophy is to supplant Aristotelianism, a strategy is needed to effectively call into question venerated authorities and traditions, but-importantly-without directly impugning their credibility. In a stroke of genius, Descartes devises a broader methodist strategy to accomplish this. As part of the strategy, we're to carry out a once-in-a-lifetime epistemological audit-a thorough examination of the books, as it were, scrutinizing our beliefs and their basis. The opening lines of the Meditations present a simple and compelling rationale for the audit: Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences [scientiis] that was stable and likely to last.