Enforcing cooperation in public goods games: Is one punisher enough? (original) (raw)
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Research Square (Research Square), 2023
From the harmonies that govern the behavior of an ant colony to the synchronized flight of a fleet of birds, nature eloquently demonstrates the transformative power of cooperation. It is not merely an idea but a tangible force that drives the pulse of life guides survival, and orchestrates the mighty symphony of evolution. Cooperation is, therefore, not a choice but a requirement-a fundamental tenet of our existence-underpinning the evolution of societies and the prevailing of nature over vast odds. Far from mere instruments of coercion, control, and punishment mechanisms are crucial safeguards in our society, nurturing cooperation and upholding justice. They discourage individuals from exploiting social frameworks and sustaining cooperation norms. In the context of a surveillance strategy designed to foster cooperation, a panoptical approach refers to a system in which control is always possible. This method creates a state of constant and deliberate visibility, which ensures that power operates automatically. It minimizes the punishment costs by making the ubiquitous impression of being watched and held accountable, encouraging cooperative conduct. In a previous paper, we presented a punishment mechanism under panoptic surveillance in which the number of penalized individuals is reduced to an adjustable fraction of the population of free riders from which the sanctioned are randomly selected. The findings imply that by adjusting "how many" free riders are punished, potential sanctions alone can increase population-wide cooperation. This article builds on that strategy by examining the influence of "how many" free riders are punished and analyzes the impact of "how much" the punitive sanction is severe on encouraging cooperation. We employ a compulsory public goods game model with replicator dynamics to investigate this issue. The findings suggest that long-term sustainable cooperation can be achieved by fine-tuning the compromise between retaliation severity and punishment certainty (the number of sanctioned wrongdoers), i.e., the delicate nuance of mercy and justice.
Overpunishing is not necessary to fix cooperation in voluntary public goods games
Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2013
Altruistic punishment and voluntary participation allow the fixation of cooperation in public goods games. c This was shown in the absence of antisocial punishment and with sanctions proportional to the number of punishers. c The original model is modified by introducing a milder punishing mechanism based on a fix sanction. c The two models are dynamically equivalent, so overpunishment is not necessary to solve the social dilemma. c The emergence of altruistic punishment and the ultimate fixation of cooperation is also clarified.
2014
Theoretical and experimental research underscores the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation between humans. Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and that withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation is explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a novel public good experiment with punishment and from 16 public goods experiments from countries around the world, we report results showing that revenge alone does not drive antisocial punishment of cooperators, and that such punishment is predominantly part of an upward and downward punishment strategy, presumably aimed at punishing those who deviate from the punisher's aspired cooperation norm. More interestingly, we show that the effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation is mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, more than free riders being deterred. We also show that the anticipation of being punished is more effective in enhancing cooperation than the actual punishment itself, and that the ratio of strong reciprocators in a given social group is a potent predictor of the group's level of cooperation and success in providing public goods.
Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theoretical solutions have been proposed and experimentally explored, including reputation monitoring and diffuse punishment. Here, we empirically examine an alternative theoretical proposal: responsibility for punishment can be borne by one specific individual. This experiment shows that allowing a single individual to punish increases cooperation to the same level as allowing each group member to punish and results in greater group profits. These results suggest a potential key function of leadership in human groups and provides further evidence supporting that humans will readily and knowingly behave altruistically.
Why People Punish in Public Goods Games
Theoretical and experimental research underscores the role of punishment in the evolution of cooperation between humans. Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and that withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation is explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a novel public good experiment with punishment and from 16 public goods experiments from countries around the world, we report results showing that revenge alone does not drive antisocial punishment of cooperators, and that such punishment is predominantly part of an upward and downward punishment strategy, presumably aimed at punishing those who deviate from the punisher's aspired cooperation norm. More interestingly, we show that the effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation is mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, more than free riders being deterred. We also show that the anticipation of being punished is more effective in enhancing cooperation than the actual punishment itself, and that the ratio of strong reciprocators in a given social group is a potent predictor of the group's level of cooperation and success in providing public goods.
Punishment Without Crime: A Tale of Cooperation and Competition in Public Goods Games
2013
Punishment is known to be one of the major factor of cooperation in the public goods (PG) games. However, the exact nature and reasons why people punish each other to a large extent remains unexplored. In this work we study the punishment strategies in a systematic way, disentangling several possible explanations for punishing behaviour, including competitive, emotional and preemptive motives, alongside with availability and tolerance towards punishment. We set and ran a series of experiments in different regions of Russia, which establishes that actual disapproval of others’ contirbutions is the determinant of punishment in a minority of cases. Using a structural statistical model, we offer a classification of behavioural strategies of the punishers for our sample, as well as in cross-regional perspective. This analysis establishes that, besides ethical considerations, willingness to outperform other players in the group, and precautionary punishment in anticipation of the punishme...
Comparing Consequences of Carrots and Sticks on Cooperation in Repeated Public Good Games
papers.ssrn.com
Many sociologists and economists have maintained that costly sanctions indeed are able to create and sustain cooperation, but under which conditions carrots or sticks are more successful in this respect still an unsettled issue. Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (2009) recently clarify that the multiplication effect related to sticks is a plausible theoretical explanation for the superiority of sticks. However, there are also more behavioral arguments from which one could maintain that carrots might work better than sticks, for example, because they do not undermine the cohesion of the group as sticks might do. This experimental study investigates whether in a simple experimental setting sticks and carrots differ in their effectiveness in maintaining cooperation. Our results show that while carrots do increase cooperation, sticks turn out to be more effective in our experiment. In addition, we do not find that the group cohesion becomes stronger in the condition with carrots although giving rewards produces positive feelings towards the group.
Endogenous choice of institutional punishment mechanisms to promote social cooperation
forthcoming in Public Choice, 2021
Does the desirability of social institutions for public goods provision depend on the extent to which they include mechanisms for endogenous enforcement of cooperative behavior? We consider alternative institutions that vary the use of direct punishments to promote social cooperation. In one institution, subjects participate in a public goods experiment in which an initial stage of voluntary contribution is followed by a second stage of voluntary, costly sanctioning. Another institution consists of the voluntary contribution stage only, with no subsequent opportunity to sanction. In a third stage subjects vote for which institution they prefer for future interactions: do they prefer one that does allow sanctions or one that does not allow sanctions? Our results show that even though sanctions are frequently used when available, the clear majority of individuals vote for the institution that does not allow sanctions. Thus, a distinction is required between the principles that guide the choice of institutions and the principles that apply to actions guided by institutions. Our results indicate that it is the wealth generated by the institution that determines its desirability.
An individualistic approach to institution formation in public good games
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2016
In a repeated public goods setting, we explore whether individuals, acting unilaterally, will provide an effective sanctioning institution. Subjects first choose independently whether they will participate in a sanctioning stage that follows a contribution stage. Only those who gave themselves the "right" to sanction can do so. We find that the effectiveness of the institution may not require provision of the institution at the level of the group. Individuals acting unilaterally are able to provide sanctioning institutions that effectively raise cooperation. The effectiveness of the institution, however, depends on whether the "right" to sanction entails a monetary cost or not.
The Seeds of Success: The Pivotal Role of First Round Cooperation in Public Goods Games
Journal of the Economic Science Association, 2024
This paper examines cooperation and punishment in a public goods game in Istanbul. Unlike prior within-subject designs, we use a between-subject design with separate no-punishment and punishment conditions. This approach reveals that punishment significantly increases contributions, demonstrating the detrimental effect of having prior experience without sanctions. We highlight two critical factors-heterogeneous initial contributions across groups and how subjects update their contributions based on prior contributions and received punishment. An agent-based model verifies that the interaction between these two factors leads to a strong persistence of contributions over time. Analysis of related data from comparable cities shows similar patterns, suggesting our findings likely generalize if using a between-subject design. We conclude that overlooking within-group heterogeneity biases cross-society comparisons and subsequent policy implications.