Spatial SINR Games of Base Station Placement and Mobile Association (original) (raw)

Spatial SINR games combining base station placement and mobile association

2009

Abstract We study in this paper the question of determining locations of base stations (BSs) that may belong to the same or to competing service providers, taking into account the impact of these decisions on the behavior of intelligent mobile terminals who can connect to the base station that offers the best utility. We first study the SINR association-game: we determine the cells corresponding to each base stations, ie the locations at which mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station than to other.

Spatial Games for the downlink case combining base station placement and mobile association

We study the mobile association game: we determine the cells corresponding to each base station, ie, the locations at which intelligent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station rather than to others. This paper proposes a new approach based on optimal transport theory to characterize the solution based on previous works on dense networks. We study the global optimal solution for the downlink case problem combining base station placement and mobile association. We then compare the solutions between ...

Spatial games combining base station placement and mobile association: the downlink case

We study the mobile association problem: we determine the cells corresponding to each base station, i.e, the locations at which intelligent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station rather than to others. This paper proposes a new approach based on optimal transport theory to characterize the solution based on previous works on fluid approximations. We are able to characterize the global optimal solution, as well as the user optimal solution, for the downlink case problem.

Uplink spatial games on cellular networks

2010

Abstract We consider the uplink mobile association game with a large number of mobile terminals. Traditional techniques consider the discrete modelization but these models lead to high combinatorial complexities. Thanks to optimal transport theory we are able to characterize the cell formation as well as the equilibrium properties of the network where intelligent mobile terminals decide by themselves to which base station upload their information.

Base Station Association Game in Multi-cell Wireless Networks

We consider a multi-cell wireless network with a large number of users. Each user selfishly chooses the Base Station (BS) that gives it the best throughput (utility), and each BS allocates its resource by some simple scheduling policy. First we consider two cases: (1) BS allocates the same time to its users; (2) BS allocates the same throughput to its users. It turns out that, combined with users' selfish behavior, case (1) results in a single Nash Equilibrium (NE), which achieves system-wide Proportional Fairness. On the other hand, case (2) results in many possible Nash Equilibria, some of which are very inefficient. Next, we extend (1) to the case where the users have general concave utility functions. It is shown that the if each BS performs intracell optimization, the total utility of all users is maximized at NE. This suggests that under our model, the task of joining the "correct" BS can be left to individual users, leading to a distributed solution.

Spatial games and global optimization for the mobile association problem: the downlink case

2010

Abstract We study the mobile association problem: we determine the cells corresponding to each base station, ie, the locations at which intelligent mobile terminals prefer to connect to a given base station rather than to others. This paper proposes a new approach based on optimal transport theory to characterize the solution based on previous works on fluid approximations. We characterize the optimal solution from both the global network and the individual user points of view, for the downlink setting.

Base Station Association Game in Multi-Cell Wireless Networks (Special Paper

2008

We consider a multi-cell wireless network with a large number of users. Each user selfishly chooses the Base Station (BS) that gives it the best throughput (utility), and each BS allocates its resource by some simple scheduling policy. First we consider two cases: (1) BS allocates the same time to its users; (2) BS allocates the same throughput to its users. It turns out that, combined with users' selfish behavior, case (1) results in a single Nash Equilibrium (NE), which achieves system-wide Proportional Fairness. On the other hand, case (2) results in many possible Nash Equilibria, some of which are very inefficient. Next, we extend (1) to the case where the users have general concave utility functions. It is shown that the if each BS performs intracell optimization, the total utility of all users is maximized at NE. This suggests that under our model, the task of joining the "correct" BS can be left to individual users, leading to a distributed solution.

Non-cooperative association of mobiles to access points revisited

2012

Abstract We consider in this paper games related to the association problem of mobiles to an access point. It consists of deciding to which access point to connect. We consider the choice between two access points or more, where the access decisions may depend on the number of mobiles connected to each one of the access points. We obtain new results using elementary tools in congestion and crowding games.

Modeling Competition Among Wireless Service

2009

We consider a scenario where a population of customers is spatially distributed in a region which is served by two wireless service providers that offer Internet Access via two noninterfering technologies: one having a uniform coverage over the region (e.g. WAN), and the other, a limited coverage (e.g. WiFi “hotspots”). We assume that customers are equipped with “dual mode ” wireless communication devices that have the capability to select which among the available providers to use. We introduce a stochastic geometric model for the locations of customers and providers ’ access points and a utility-based mechanism modeling how devices select among providers. In particular, we assume that each device makes greedy decisions at random times, i.e., selects the available provider offering the highest utility at that time. We demonstrate that this process may have multiple equilibria, and prove that the system will almost surely evolve to one of the equilibrium configurations, starting fro...

A Novel Base Stations-Mobile Stations Association Policy for Cellular Networks

2014 IEEE 80th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2014-Fall), 2014

We propose a novel base stations (BSs)-mobile stations (MSs) association policy for cellular networks. In this policy, the BS which provides the highest signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) among those located within a predetermined maximum association distance of the MS is selected as the serving BS. This policy encompasses the conventional highest-SIR association as a special case. Application of the new policy in 2-and 3dimensional single-tier (homogeneous) and 2-dimensional twotier (heterogeneous) networks is discussed. Coverage probability expressions are derived assuming BSs in each tier are distributed according to an independent homogeneous Poisson point process (PPP). Rayleigh fading and exponential path-loss radio channels are assumed. Analysis is validated by Monte-Carlo simulations. For single-tier networks, two methods are proposed for the selection of the maximum association distance. With such selection, the proposed association policy performs similarly to the highest-SIR association. It is shown that this policy can also be used to manage user offloading to small cells in two-tier heterogeneous networks.