EU–UK institutional arrangements and Brexit: a view from Switzerland (original) (raw)
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Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 2016
Defining an alternative arrangement for the UK's future relationship with the European Union following ‘Brexit’ will raise both substantive and institutional issues. In the public debate, the latter tend to be underestimated. The present article is based on the thesis that, should the UK seek a market access agreement based on EU law rules, it will face strict institutional demands from the Union that go far beyond the element, often mentioned in the ‘Brexit’ debate in the context of EEA membership, of having to accept EU-made law as it comes. The thesis is derived from experience with the EU's legal arrangements with other partners, notably the EFTA States as well the current negotiations with Andorra, Monaco and San Marino.
Brexit: What can the United Kingdom learn from Swiss-European Union Relations?
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The article highlights some of the specificities of Swiss-EU relations, the costs for Switzerland if it were to lose access to the EU Single Market and some first related implications for the UK. To begin with, the EU is a very important economic partner for both Switzerland and the UK. The challenge for the UK will clearly be to obtain free trade with selective integration in specific areas such as financial services, the automobile industry, airlines landing rights and nuclear energy. Emphasis is put on the EU position regarding a strong institutional framework, a homogeneous market and the free movement of persons. The analysis highlights the difficulty to partially join the Single Market without systematically taking over EU new legal provisions and accepting EU Court of Justice interpretations of EU pertinent law. Based on the Swiss experience, the article points to some red lines, which ought to be of interest for the UK.
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Relations between Switzerland and the European Union (EU) are at a turning point. Seven year long negotiations to institutionalize the country’s unique model of “integration without membership” through an institutional framework agreement (IFA) failed in May 2021, when the Swiss government unilaterally decided to pull out of these negotiations. Although the government has emphasized its desire to maintain the status quo and continue its bilateral approach in engaging with the EU, it is far from certain that the EU will accommodate Swiss preferences. Rather, the EU has emphasized that it will no longer update any existing and not conclude any bilateral agreements with Switzerland until an institutional agreement is signed. The EU’s decision not to update regulations for Swiss medtech products and to relegate Switzerland to third-country status in Horizon Europe suggests that the risk of an erosion of the bilateral treaties is real and that the path ahead in Swiss-EU relations will be...
The end of chocolate box-style integration? EU-Swiss relations after the referendum
This is not the first time that Switzerland decided to do a bit of cherry picking. In fact, it started to dismantle the existing framework on the movement of persons two years ago when it reintroduced quotas for EU citizens from Central and Eastern Europe. At that time, the EU registered a mild protest. Now that the results of the referendum held on February 9th may also affect the West European nationals, the European Union will not, most likely, shy away from doing what it should have done a while ago. And that is to ask the Swiss authorities a simple question: Are you with us or not? All seven agreements falling under the Bilateral I package, which was signed in 1999, are bound by a so-called ‘guillotine clause’. They must enter into force altogether or not at all. If one of them is terminated, the others will end up in the law history books too. Back in late 1990s, it was a smart move to include such a clause as it stopped Switzerland and its voters from choosing truffles over the less- popular chocolates from the same box. But in 2014, this arrangement may be more problematic than it appears to be at the first sight. This Commentary argues that the time has come for a serious and comprehensive discussion about the future of EU-Swiss relations.
Exploring the ‘Pros’ and ‘Cons’ of Swiss and Norwegian Models of Relations with the European Union
Cooperation and Conflict, 2006
A theoretical appraisal of the Swiss and Norwegian models of relations with the European Union (EU), as well as an empirical assessment of experience accumulated, shows that the European Economic Area (EEA) model is quite constraining. Both models have semi-colonial features. In the EEA model, the non-EU member has a little more influence on decision-making but is less independent of the EU than with the Swiss approach. The latter is time-consuming and is subject to much give and take. In the long run, however, countries expected to benefit from the new European Neighbourhood Policy, such as Israel, might find that an EEA approach is not acceptable if it does not offer membership as a long-term possibility, because it is undemocratic. Finally, in the eventuality of a trade war between the United States and the EU, a scenario of high relevance for Israel, the Swiss model would give it more freedom of manoeuvre than the EEA model. Israel would not be part of the EU trading bloc in the eyes of the United States. This is much less clear in the event of EEA membership. On the other hand, an in-depth examination of the Swiss model shows that the 'à la carte' approach does not allow for any degree of depoliticization in relations with the EU, as Israel was hoping for.
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The institutions of the EU underlie permanent influences from various sides. The resignation of the UK marks definitely a major impact on European Integration development. Analysing the transformations of power of the different EU institutions draws a picture surprisingly indicating an increase of significance of the supranational institutions. The EP used its power to consent or refuse to influence t he negotiation preferences. The EC officially lead the negotiations and could contribute with in-depth knowledge but communicated with so-far unknown transparency and inclusiveness. As there were no major differences in the single countries' interests except the Irish special interest, the Council's influences on the negotiations were limited. The Brexit negotiations were primarily shaped by the supranational institutions what can mark a turning point in the institutional imbalances through the domination of the New Intergovernmentalism.