The Impact of the Judiciary on Economic Activity (original) (raw)

2007, Cahiers De Recherche

This paper examines the consequences of slow judiciaries on firms' contracting behaviour in India. After deriving testable implications from a game theoretical model, I examine how case pendency rates in India's state courts affect the contracting behaviour of 170,000 small non-agricultural informal firms from the 2000 National Sample Survey's 55 th round. I find that a slow judiciary implies more breaches of contract, discourages firms from undertaking relationship-specific investments, impedes firms' access to formal financial institutions, and favours inefficient dynasties. Moving a firm from the highest to the lowest pendency state would result in a 10% improvement in firm performance.

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