The FTAA as a Three-level Bargaining Game (original) (raw)
Related papers
Negotiating the Free Trade Area of the Americas
2011
The book brings the first detailed historical account of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations. It examines the US and Brazilian foreign policy making in a historical perspective, and highlights how ideas and beliefs, instead of material facts only, impacted on the demise of the negotiations. http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/view/10.1057/9780230119055
US-Regional Agreements with Latin America - The Long and Unsuccessful Saga of CAFTA and the FTAA
2011
As the trade negotiations within the FTAA region become more complicated with many more options for both the United States and its Latin American partners, it becomes more difficult to determine the prime motivation for any of the partners. Some have argued that the US negotiating process can be best described as having multiple tracks. The first and primary track is a commitment to a reduction in average tariffs. The second track consists in sector or issue specific agreements which can not be easily concluded in a regional tariff reduction exercise. In order to simplify and manage the theoretical construct for this complicated bargaining process, this paper develops a sequential bargaining game framework and applies it to US-Latin American trade negotiations. Within this process, the US representing the offering party has multiple recipients. Not all recipients will simultaneously accept a sector or issue specific agreement. Consequently, the search for partners which may appear as a random walk is in reality a sequential probe for an agreeable partner starting with the WTO shifting to a regional FTAA then digressing to a sub-regional CAFTA and finally to a group of bilateral agreements. While a multilateral agreement within the confines of the WTO may appear to be the best solution, at first blush, a Hemisphere wide FTA may turn out to be the first best outcome, especially given the activities of the Europeans in the WTO. The Saga of CAFTA and the FTAA I. The first "Summit of the Americas" held in Miami in 1994, is considered to be the official initiation of the thirty-four Western Hemisphere 1 country negotiations designed to establish a Free Trade of the America's (FTAA). 2 Since 1994, there have been five summits 3 and eight trade ministerial meetings. 4 The first draft of the FTAA was adopted at the Quebec 1 The countries involved in the negotiations include: Antigua and Barbuda,
latn.org.ar
This paper explores the underpinnings of the U.S. bilateral trade strategy toward Latin America since the launching of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Whereas structural explanations and the projected gains from trade and investment largely explain the impetus for NAFTA, we argue that an understanding of the motives for the negotiation of subsequent free trade agreements (FTAs) launched under the Bush administration's 'competitive liberalization' strategy with Chile, Central America, and Peru demands further thought. Characterized by large asymmetries between the U.S. and its bilateral partners in Latin America, these latter agreements mainly enabled U.S. policymakers to engage in bottom-up rule-making around difficult regulatory issues pertaining to the 'new' trade agenda---services, investment, and intellectual property. While perhaps worthwhile in their own right, we argue that the related gains in the 2000s pale next to previous U.S. accomplishments achieved a decade earlier at the regional and multilateral levels.
Debating Trade: The Legislative Politics of Free Trade Agreements in Latin America
Government and Opposition, 2019
Stereotypes of Latin American legislatures as either rubber stamps or obstructionist obscure important cross-national differences. This article argues that the ability and willingness of legislatures to serve as counterweights to presidents is a function of their capabilities, electoral rules, and the president's powers. These arguments are assessed by comparing the legislative debates of free-trade agreements with the United States and accompanying legislation in Chile, Costa Rica and Peru. The cases reveal that legislatures with strong capabilities behave proactively, proposing their own policies challenging the executive's. If they challenge the president, Congresses with weaker capabilities do so primarily through obstruction. Further, electoral rules shape the way legislators go about challenging the executive. Whereas legislators elected under personal-vote systems take their cues from constituents, those elected under party-vote systems follow the party line. Worryingly, however, even a capable and motivated legislature may be sidelines by a powerful executive.
2001
The Issue: The Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is in the process of being created. Using existing free trade regimes and their dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) as examples, it is clear that such regimes often overlook non-trade related considerations, such as the environment. This trend will likely continue under the FTAA unless its DRM differs significantly from those of existing trade regimes. Research questions: 1. How do the current trade DRMs of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the World Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) function? 2. What weaknesses in the processes of these existing DRMs prevent "good" decisions from being reached? 3. How can these processes be improved upon to provide DRMs for the FTAA that will result in "good" decisions? Methodology: A literature review was conducted to broaden our understanding of how the DRMs of WTO/GATT, NAFTA, and the future FTAA function, and to reveal weaknesses in these mechanisms. A list of potential recommendations for the DRM of the FTAA was drafted and brought before individuals from diverse areas of interest and expertise in interviews to gauge their responses and include additional recommendations. The pros and cons of each recommendation, as revealed through the literature and interviews, were considered in determining their desirability.
The Collapse of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in Cancún
Novus Orbis Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2019
The Doha Round or the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), which was officially launched in 2001, is the very first trade round of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Since developed and developing countries have different priorities and interests, the Doha Round has witnessed a series of deadlocks over ten years until the Bali Ministerial Conference in 2013. The first deadlock occurred at the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003. The primary points of dispute between developed and developing countries were agriculture and the so-called Singapore issues. This study investigates the Cancún Ministerial Conference as it is a remarkable example of how participant countries strive to secure their interests even at the expense of the collapse of the multilateral trade negotiations. In that regard, this study aims to examine the opposing negotiation behaviour has witnessed and determine how their insistence on different proposals lead to the failure of trade negotiations in Cancún. The primary argument of this study is that developing countries’ common stance and the creation of so-called G-20under the leadership of Brazil, along with India and China, prove the triumph of these countries as they succeeded to block any agreement that disrupts their interests at the Cancún Ministerial Conference. Although the Cancún failure damages the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations, developing countries appreciate their coherent coalition strategies, which trigger the shift in the balance of power within the WTO in their favour. Keywords: Trade Negotiations, the WTO, the Doha Round, Developing Countries, G-20