Assessing Donor-driven Reforms in the Palestinian Authority: Building the State or Sustaining Status Quo? (original) (raw)
Related papers
Creating 'Partners for Peace': The Palestinian Authority and the International Statebuilding Agenda
The Palestinian Authority (PA) offers an interesting case study of statebuilding in a conflict-country context. Created as an interim administration in the West Bank and Gaza in 1994, the PA has been hampered by the statebuilding framework enshrined in the Oslo Accords, its lack of sovereignty, the lack of final status negotiations, and the 'partners for peace' paradigm which is an attempt by donors and international organisations to support who they regard as the 'right' type of elite*that is, those willing to 'make peace' with Israel (as defined by Israel). This article explores the impacts of this paradigm and argues that it has paralysed the formal political process in Palestine and has securitised democracy.
State formation in Palestine: viability and governance during a social transformation
2004
The crisis-ridden progress in Palestinian state formation since the signing of the Oslo Agreements raises important questions about reform priorities and the future prospects of constructing a viable Palestinian state. Were the obstacles to progress primarily due to poor governance and poor leadership on the Palestinian side, how far have corruption and the weakness of democracy in the Palestinian Authority been responsible, and what were the effects of the economic and political relationships between Israel and the emerging Palestinian state? This book examines these key questions, and challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to democracy, and its failure to control corruption. It argues that the analytical framework of "good governance" is not appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and that it is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. Instead, an alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a context of economic and social transformation. This is then applied in detail to different aspects of state formation in Palestine to show that while there were indeed internal failures of governance, the institutional architecture set up by the Oslo agreements established an asymmetric Israeli control over the emerging Palestinian state and this was responsible for many of the most serious failures of governance. This architecture is based on Israel's insistence on security first, and since this is not likely to change soon, the analysis has important implications for the prospects of Palestinian state formation. First published 2004 RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon
State formation and international aid: The emergence of the Palestinian authority
1997
Thirty years ago, Samuel Huntington criticized Western aid policy toward new states that assumed that economic improvement in the standard of living coupled with democratic institutions would yield a more stable and democratic state-building process. An extensive political economic literature on the developmental state has since emerged that explores the complex relationship between state capacity, economic development and democracy, much of it critical of both the economist assumption, and the importance of democracy in achieving sustainable growth, at least in the initial stages of statehood. This literature, however, does not specifically relate to the impact of international aid affects state consolidation despite its critical role in the initial stages of new states. The paper explores how international aid affects on new state formation in the 1990s as reflected by the Palestinian experience, and more specifically whether Huntington's criticism is valid today regarding the international aid regime toward the Palestinian Authority established in May 1994. It shows that international aid was initially based on economist assumptions, changed course to reflect the importance of the state, and now must seek a better balance between the centralization of power, developing state capacity, and promoting civil society.
2004
The crisis-ridden progress in Palestinian state formation since the signing of the Oslo Agreements raises important questions about reform priorities and the future prospects of constructing a viable Palestinian state. Were the obstacles to progress primarily due to poor governance and poor leadership on the Palestinian side, how far have corruption and the weakness of democracy in the Palestinian Authority been responsible, and what were the effects of the economic and political relationships between Israel and the emerging Palestinian state? This book examines these key questions, and challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to democracy, and its failure to control corruption. It argues that the analytical framework of "good governance" is not appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and that it is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. Instead, an alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a context of economic and social transformation. This is then applied in detail to different aspects of state formation in Palestine to show that while there were indeed internal failures of governance, the institutional architecture set up by the Oslo agreements established an asymmetric Israeli control over the emerging Palestinian state and this was responsible for many of the most serious failures of governance. This architecture is based on Israel's insistence on security first, and since this is not likely to change soon, the analysis has important implications for the prospects of Palestinian state formation. First published 2004 RoutledgeCurzon 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by RoutledgeCurzon
The Palestinian Authority: A State Failure
While failing and weak states are not new to the Middle East, the problem assumed a new dimension with the outbreak of the Arab Spring. During the years of the Oslo process, extensive efforts and resources were invested in promoting the political process so as to encourage the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. However, too little effort was put into ensuring the foundation for the establishment of a functional Palestinian state in the post-peace agreement period. Now, at this point, the Palestinian case requires an unflinching, honest look at 22 years of a political process in which the Palestinians failed to build a functioning state entity. The two semi-state Palestinian entities in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are experiencing a dangerous process of state failure, and the international community is helpless in stopping it. It seems that without an organized, persistent, painstaking, and responsible state building process in which Israel plays an important part, there is no real hope for the development of these entities into functioning states, whether each on its own or together as one Palestinian state.
Overseas Development Institute, 2015
This evaluative review attempts to answer three main questions: To what extent have the Statebuilding and Service Delivery Grant (SSDG) and the Palestinian Governance Facility (PGF) achieved their objectives, including in relation to value for money? Do the programmes illustrate coherence: internally, between each other and with other interventions? How appropriate are the programmes to Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) policy, the Palestinian Authority’s needs and in relation to addressing fiduciary risk? The evaluative review has used a modified and combined results framework for both programmes in order to answer these questions and assess achievements across the results chain.
The Palestinian Authority: the dangerous transition from failing entity to failing state*
Israel Affairs, 2017
Despite the vast resources poured by the international community into the construction of Palestinian institutions, the PA has failed to build and maintain the infrastructures required for the establishment of a vital, democratic and functioning state. By most common parameters, the PA is a failed entity. Taking into account this experience and the consequences of the last six years of Arab upheavals, characterized by the increasing phenomenon of failed states, there is a need for a paradigm shift that will increase the likelihood of a functioning Palestinian state after a peace agreement with Israel is signed and reduce the risk of its being a failed state that would pose a complex, dangerous challenge for Israel and the neighbouring Arab states.
Donor Aid Effectiveness and Do No Harm in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 2018
On the 25th Anniversary of the Oslo Accords, this report assesses the approach taken by 9 of the top Western donor countries/institutions that have for decades determined the structure of development aid in the Occupied Palestinian territory (OPT). It does this by focusing on the period 2010-16 through a quantitative keyword and qualitative analysis of 80 of their combined reports, and interviews with several dozen officials who contribute to the shaping of policy. This examination was conducted in order to offer a better understanding of how these donors perceive the Oslo Peace Process, Palestinian development, Israeli military rule, the ongoing colonisation of Palestinian land and the conflict resulting out of the combination of these processes. This is all carried out using an ‘Aid Effectiveness’ lens, with an emphasis on local leadership and local knowledge, but while also bearing in mind a ‘fragile and conflicted states’ framework and the ‘do no harm’ principle. Thus, the report’s analysis acknowledges that all donors involved in a conflict situation become actors in that conflict. For this reason, they should strive to provide their assistance in as neutral a manner possible, and be cognisant of the actual context they are intervening in (through strong analysis) in order to not make conditions worse. The 9 Western actors analysed comprise not only some of the biggest sources of funding in the $30+ billion spent on ‘Oslo aid’ since 1993, but are also the ‘intellectual drivers’ who have determined just how that aid – and Palestinian economic and social institutions – is shaped. They include the United States, which has dominated the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) politically as arbiter of Israeli-Palestinian peace-building; the European Union, which with its member states has acted as the leading financial contributor of Oslo aid, and the World Bank, which has played a leading role reporting on the state of Palestinian development and guiding donors through the bilateral giving process. Other influential actors analysed include the IMF, Canada, the UK, Norway, Sweden and Germany, all of whom have been funding a peace-building model built on an underlying precept that Palestinians need to be endowed with liberal democratic institutions in order for them to be able to cohabitate in peace with Israel, and where that peace will be cemented based on free market international trade and development funding to incentivise the Palestinians to abandon violence. This report also provides context for living and political conditions in the OPT, which are then compared to the donors’ policies and a description of each donor. In so doing, it sheds light on a gap that exists between the overarching Oslo aid model and donors’ policies, with actual conditions in the OPT and what is considered effective aid. The report also describes a noticeable rhetorical gap that exists between donors’ policies with their actions, and identifies nuances in the donors’ positions. The report further engages expert opinions on the state of Oslo and the OPT, while providing recommendations for future research into the role of these powerful and under-researched donors. Funding- The research for this study was carried out by Dr Jeremy Wildeman at the University of Bath’s ‘Department for Social and Policy Sciences’, with funding support from the Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF).