Graveyard of a Dozen Schemes (original) (raw)

The US Army's Influence on Marine Corps Tank Doctrine and its Failure at the Battle of Tarawa

Marine Corps History, 2018

This paper shows the U.S. Army's influence on the employment of armor by the Marine Corps and its doctrinal progression in the Pacific Theater of Operations. It explains why the battle for Tarawa became the primary element that shed light on flawed the interwar doctrine founded on fundamentally different principles of employing tanks in combat. To show doctrinal progress and indicate changes, it highlights key sources such as Tables of Organization (T/Os) for tank battalions, compares Army and Marine Corps field manuals during the inter-war and post-war period, and references commentary in after action reports and veteran interviews. With this information, the assault and inland operations on Tarawa becomes a starting point for tracking doctrinal change followed by summaries of tank operations throughout the Central Pacific culminating with the strategic discussion amongst FMF PAC leaders at the Tank Matter’s Conference that convened in May 1945. The result of this conference was a revised table of organization for the Marine Corps that lasted through the Vietnam War and the publication of the manual for Marine Corps Amphibious Operations: Employment of Tanks (Phib-18) in 1946. This paper concludes that Tarawa was the key element proving that the interwar tank doctrine of the Marine Corps Tentative Manual for Landing Operations was founded on Army tactical principles creating a dramatically different understanding of how tanks were effectively employed to support amphibious operations.

Cambrai 1917 The Birth of the Armored Warfare

In war the main problem to solve is—"How to give blows without receiving them" ; it has always been so and is likely always to remain so, for battles are two-act tragedies : the first act consisting in hitting and the second in securing oneself against being hit. If we look back on the 4,000 years of the known history of war, we shall find that its problems are always the same : thus in battle the soldier has to think of four main acts: (i) How to strike his opponent when at a distance from him; (ii) How to move forward towards him; (iii) How to strike him at close quarters ; (iv) How to prevent himself being struck throughout the whole of this engagement. In these four acts must be sought the origins of the tank, the idea of which is, therefore, much older than the Trojan horse; indeed, it dates back to some unknown period when aboriginal man raised his arm to ward off the blow of an infuriated beast or neighbor. To ward off a blow with the bare skin is sometimes a painful operation ; why not then cover the arm with leather or iron, why not carry a shield, why not encase the whole body in steel so that both arms instead of one may be used to hit with, for then man's offensive power will be doubled? If we look back on the Middle Ages, we find that such a condition of fighting was actually possible and that knights clad in armor cap-a-pie were practically invulnerable. As regards these times there is an authentic record concerning twenty-five knights in armor who rode out one day and met a great mob of insurgent peasants which they charged and routed, killing and wounding no fewer than 1,200 of them, without sustaining a single casualty themselves. To all intents and purposes, these knights were living tanks —a combination of muscular energy, protective armor, and offensive weapons.

Design of Warfare

2017

Much of what is written about war, beyond the generally quite searing eyewitness recollections of the combatants themselves, consists of the official reports, carefully crafted analyses, histories, and memoirs of senior leaders that focus upon planning, operations, and the outcomes of the particular conflicts in question. The common themes that arise—across times and cultures—highlight the importance of valor, the subtle interplay of strategy and contingency and, most of all, the determinative factors of sheer numbers and superior technology. What is too seldom considered, though, with few exceptions, is the matter of the design for warfighting. By this term we mean not only the design of weaponry, but also the structure of military units, the concepts of operations for their use in battle, and the information systems that first sense the enemy’s composition and disposition of forces, then process and transmit this knowledge as a guide to action. Taken together these elements form t...