Models of national referenda in Hungary - an overview starting from the change of political regime to the present day (original) (raw)
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Direct democracy in Hungary: from popular sovereignty to popular illusion
Since 1989 in Hungary there have been organised six national referenda related to twelve questions. Based on the content of the questions raised, one can draw a line of evolution in the history of the institution. In 1989 and in 1990 the questions were closely connected to the big political issues of the transition and democracy-building: the timing and procedure of the election of the head of the state and symbolic questions related to the state-socialist period. The 1997 referendum regarded the NATO membership, while the 2003 referendum the EU accession – therefore this period was in close connection with the country's main strategic aims. The 2004 and 2008 referenda were about core political questions – therefore functioned as instruments of outsourced daily political debate between government and opposition. Moreover, during this period sixteen questions were set on the National Assembly's agenda based on succesful popular initiatives. Since 2010 the legislative and the executive power's approach to the classic tools of direct democracy has radically transformed. The Government started to use frequently the so called 'national consultation' in important legislative issues, including the constitution-drafting process. This tool has neither constitutional foundations nor legislative background in the Hungarian legal order. Moreover, it lacks the possible benefits of direct democracy and bears the typical weaknesses of it. Besides, based on the new Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) and the new Act on Electoral Procedure (2013) the possibility of a successful national referendum has been greatly restricted: there is prescribed as a necessary condition for validity the participation of the majority of the voters in the referendum. This condition was barely reached twice in the preceding decades. Furthermore, the institution of popular initiative is not part of the legal system anymore. The latest events related to direct democracy bear more worrisome developments. The Government initiated a referendum which adressed the European Union related to its competence to decide on settlement of migrants in Hungary – a question which is obviously excluded from the possible topics of national referenda based on the constitutional background and European law. The National Election Committee authenticated the question and its decision was surprisingly upholded by the Curia (the Supreme Court of Hungary). The seventh national referendum in the history of the democratic Hungary (on October 2, 2016) will symbolize a new stage in the line evolution of national referenda, the institution itself becoming an instrument of populist governmental politics. All in all, these tendencies are demonstrating that the classic tools of direct democracy are loosing their relevance in practice while populist instruments are used more frequently. That is why it is of key importance to identify precisely the set of constitutional requiremets related to the genuine exercise of direct democracy and to separate other populist political instruments from these. The aim of the paper is to contribute to the contemporary debate related to this challenge.
Direct Democracy in Hungary (1989-2016): from Popular Sovereignty to Popular Illusion
2017
Since 1989, there have been organized seven national referenda related to thirteen questions in Hungary. Based on the content of the questions raised, one can draw a line of evolution in the history of the institution: the symbolic political issues of the transition and democracy-building were followed by the country's main strategic aims. Later, national referenda functioned as instruments of outsourced daily political debate between government and opposition, while at present-based on practice-national referendum can be considered as a typical instrument of plebiscitarian direct democracy. Moreover, during this period, sixteen questions were set on the National Assembly's agenda based on successful popular initiatives. Since 2010, the legislative and the executive power's approach to direct democracy has radically transformed. The Government started to use frequently the so-called national consultation in important legislative issues-a misleading communication tool which has no legal background. Besides, based on the new Fundamental Law of Hungary (2011) and the new Act on Electoral Procedure (2013), the possibility of a successful national referendum has been greatly restricted: there is prescribed as a necessary condition for a valid result that the majority of the voters should cast a valid vote. This condition was barely reached twice in the preceding period. Furthermore, the institution of popular initiative is not part of the legal system anymore. These trends are demonstrating that the classic tools of direct democracy are losing their relevance, while populist instruments are used more frequently in practice. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the contemporary debate related to this challenge .
During the last years, Hungary was often highlighted negatively by the foreign press. Topics like media regulation, the quality of the new constitution or the dual citizenship of Hungarians living abroad were regularly discussed and have marked the country’s international image. Yet the subject of election reform, which was also implemented during this time, remained in the background, out of the spotlight of clear and critical interest. This is startling given that the effects of the adopted acts – a law on parliamentary elections1 and a second on the election procedure2 - have the potential to be as important, if not more so, to the future development of the Hungarian democracy than the other regulations mentioned above. Obviously, electoral systems fundamentally influence the outcomes of elections through the aggregation of votes into mandates and have a huge impact on the development of the party system. They are often purely administrative, unquestioned elements of a democracy compared to party competition, and their rules are traditional and widely accepted by all political powers. The analytical interest is quickly piqued when reforms to the electoral system alter the existing rules of transforming votes into mandates, especially, if the reform is adopted and implemented by the overwhelming majority of a one-party government against the resistance and amendments of all other parliamentary forces. In consequence, it can be suggested that the changes only serve the political interest of the governing party. Does this hypothesis apply to Hungary? This paper has two main objectives: to reveal the background of the electoral system reform in Hungary and to analyse the effect of the new system from the perspective of the current political situation and cleavages in Hungarian society with an emphasis on the forthcoming parliamentary elections in 2014.
Baltic Journal of European Studies
This article explores the political role of a referendum in Central European countries, in particular in Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. In this article, political effectiveness is understood as a possibility to influence the decision-making process by citizens through a referendum. The transformation of political systems in Central European states from socialist/communist to democratic ones resulted in increasing interest in the notion of referendum, one of the common forms of direct democracy. However, most referenda have been abused for political purposes. The focus of this article is a referendum used at the national level. This study examines the use of a referendum in Central European states from 1989 to 2015. The database presents, country by country, the subject matter of voting, people’s participation and the results in order to show the citizens’ opportunity (or lack of it) to express their opinions and to contribute to policy-making by circumventing the standar...
Hungarian Constitutional Reform. The Fundamental Law in Hungary's Democratic Framework
The constitutional changes involving Hungary have followed, in the country’s history and more prominently from 1956, a common fil rouge in their development. We do not face, in point of fact, a nation going through a political or constitutional revolution; and yet, the Magyar constitutional ground has changed to a remarkable extent three times between the end of the Second World War and now. These gradual transformations have been described as “revolutions under the rule of law”, in order to underline the exceptionally systematic use of the existent legislative tools in order to enact a factual transition. In 2010, in the middle of an economic and financial crisis by which, for various reasons, Hungary was strongly hit, Fidesz party (Young Democrats’ Alliance-Hungarian Civic Union), guided by Viktor Orbàn, who had been one of the young leaders in the ‘treated revolution’ from communism, won the parliamentary elections, gaining, together with its ally, KDNP (Christian Democratic People’s Party), a two-thirds supermajority of the MPs and relegating the oppositions – the socialist party, MSZP, and the extreme right party Jobbik in primis – to an inedited irrelevance. As soon as Prime Minister Orbàn announced his will to approve a new Fundamental Law, many criticisms were raised by some of the most authoritative voices on the national and international political and constitutional context. The main concern focused on the method adopted by reformers, whose supermajority allowed to exclude minority parties from the process of constitutional reform, without formally spoiling the legal bindingness of the reformed Fundamental Law. And yet, the announcement was followed by a Proclamation of the Parliament, which stated that “after 46 years of occupation, and 20 confused years of transition, Hungary has regained the right and power of self-determination [...]. In spring 2010, the Hungarian nation gathered its strength once again, and brought about a successful revolution in the polling booth. Parliament declares that it recognizes and will respect this constitutional revolution. [...] Parliament declares that in April’s election a new social contract was born. [...] The pillars of our common future will be work, home, family, health and order”1. When, in 2011, the National Assembly eventually approved the new Constitution, the merit appeared to be at least as ambiguous as the method. A lower protection of human rights, a reform of justice and constitutional justice which delegates to the government an increased number of designations with a decrease in judges’ autonomy, a symbolic but impressive refusal of the former Constitution: a further analysis of the new Fundamental Law and its five Amendments – occurred between 2012 and 2013 -, which this paper aims at providing, reveals how de facto a less inclusive mentality drove the last years’ change.
Potentials of Direct Democracy in an Extremely Majoritarian System: The Case of Hungary
Ironically, direct democracy antedates democracy in Hungary: The first referendum was held even before the first free elections took place. Since 1989, 6 ballots have been held, in which 12 questions were decided. In the first phase questions regarding the democratic transition were decided. Those referendums helped to make a clear-cut break with the communist past. In a second step fundamental questions regarding the country’s international orientation were legitimised by popular ballot (NATO- and EU-accession, 1997, resp. 2003). Since then the use of referendums has changed: Parties started to use them in a more strategic way, trying to alter the balance of power or even to oust the government. Finally, Hungary’s new constitution of 2012, makes it very difficult to initiate referendums. Nevertheless the political actors have adapted to the new situation, trying to use the instrument of initiatives not so much to enforce referendums, but to mobilise their supporters. Hungary’s direct democracy is embedded in a predominantly representative system, thus serving as a complementary tool. This contribution will give an overview on the functions of referendums in the Hungarian political system and trace their changes. Methodologically the contribution is a case study, which describes the evolution of the legal framework and analyses the impact of the successful and unsuccessful referendums, thereby answering the question of the problem-solving capacity of Hungary’s direct democracy. Furthermore, the additional functions of direct democracy in the political process can be identified (such as legitimising political decisions).