2510) Democracy Deficit in Emerging Countries: Undemocratic trends in Latin America and the role of Brazil (2013) (original) (raw)

2013, Promoting Democracy: What Role for the Emerging Powers?

Most of the so-called emerging powers – an ambiguous, and perhaps misleading concept – are demonstrably non-democratic countries. Even worse: not only they do not promote democratic values and institutions at their own domestic level, but some of them actively undermine the advancement of democratic practices and processes in the international context (both bilaterally and at multilateral organizations). China and Russia are the most visible undemocratic powers at naked eyes, but also India and Brazil, arguably “big democratic emerging economies”, have not notably distinguished themselves as ardent and irreproachable defenders of democratic values and principles in their respective foreign policies; and, of course, their low quality democracy and large scale, politically tolerated (or stimulated) corruption practices at national level offer no good examples for institutional democratic building up in other countries. Worse in the case of Brazil: after adhering to a vigorous democratic dynamics since the reversal of military dictatorship in mid-80s, the new governing elites since the inauguration of Lula and Workers’ Party administrations, in early 2000s, have in fact strengthened the undemocratic trend that plagues nowadays many countries in Latin America. As a typical leftist party, as many others in Latin America, PT revealed itself to be a high tolerant organization towards old habits and practices (like prebendalism, patrimonialism, and corruption), and to “new” political features, leaning to some form of 21st century colbertism, that is, a dirigiste approach to the economy, a preference for State-driven initiatives and controls (instead of autonomous agencies), and even a kind of corporate fascism that is more evident in the Bolivarian experiments. Lula, and PT, excelled in supporting their old friends of Castroist Cuba, and the “new kids in the block” of Bolivarian states, notably Chávez’s Venezuela, Morales’ Bolivia, Correa’s Ecuador, and Ortega’s Nicaragua (not forgetting some of the worst “rogue states” in other continents, among many others candidates of the antidemocratic club). The paper intends to demonstrate that (a) Lula’s foreign policy represents a clear departure from Brazil’s traditional postures in terms of defense of human rights and democratic values, as reconstructed after the long undemocratic military interregnum by statesmen like Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and (b) that the South-South activism and infantile “anti-imperialism” of PT’s government is directly at odds with, and opposed to the more prudent stance of the professional diplomacy. Clearly, it does not promote democracy, inside Brazil, and much less abroad, as Lula and PT’s governments choose to support some of the most undemocratic regimes around the world (a move clearly revealed by the votes at UN Human Rights Commission, for instance). It is impossible to understand Brazil’s foreign policies since 2003 if one does not recognize the fundamental differences between former governments and PT’s governments. [Hartford, March 26, 2013]