Unfolding Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence (original) (raw)
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One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās, represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provides new epistemological insights into legal reasoning in general but also furnishes a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning which can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. in the present paper we will discuss the case of so-called co-relational inferences by indication and ressemblance. More precisly, in the present paper we focus on the ways to transfer a juridical ruling to a new case when the ratio legis is not present.
One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress three of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) the interaction of heuristic with logical steps, (2) the dynamics underlying the meaning-explanation of the terms involved,(3) the unfolding of parallel reasoning as similarity in action. They display what we take to be the main epistemological idea behind the qiyās, namely: the open texture of the extension of normative statements subject to this kind of parallel reasoning. In the present paper we will only discuss the case of so-called co-relational inferences of the occasional factor. The other kinds of inferences will be studied in a second paper.
: One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress three of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) the interaction of heuristic with logical steps, (2) the dynamics underlying the meaning-explanation of the terms involved,(3) the unfolding of parallel reasoning as similarity in action. They display what we take to be the main epistemological idea behind the qiyās, namely: the open texture of the meaning of normative statements subject to this kind of parallel reasoning.
2018
One of the epistemological results emerging from this initial study, is that the different forms of co-relational inference, known in the Islamic jurisprudence as qiyās represent an innovative and sophisticated form of reasoning that not only provide new epistemological insights of legal reasoning in general but they also furnish a fine-grained pattern for parallel reasoning that can be deployed in a wide range of problem-solving contexts and that does not seem to reduce to the standard forms of analogical argumentation studied in contemporary philosophy of science. More specifically the main claim is that a dialectical framework provides the right instrument to stress three of the most salient features of this form of inference: (1) the interaction of heuristic with logical steps, (2) the dynamics underlying the meaning-explanation of the terms involved (3) the unfolding of parallel reasoning as similarity in action. They display what we take to be the main epistemological idea beh...
Inferences by Parallel Reasoning in Islamic Jurisprudence
Logic, Argumentation & Reasoning, 2019
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Parallel Reasoning by Ratio Legis in Contemporary Jurisprudence. Elements for a Dialogical Approach
2019
Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialogical framework developed in Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020). After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasonin...
Defeasible Reasoning in Islamic Legal Theory
Informal Logic, 2024
There is a common understanding among logicians today that nonmonotonic types of reasoning, such as defeasible or presumptive, can clearly warrant a rational acceptance of its conclusion. Recognition of the significance and legitimacy of these forms of arguments, which were considered for long as fallacious, is believed to be very recent and many logicians tended to reject any discussions around it within the tradition of logic after Aristotle. In contrast, Islamic legal theories (usūl al-fiqh), since medieval age, has recognised the validity and importance of non-deductive forms of reasoning, analysed the structures of such arguments and demonstrated how the conventionally understood fallacies are not essentially fallacies. Qiyās-generally represents analogical reasoning-is taken here as a case of defeasible reasoning in Islamic argumentation. This paper will show through works of two emblematic medieval Muslim jurist-logicians, al-Juwainī and al-Ghazzālī, that understanding the legitimacy and the structure of nondeductive forms of arguments is at the core of Islamic legal theories and that they recognised its legitimacy and proposed a dialectical method (jadal) of approaching it.
PRECEDENTS AND THE ROLE OF ANALOGY IN COMMON LAW AND ISLAMIC LAW
This paper looks at the common grounds for legal reasoning based on analogy in common law and Islamic law. Despite the difference between the systems, based on the structure and sources, the use of judicial precedent and Qiyas (analogical reasoning) prima facie seem strikingly similar but unexplored. The authors look at the development stages of the two doctrines, the role of analogy, and the making of conclusions. The method of this doctrinal study is comparatively less synthetical and more analytical. The study finds that analogy does play a role in legal reasoning based on the doctrine of judicial precedent and Qiyas. However, there is a difference between the two doctrines where the analogy is the instrument of the discovery of facts in common law and of the discovery of rules and vice of them in Islamic law, which enable jurist to extend it to a new case that shares the vice of a previous case. Therefore, the certainty of rules and their uniformity seem stronger in Islamic law compared to common law.