Long-Run Trends in Incarceration of Drug Offenders in the United States (original) (raw)

The Replacements: The Effect of Incarcerating Drug Offenders on First-Time Drug Sales Offending

Crime & Delinquency, 2020

It is proffered that incarcerating offenders will not attenuate criminal activity because new offenders are readily available to supplant those who are imprisoned. This situation, referred to as offender replacement, is mostly applicable for drug selling crimes where a market for illegal drugs exists. We hypothesize that if the incarceration of established drug offenders attenuates competition and creates a fertile environment for novice drug dealers to enter the market, a rise in the drug incarceration rate should increase the likelihood of first-time drug selling behavior. Using a multilevel modeling procedure, we find that a one-unit increase in the drug incarceration rate results in a 15% rise in the odds of a first-time offender being prosecuted for a drug-selling crime.

Kingpins or Mules: An Analysis of Drug Offenders Incarcerated in Federal and State Prisons

Criminology <html_ent glyph="@amp;" ascii="&"/> Public Policy, 2004

Drug policy reformers and defenders contest the extent to which lowlevel drug offenders are being sent to prison and for how long. Using data from the Survey of Inmates in Federal and State Correctional Facilities, 1997 (BJS, 2000), we assess the seriousness of incarcerated drug offenders along dimensions of dangerousness, culpability, and harm-specifically, functional role and drug group participation, type and amount of drugs, firearms involvement, and criminal conviction and arrest history. We find that only about 1.6% of federal and 5.7% of state inmates can be described as "unambiguously low-level. " Alternatively, not many are "kingpins." Rather, most fall into a middle spectrum representing different degrees of seriousness that depend on what factors are emphasized. Policy Implications: Our findings dampen hopes of dramatically reducing prison populations by getting out of prison those who are unambiguously low-level drug offenders. They simply do not represent the majority of incarcerated drug offenders. I n particular, most played some role in distribution, so eliminating prison terms for users (decriminalization) would not have affected many now in prison. Indeed, if decriminalization increased demand, it could plausibly increase prison populations by increasing the number of suppliers still subject to imprisonment. On the other hand, "drug courier exceptions" to sentencing laws that apply to minor role offenders possessing large quantities could have a greater prison reduction impact.

A Quantitative Analysis of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000

We develop a theoretical framework to study illicit drugs markets, and we estimate it using data on drug purchases. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but they can determine drugs' quality (i.e., their purity) only after consuming them. Hence, sellers can rip-off first-time buyers, or can offer higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase again from them. In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated model implies that increasing penalties may increase the purity and the affordability of drugs traded, because it increases sellers' relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first-time buyers.

Dealers, Thieves, and the Common Determinants of Drug and Nondrug Illegal Earnings*

Criminology, 2012

Drug crime often is viewed as distinctive from other types of crime, meriting greater or lesser punishment. In view of this special status, this article asks whether and how illegal earnings attainment differs between drug sales and other forms of economic crime. We estimate monthly illegal earnings with fixed-effects models, based on data from the National Supported Work Demonstration Project and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Although drug sales clearly differ from other types of income-generating crime, we find few differences in their determinants. For example, the use of cocaine or heroin increases illegal earnings from both drug and nondrug crimes, indicating some degree of fungibility in the sources of illegal income. More generally, the same set of factors-particularly legal and illegal opportunities and embeddedness in criminal and conventional networks-predicts both drug earnings and nondrug illegal earnings.

No change is a good change? Restrictive deterrence in illegal drug markets

Journal of Criminal Justice, 2011

This study applies the concept of restrictive deterrence to a sample of drug market offenders. In particular, we assess the influence of behavioral changes post-arrest on time to rearrest. Methods: The sample consists of arrest data on all drug offences in South Australia from the start of 2000 to the end of 2007 (n = 26819). Cox proportional hazard models are used to conduct survival analyses. Supplementary models focus on those repeatedly arrested for cannabis cultivation to assess the influence of adjusting amounts of drugs on time to rearrest. Results: Changing behaviors is related to more rapid rearrest. Switching offense location, drug seriousness, and charge seriousness are all risk factors. However, among offenders repeatedly arrested for cannabis cultivation, changing location and increasing the number of plants they grow is related to a longer period before rearrest. Conclusions: Offenders that change their drug market behavior after being arrested appear to be placing themselves in situations in which they are more likely to fail due to the dangers of breaking into an unfamiliar market or offense pattern. Offenders with the longest post-arrest survival seem to be those that maintain their overall pattern of behavior while implementing subtle arrest avoidance techniques.

Retail margins in illegal drug markets

Economic Analysis and Policy, 2019

This paper analyzes a retail margin for four common street drugs using the US Drug Enforcement Agency's (DEA) System to Retrieve Information on Drug Enforcement (STRIDE). The retail margin is defined as the difference between the midlevel price and street level price of the drug. We regress various supply and demand side determinants to see which has the greatest effect on retail margin using Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). Law enforcement agencies can use the results to help squeeze retail margins and decrease profits. The results indicate that an increase in arrests does not decrease margins, and an increase in the DEA budget only has an effect on the retail margin for methamphetamines. We also find a decrease in marijuana prices decreases the methamphetamine retail margin but increases the cocaine retail margin. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Economic Society of Australia, Queensland.

A Comprehensive Analysis of the Drug-Crime Relationship

Drug-use and drug-related criminal offending are among the greatest concerns of policy-makers, law-enforcement officials, scientists, physicians, and citizens alike. There is a growing interest on the part of all parties to examine the causes, possible correlations, and consequences of the drug-crime relationship.

Illicit drug markets and economic irregularities

Socio-economic Planning Sciences, 2006

Markets for illicit drugs present an interesting case study for economics, combining non-standard characteristics such as addiction and product illegality. One response has been to argue the generality of economic principles by suggesting that they apply even in the extreme case of markets for addictive substances, e.g., by showing that demand for illicit goods is responsive to price [1] [Reframing health behavior change with behavioral economics. Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Earlbaum Associates; 2000. p. 89–111.] and even by modeling addiction as rational [2] [J Political Econ 1988;96:675–700]. This paper sketches examples of an alternative reaction, focusing on idiosyncrasies of drug markets that might plausibly create counter-intuitive effects, including supply curves that slope downward because of enforcement swamping and/or a good serving as the only available store of wealth for its producer, demand reduction programs that increase demand, and consumption by “jugglers” possibly incr...

The Effect of Imprisonment on Recidivism Rates of Felony Offenders: A Focus on Drug Offenders*

Criminology, 2002

The purpose of this study is to evaluate the deterrent effect of imprisonment. Using data on offenders convicted of felonies in 1993 in Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri, we compare recidivism rates for offenders sentenced to prison with those for offenders placed on probation. W e find n o evidence that imprisonment reduces the likelihood of recidivism. Instead, we find compelling evidence that offenders who are sentenced to prison have higher rates of recidivism and recidivate more quickly than d o offenders placed on probation. We also find persuasive evidence that imprisonment has a more pronounced criminogenic effect on drug offenders than on other types of offenders. KEYWORDS Recidivism, imprisonment, drug offenders. In Malign Neglect, Michael Tonry (199581) contends that "Drugoffense sentences are the single most important cause of the trebling of the prison population in the United States since 1980." Statistics concerning state and federal prison populations support this conclusion. The percentage of state prisoners incarcerated for a drug offense nearly quadrupled from 1980 (6%) to 1996 (23%). Similarly, the percentage of federal offenders serving time for a drug offense increased from 25% in 1980 to 60% in 1996. In fact, the increase in drug offenders accounted for nearly three-quarters of the total increase in federal inmates and one-third of the total increase in state inmates during this 16-year period (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1998). These statistics reflect a crime control policy premised on a theory of * This manuscript is based on work supported by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. Points of view are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. We are grateful for the helpful comments of the editor and the anonymous reviewers on earlier drafts of the paper. CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 40 NUMBER 2 2002 329 330 SPOHN AND HOLLERAN deterrence that Skolnick (1997:411) characterizes as "superficially persuasive." The assumption is that sentencing drug offenders to prison for long periods of time will deter current and prospective offenders, leading eventually to a reduction in drug abuse and drug-related crime. As numerous commentators have observed, however, this assumption rests on the false premise that altering criminal penalties will alter behavior (Irwin and Austin, 1997; Paternoster, 1991, 1987; Tonry, 1995). In fact, scholarly research generally concludes that increasing the severity of penalties will have little, if any, effect on crime. This conclusion also is applicable to offenders convicted of drug offenses. As Cohen and her colleagues (19981260) recently noted, "Observers of the criminal justice system who in general agree on little else have joined in arguing that increased penalties for drug use and distribution at best have had a modest impact on the operation of illicit drug markets, on the price and availability of illicit drugs, and on consumption of illicit drugs." The purpose of this study is to evaluate the deterrent effect of incarceration, with a particular focus on drug offenders. Using data on offenders convicted of felonies in Jackson County (Kansas City), Missouri, in 1993, we compare recidivism rates for offenders sentenced to prison with those for offenders sentenced to probation. Using multiple definitions of recidivism, we examine recidivism rates for drug offenders, drug-involved offenders, and offenders convicted of nondrug offenses, controlling for the offender's background characteristics, prior criminal record, and other relevant factors. PRIOR RESEARCH EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF PUNISHMENT The crime control policies pursued in the context of the War on Drugs rest largely on the philosophy of deterrence. As developed by eighteenthcentury utilitarian philosophers such as Jeremy Bentham (1948) and Cesare Beccaria (1963 [1764]), deterrence theory suggests that crime results from a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of criminal activity: Individuals commit crimes when the benefits outweigh the costs. Because an important "cost" of crime is apprehension and punishment, deterrence theorists suggest that "persons will refrain from committing offenses if they perceive that they are certain to be punished, with a severe penalty, and soon after the crime has been committed" (Paternoster, 1991:219). Deterrence can be either specific or general. Specific deterrence occurs when those who have been punished "cease offending, commit less serious offenses, or offend at a lower rate because of the fear of some future sanction" (Paternoster and Piquero, 1995:251). General