Habitusgenese. An Analysis of the Concept of Habit in E. Husserl's Phenomenology (original) (raw)
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The Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2017
Analysis of the concept of habit has been relatively neglected in the contemporary analytic literature. This paper is an attempt to rectify this lack. The strategy begins with a description of some paradigm cases of habit which are used to derive five features as a basis for an explicative definition. It is argued that habits are social, acquired through repetition, enduring, environmentally activated, and automatic. The enduring nature of habits is captured by their being dispositions of a certain sort. This is a realist account of habits in so far as the dispositions put forward must fit with some recognizable underlying system-in the case of humans a biological system-to fill the role as set out by the definition. This role is wide-ranging; in addition to the familiar cases of habitual behavior, habitual activities also include thinking, perceiving, feeling and willing.
The Aristotelian conception of habit and its contribution to human neuroscience
The notion of habit used in neuroscience is an inheritance from a particular theoretical origin, whose main source is William James. Thus, habits have been characterized as rigid, automatic, unconscious, and opposed to goal-directed actions. This analysis leaves unexplained several aspects of human behavior and cognition where habits are of great importance. We intend to demonstrate the utility that another philosophical conception of habit, the Aristotelian, may have for neuroscientific research. We first summarize the current notion of habit in neuroscience, its philosophical inspiration and the problems that arise from it, mostly centered on the sharp distinction between goal-directed actions and habitual behavior. We then introduce the Aristotelian view and we compare it with that of William James. For Aristotle, a habit is an acquired disposition to perform certain types of action. If this disposition involves an enhanced cognitive control of actions, it can be considered a “habit-as-learning”. The current view of habit in neuroscience, which lacks cognitive control and we term “habit-as-routine”, is also covered by the Aristotelian conception. He classifies habits into three categories: 1) theoretical, or the retention of learning understood as “knowing that x is so”; 2) behavioral, through which the agent achieves a rational control of emotion-permeated behavior (“knowing how to behave”); and 3) technical or learned skills (“knowing how to make or to do”). Finally, we propose new areas of research where this “novel” conception of habit could serve as a framework concept, from the cognitive enrichment of actions to the role of habits in pathological conditions. In all, this contribution may shed light on the understanding of habits as an important feature of human action. Habits, viewed as cognitively controlled behaviors that in turn improve cognitive control of behavior, are a crucial resource for enhancing human learning and behavioral plasticity.
On the Origin, Nature, and Genesis of Habit
DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals), 2016
This article details fundamental aspects of habits, beginning with the fact that habits are dynamic patterns that are learned, and that in coincidence with this learning, habits of mind are formed, as in the formation of expectations, thus of certain if/then relationships. it points out that, in quite the opposite manner of the practice of phenomenology, the strange is made familiar in the formation of habits. it shows how clear-sighted recognition of the seminal significance of movement and phenomenologically-grounded understandings of movement are essential to understandings of habits and the habits of mind that go with them. The article differentiates non-developmentally achieved habits from developmentally achieved habits, but elucidates too the relationship between instincts and habits. it elucidates the relationship in part by showing how, contra merleau-Ponty, "in man" there is a "natural sign"-or rather, natural signs. By relinquishing an adultist stance and delving into our common infancy and early childhood, we recognize the need for what husserl terms a "regressive inquiry" and thereby recover 'natural signs' such as smiling, laughing, and crying. at the same time, we honor husserl's insight that "habit and free motivation intertwine." as the article shows, resolution of the relationship between habit and free motivation requires recognition of nonlinguistic corporeal concepts that develop in concert with synergies of meaningful movement, concepts and synergies achieved not by embodied minds but mindful bodies. on tHe oRIgIn, nAtURe, And genesIs of HABIt CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
Habit beyond Psychology. The Evolution of the Concept (2017)
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy , 2017
In the following text I reexamine the connotations of the term habit from the perspective of Peirce’s pragmatism. I start by tracing back the roots of the term in the Metaphysical Club’s discussions of Alexander Bain’s theory of belief. By stressing the relative overlap between belief and habit I am also proposing that the latter term transcends the boundaries of empirical psychology. Peirce’s well-known antipathy to psychologism in logic raised the status of habit to a universal concept that participates in the unlimited process of interpretation. Habit, therefore, falls into a new lineage of meaning that can be traced back to antiquity and turns into a generative notion with extensive connotations. As a result it becomes an inseparable part of Peirce architectonic philosophy, capable to shed new light on his evolutionary cosmology and metaphysics. Conceiving of habit as an operative element in the evolution of all phenomena in the universe is the main objective of this article.
Theologies of Habit: From Hexis to Plasticity
Body & Society, 2013
This article examines medieval and early modern theologies of habit (those of Augustine, Aquinas and Luther), and traces a theme of appropriation through the discourse on habit and grace. It is argued that the question of habit is central to theological debates about human freedom, and about the nature of the Godrelationship. Continuities are then highlighted with modern philosophical accounts of habit, in particular those of Ravaisson and Hegel. The article ends by considering some of the philosophical and political implications of the preceding analysis of habit.