Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy (original) (raw)

Philosophical Criticisms of Experimental Philosophy

The philosophical relevance of experimental psychology is hard to dispute. Much more controversial is some experimental philosophers’ critique of armchair philosophical methodology, in particular the reliance on ‘intuitions’ about thought experiments. This chapter responds to that critique. It argues that, since experimental philosophers have been forced to extend the category of intuition to ordinary judgments about real-life cases, their critique is in immediate danger of generating into global scepticism, because all human judgments turn out to depend on intuitions. Recently, some experimental philosophers have tried to demarcate the target of their critique more narrowly. However, their attempts are still far too indiscriminate, and over-generate scepticism. Nevertheless, once experimental philosophy has refined its own methodology, it may contribute to the refinement of the methodology of mainstream philosophy, by filtering out the effects of cognitive bias, although it offers no prospect of doing without judgments on real or imaginary cases.

Introduction: Experimental Philosophy and Its Critics, Parts 1 and 2

Philosophical Psychology, 2010

In this brief introduction, we would first like to explain how these two special issues of Philosophical Psychology (Nos. 23.3 & 23.4) actually came about. In addition, we will provide an outline of their overall structure and shortly summarize the featured papers.

Enriching the Framework of Experimental Philosophy University of Calgary

2010

Despite its historical neglect, intuition is curr ently a scholarly focus in such a broad range of behavioural and social sciences, as psycho logy, cognitive science, economics, education, medicine, management, and so forth. Moreover, intu it on is expected to be a ‘fundamental bridging construct’ (Hodgkinson et al., 2008) to unify inqui ries in these areas. Experimental philosophy – socio-experimental psychological research on intuit ions about philosophical cases – may be reckoned part of this fascinating, interdisciplinary movemen t. Little attention, however, has been paid, in experimental philosophy, to the movement, since the prevailing practice of experimental philosophy is mainly modeled on the heuristics and biases approach (HB), i.e., one, albeit paradigmatic, restrictive approach to intuition among many. Thus, reconsider ing the practice of experimental philosophy in light of other approaches to intuition will suggest further possible directions it can take, or so I s hal...

Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism. Rethinking Philosophical Method

2015

Publisher's abstract: Experimental philosophy is one of the most exciting and controversial philosophical movements today. This book explores how it is reshaping thought about philosophical method. Experimental philosophy imports experimental methods and findings from psychology into philosophy. These fresh resources can be used to develop and defend both armchair methods and naturalist approaches, on an empirical basis. This outstanding collection brings together leading proponents of this new meta-philosophical naturalism, from within and beyond experimental philosophy. They explore how the empirical study of philosophically relevant intuition and cognition transforms traditional philosophical approaches and facilitates fresh ones. Part One examines important uses of traditional "armchair" methods which are not threatened by experimental work and develops empirically informed accounts of such methods that can potentially stand up to experimental scrutiny. Part Two analyses different uses and rationales of experimental methods in several areas of philosophy and addresses the key methodological challenges to experimental philosophy: Do its experiments target the intuitions that matter in philosophy? And how can they support conclusions about the rights and wrongs of philosophical views? Essential reading for students of experimental philosophy and metaphilosophy, Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism will also interest students and researchers in related areas such as epistemology and the philosophies of language, perception, mind and action, science and psychology. Contents and Contributors: Introduction: Rationalism and Naturalism in the Age of Experimental Philosophy – An Introduction Eugen Fischer and John Collins The Volume: Synopsis Eugen Fischer and John Collins Part 1: The Armchair and Naturalism 1. The Nature of A Priori Intuitions: Analytic or Synthetic? David Papineau 2. Understanding the Question: Philosophy and its History Tim Crane 3. Two Kinds of Naturalism John Collins 4. Philosophical Insights and Modal Cognition Mikkel Gerken 5. Thought Experiments, Concepts, and Conceptions Daniele Sgaravatti 6. Against Naturalistic Defences of Intuition Hilary Kornblith Part 2: Varieties of Experimental Philosophy 7. Humans as Instruments: Or, the Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy Jonathan M. Weinberg 8. The Illusion of Expertise Edouard Machery 9. Intuition, Philosophical Theorising, and the Threat of Scepticism Jennifer Nado 10. Experimental Philosophy and Naturalism Bence Nanay 11. Experimental Philosophical Semantics and the Real Reference of 'Gödel' Amir Horowitz 12. Intuitions and Illusions: From Explanation and Experiment to Assessment Eugen Fischer, Paul E. Engelhardt and Aurelie Herbelot. Index

The Concept of Intuition in Experimental Philosophy

Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, 2022

Although the concept of intuition has a central place in experimental philosophy, it is still far from being clear. Moreover, critics of that movement often argue that the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy does not correspond to the concept of intuition used in traditional, armchair philosophy. However, such a claim is problematic, because most attempts to define this concept are made with regard to the armchair philosophy's point of view and not that of experimental philosophy. In the article I analyse the concept of intuition in experimental philosophy by taking into account its theoretical assumptions, and the research practice of its representatives. By analysing the most influential experimental philosophers' views, I formulate its core characteristics. According to them, intuition is a mental state that is a reaction to the described case, which is revealed in the readiness to express a judgment about this case. Then, I investigate step by step the frequently postulated methodological, phenomenological, and etiological conditions that could narrow down the initial definition. I show that the only condition coherent with experimental philosophy's assumptions and its practice is an etiological one, as the mental state that could be classified as intuition has to be shaped by pragmatic, and not only semantic factors. In the last parts of the text, I draw out some of the consequences of the position that I have presented, regarding the methodology of experimental philosophy and philosophy in general.

THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Philosophical Explorations, 2007

Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we respond to some criticisms of experimental philosophy that have recently been put forward by Antti Kauppinen. Unlike the critics of experimental philosophy, we do not think the fledgling movement either will or should fall before it has even had a chance to rise up to explain what it is, what it seeks to do (and not to do), and exactly how it plans to do it. Filling in some of the salient details is the main goal of the present paper.

Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Disputes

2012

One view of philosophy that is sometimes expressed, especially by scientists, is that while philosophers are good at asking questions, they are poor at producing convincing answers. And the perceived divide between philosophical and scientific methods is often pointed to as the major culprit behind this lack of progress. Looking back at the history of philosophy, however, we find that this methodological divide is a relatively recent invention. Further, it is one that has been challenged over the past decade by the modern incarnation of experimental philosophy. How might the reincorporation of empirical methods into philosophy aid the process of making philosophical progress? Building off of the work of Sytsma , we argue that one way it does so is by offering a means of resolving some disputes that arise in philosophy. We illustrate how philosophical disputes may sometimes be resolved empirically by looking at the recent experimental literature on intuitions about reference.

Thought Experiments and Experimental Philosophy

In recent years, there has been a lot of debate in philosophical methodology about the best rational reconstruction of philosophical thought experiments. Concerning this debate, I argue against the current consensus that our intuitive judgments about Gettier thought experiments should be interpreted in modal terms. In order to provide a non-modal alternative, I present a detailed reconstruction of a paradigmatic Gettier thought experiment in terms of suppositional thinking. Next, I explore a problem that all rational reconstructions must face, namely that there is a large gap between the explicit case description of a thought experiment and our total supposition of the relevant scenario. In the final section, I use these considerations to make room for alternative explanations of some challenging results from experimental philosophy – explanations that are friendlier to the method of thought experimentation than the skeptical conclusions of experimental philosophers of a ‘restrictionist’ stripe.