Employment lessons from the electronics industry (original) (raw)
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The study investigates employment trends in the U.S. electronics industry, highlighting how technological advancements, including automation and product redesign, influence labor productivity and job opportunities. While sectors such as microelectronics and computers have seen job growth, the consumer electronics sector has experienced significant declines. The findings emphasize that rising productivity can limit net job creation despite increases in output, underscoring the importance of adaptive workforce strategies in response to international competition and market demands.
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