Feminists on the Inalienability of Human Embryos (original) (raw)
The feminist literature against the commodification of embryos in human embryo research includes an argument to the effect that embryos are "intimately connected" to persons, or morally inalienable from them. We explore why embryos might be inalienable to persons and why feminists might find this view appealing. But, ultimately, as feminists, we reject chis view because it is inconsistent with full respect for women's reproductive autonomy and with a feminist conception of persons as relational, embodied beings. Overall, feminists should avoid claims about embryos' being inalienable to persons in arguments for or against the commodification of human embryos. One of the many ethical issues with human embryo research-especially when the research involves the destruction of embryos-is that it risks commodifying, or resulting in the commodification of, that which perhaps ought not to be commodified, namely, women's reproductive labor and human reproductive tissues or their derivatives. Feminists and women's health activists have insisted upon the importance of the first of these two issues-the commodification of women's reproductive labor (Dickenson 2001; Dodds 2003). Concern about the potential exploitation of women involved in embryo research (through the donation or sale of oocytes or embryos) is crucial for feminists. Of equal concern, however, is the potential commodification of human oocytes and, in particular, of human embryos. Arguments against the commodification of human embryos are many and varied. The most obvious, perhaps, start with the premise that human embryos are persons with full moral standing and conclude that like other persons (for example, adult humans with inalienable rights to life and security of the
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