Technical progress and its factors in Russia’s economy (original) (raw)
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The present paper uses the “growth accounting” methodology to estimate technological change, in an attempt to formulate an explanation of Russia’s economic decline and signs of recovery in the period 1992-1999 in relation to technological change. The results do show that, despite the general economic collapse during the 1990s rooted in the very structure of the Soviet economy, the level of technology has practically remained unchanged which, in turn, prevented the Russian Economy from further deteriorating. Our empirical findings also show that the Russian economy tended to be a labour-intensive economy and this, possibly, explains the limited unemployment in the crisis period. We investigate these findings in relation to the type of class coalitions within Russian social formation. In this paper, we also examine the structural characteristics of the particular post-soviet form of socio-economic organization, in order to shed some light on the Russian economy’s evolution during the first years of transition.
Growth, Technological Change and Output Gap in Russia
2005
The present paper uses the “growth accounting” methodology to estimate technological change, in an attempt to formulate an explanation of Russia’s economic decline and signs of recovery in the 1992-1999 time span, in relation to technological change. Also, the potential output and output gap is estimated using a Cobb Douglas production function and a Hodrick-Prescott filter for the Russian Economy before 2000. The results do show that, despite the general economic collapse during the 1990s, rooted in the Soviet economy’s very structure, the level of technology has, practically, remained unchanged which, in turn, prevented the Russian Economy from further deteriorating. Meanwhile, the relationship between output gap and inflation is briefly examined and the results suggest that output gap is sufficient to explain the largest part of inflation in the Russian economy. As a final conclusion, technological progress and, consequently, long-term economic growth is linked to Russia’s politi...
Is Mining Fuelling Long-Run Growth in Russia? Industry Productivity Growth Trends since 1995
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
GDP per capita growth rates in Russia have been among the highest in the world since the mid-1990s. Previous growth accounting research suggests that this was mainly driven by multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth. In this paper we analyse for the first time the drivers of Russian growth for thirty-four industries over the period 1995 to 2008. We pay in particular attention to the construction of a proper measure of capital services, to use in place of the stock measures employed in previous research. Based on these new measures, we find that aggregate GDP growth is driven as much by capital input as by MFP growth. Mining and Retailing account for an increasing share of the inputs, but are weak in terms of MFP performance. In contrast, MFP growth was rapid in goods-producing industries, but the sector's GDP share declined. The major drivers of MFP growth were in the high-skilled services industries that were particularly underdeveloped in the Russian economy in the 1990s. JEL: O47; P28; L16
Is the new model of economic growth feasible for Russia
Given the quality of the existing institutions and the significant role of the government sector in the economy, the Russian Federation has depleted the potential of the current model of growth based on commodity exports. The dramatic deceleration of the GDP growth rate down to less than 2% in 2013 bears evidence for this proposition. The Russian government is confronting the choice between an expansionist scenario and a conservative one, both built on the assumption that the existing ineffective institutions need not to be changed. On the contrary, according to our estimates, it is impossible to work out a new model of growth without taking into account the role of private initiative, healthy market-orientated institutions and investment in human capital. The premises for their contributions to development can be found in nowadays Russia. We focus on two groups of economic agents whose influence is increasing and can potentially become the driving force of a new model of Russian economic growth. These are " new business " and " new bureaucracy ". "New business" is made by dynamic companies that are market-orientated but whose incentive to invest within existing institutional framework is limited. "New bureaucracy" consists of both progressive regional elites, who are interested in the development of their provinces, and efficiency-motivated professionals at the federal level.
Modernization and the Russian Economy: Three Hundred Years of Catching Up
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012
The special features of Russian economic development The backwardness of Russia when compared to the countries of Western Europe was apparent at turn of the 17 th and 18th centuries, when, it is generally considered, Russian economic growth began. From that time on, overcoming this backwardness, reducing the gap between Russia and the more developed countries of Europe and the rest of the world, became the principal goal of Russian economic development and the principal task of Russian governments. This task, which may be described as that of "modernization in order to catch up", was first articulated by Peter the Great (1683-1725) whose celebrated economic and technological changes were achieved thanks to a policy of borrowing from the West. Over time, it became clear that there were both advantages and disadvantages associated with the need simultaneously to modernize and catch up. The advantage of backwardness was that the technological and institutional innovations of the more developed countries could be borrowed and modernization achieved at a relatively rapid pace. 1 A characteristic feature of Russia's quest to "modernize and catch up" is that for approximately the last 200 years there has been a stable time lag between the level of development of Russia and that of more economically developed countries such as France and Germany (See Tables 1 and 2). The magnitude of this time lag is about 50 years and although the lag sometimes increases and sometimes decreases, in generally varies around this mean. The Russian Minister of Finance, Nikolai Bunge, remarked upon this phenomenon at the end of the 19 th century and at the end of the 20 th century it was studied in detail by Egor Gaidar. 2. Table 1: Structure of employment in the main branches of the Russian economy in comparison with France and Germany, % Year USA France Germany Holland Great Britain Japan Russia Agriculture, timber and fisheries Table 2: Russian backwardness relative to the per capita Gross Domestic Product of Germany and France Country Years
Problems and prospects of Russia’s economic growth
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This article examines the patterns of economic growth in Russia. It demonstrates that while the discussions focus on the problems of the short-term growth and the incentives therefor, the growth problems are more important in the long-term perspective. The article evaluates the future growth potential of Russia under various assumptions within the framework of standard methods of economic growth prediction. If the current tendencies persist, the next two decades will show a considerably lower growth of the gdP of Russia than within the previous 15 years, due primarily to the sharp decrease in the availability of labor. Besides, the better part of the potential for the increase in productivity is already exhausted. The growth of the gdP of Russia will stay below two percent per annum. Refs 25. figs 6. Table 1.
Economic Growth, Technical Progress and Labor Productivity
International Journal of Innovation in the Digital Economy
The debate on deindustrialization assumes that domestic industry is a leading sector and produces positive externalities for the whole economy. This paper will partially refute this. Since the early 1990’s, most developed and emerging economies have been subjected to two paradoxes: the paradox of Solow, which calls into question the relationship between ICT investment and productivity gains, and the paradox of Gordon, showing that productivity gains in the ICT sector do not propagate to all other sectors. These paradoxes lead one to question the linear nature of the kaldorian cumulative mechanisms. Following both a theoretical and an empirical approach, such relationships are analyzed from the viewpoint of the various models of unbalanced growth built by Baumol. The author will highlight the limits of such models and provide elements for an alternative explanation. Ultimately, the real problem is to investigate the economic nature and the role that services and forms of intangible c...
The Russian Economy: Can Growth be Restored within the Economic System? FOI-R-3876-SE, May 2014
The Russian economy: Can growth be restored within the economic system? , 2014
What are the characteristics of the Russian economic system and what potential does it have to spur growth? Would strengthening of the institutions underpinning the market economy make a difference? And is there any chance for reform initiatives from below through democratization? The purpose of the report is to analyse the systemic characteristics of economic development in Russia after 2009 and to assess the potential of the present hybrid economic system to resolve the impediments to future growth based on the improvement of productivity and innovation. Fundamentally this is an investigation of the extent to which the economic system can facilitate a more efficient allocation of resources between sectors, reduce resource waste, increase productivity and strengthen competition by enabling entry of new actors into different markets. The study develops a model based on Gaddy and Ickes (2010) and analyses the effects of rent dependence and Putin’s rent redistribution system on small and medium-sized enterprises, ‘the new private sector’, which has been added to the original model. It is shown that when a dominant part of the economy is ruled by the management of oil rents to secure the power of the regime, the role of market-oriented institutions becomes limited. Weak institutions have a background in the democracy shortage in Russia which is reflected in weak channels of ‘voice’ for citizens and organisations to express their opinion. The report analyses the effects of the present restrictions on voice and civil society development and concludes that there is little hope for ‘reform from below’ of the system. The confidence crises caused by the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 further aggravate Russia’s problems of restoring growth.
Structural changes and economic growth in the world economy and Russia
Russian Journal of Economics, 2019
The article considers the problem of the relationship of structural changes and economic growth in the global economy and Russia in the framework of different methodological approaches. At the same time, the paper provides the analysis of complementarity of economic policy types, which, on the one hand, are aimed at developing the fundamentals of GDP growth (institutions, human capital and macroeconomic stabilization), and on the other hand, at initiating growth (with stable fundamentals) with the help of structural policy measures. In the study of structural changes in the global economy, new forms of policies of this kind have been revealed, in particular aimed at identifying sectors — drivers of economic growth based on a portfolio approach. In a given paper a preliminary version of the model of the Russian economy is provided, using a multisector version of the Thirlwall’s Law. Besides, the authors highlight a number of target parameters of indicators of competitiveness of the s...