LOBBYING OF ORGANISED INTERESTS: THE CAPACITY AND RESOURCES OF PRIVATE BUSINESS INTEREST ORGANISATIONS (original) (raw)

Interest groups in the European Union: How powerful are they?

West European Politics, 2008

The question of interest group influence is central for both scholars interested in studying policy-making in the EU and those concerned with the legitimacy of decisionmaking in that entity. Many hypotheses exist that stress a series of factors possibly shaping interest group influence. Nevertheless, only few studies have tried empirically to examine these hypotheses for the case of the EU. What is more, existing empirical studies report contradictory findings. To help researchers advance upon this state of the art, three obstacles that impede research dealing with interest group influence in the EU are discussed: defining the terms 'power' and 'influence'; accounting for different pathways to influence; and measuring influence. In addition to this, several ways to address these obstacles are advanced: by taking a pragmatic approach with respect to defining influence and power; by being conscious that actors may use different pathways to influence when drawing conclusions about interest group influence; and by combining different methods when measuring influence.

Lobbying and Public Affairs in Europe: Some Comparative Remarks

Lobbying in Europe: Public Affairs and the Lobbying Industry in 28 EU Countries, 2017

The public affairs and lobbying industry represents an extremely relevant and fascinating field of observation to political analysts and to everyone engaged in the comprehension of complex political and economic environments such as the European one. To analyse how the influence of power works and what role interest groups and the various actors of a political system play in public decision-making processes is extremely useful to understand those processes and how the system operates. That is why, in collecting the data and all the points of view provided in the various chapters of this volume, we hope to have laid down the basis for a new and more complete perspective on what European democracy is today. The intellectual datum here is that understanding interest group systems remains crucial to understanding the functioning of advanced democracies, especially in an era when these democracies are becoming increasingly embedded in supranational policy networks. (Beyers, Eising and Maloney 2008, 1104) The main aim of this volume is to fertilize the ground for further research and for the development of new and stronger theories, able to explain what are the conditions and the factors affecting the development of public affairs in a country, the regulation of lobbying, the relationship between interest groups and traditional political actors, the weight of institutional frameworks, the influence of the European integration process on national developments, etc. The widest part of scientific literature on lobbying and interest groups seems to focus on the theoretical and historical analysis of interest groups and their role in democratic systems (Bentley

Legislative lobbying in context: Towards a conceptual framework of interest group lobbying in the European Union

We outline a conceptual framework that identifies and characterizes the contextual nature of interest group politics in the European Union to better understand variation in interest group mobilization, lobbying strategies and interest group influence. We focus on two sets of contextual factors that affect EU interest group lobbying. First, we argue that interest group activities are shaped by several policy-related factors, namely the complexity, the policy type, the status quo, the salience and the degree of conflict characterizing legislative proposals and the associated issues. Second, we posit that lobbying in the EU is affected by institutional factors that vary within the EU political system such as the institutional fragmentation within the European Commission and the European Parliament and across different national political systems depending on the patterns of interest intermediation or the vertical and horizontal distribution of powers. Finally, we theorize about the interrelationship between contextual features and interest group properties and summarize the findings of the Special Issue.

Interest Group Success in the European Union: When (and Why) Does Business Lose?

Comparative Political Studies, 2015

Business lobbying is widespread in the European Union (EU). But because not all lobbying is successful, the question arises: when does business win and when does it lose in the context of legislative policy-making in the EU? We argue that business actors are, overall, less successful than citizen groups in the European policy process. However, they can protect their interests if interest group conflict is low or the role of the European Parliament is restricted. A new dataset on the positions of more than one thousand non-state actors with respect to 70 legislative acts proposed by the European Commission between 2008 and 2010 allows us to evaluate this argument. Empirical support for our expectations is highly robust. Our findings have implications for the literature on legislative decision-making in the EU and for research on non-state actors in international organizations.

GIANTS AND DWARFS: THE MULTILEVEL LOBBYING STRATEGIES OF NATIONAL INTEREST ORGANISATIONS

The article addresses the bias in interest representation within the EU by examining the lobbying strategies of national interest organisations within the EU’s multilevel political system. Both our theoretical framework, which includes the determinants of a national interest organisation’s decision to act at the EU level, and the data analysis from the INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module (MLG) (www.intereuro. eu) reveal three main findings. Firstly, the greatest differentiation among interest organisations (IOs) appears to be between those IOs from the older member states (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), which exhibit above-average levels of activity, and those from the newer EU member states (Sweden, Slovenia), which exhibit below-average levels of activity. Secondly, the variations in IO activity levels are much greater from country to country than from one policy field to another. Thirdly, although the IOs from all five countries in our study are more likely to employ media and publishing strategies (information politics) than to mobilise their members and supporters (protest politics), we can still observe national patterns in their selection of strategies and in the intensity of their instrumentalisation.

How Much Influence do Interest Groups Have in the EU? Some Methodological Considerations

2008

More than half a century ago, James March (1955: 432) stressed the importance of measuring interest group influence when stating:“Influence is to the study of decision-making what force is to the study of motion—a generic explanation for the basic observable phenomena.” Little can be added to this affirmation; an analysis of interest group influence remains of crucial importance to an understanding of political processes.

Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups

European Journal of Political Research, 2015

Different types of interest groups use different lobbying strategies. This article presents an investigation of this already well‐established hypothesis once more, but additionally proposes that the institutional framework of the country in which interest groups operate also influences their lobbying behaviour. More specifically, it is shown that groups working in the interest of the public are better integrated into the policy‐making process when direct democratic instruments, such as referendums, occur regularly (as in Switzerland) than when referendums are the exception (Germany). The article demonstrates that Swiss cause groups – often also referred to as ‘public interest groups’ in the literature – use a more balanced mixture of insider and outsider strategies than their German peers, but also that this moderating effect cannot be found for specific interest groups, such as industry groups or unions.