The Relation of Derrida's Deconstruction to Heidegger's Destruction: Some Notes (original) (raw)
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In this paper I will discuss Heidegger's destruction and Derrida's critique of it in his deconstruction. I will read destruction in various Heidegger texts and discuss Derrida's intervention through his critique of destruction in deconstruction. Heidegger writes that metaphysics is in decline and is approaching its end, as the earth informed by metaphysics has become desolate, as is evident from the events of the last century. This decline marks the oblivion of Being as metaphysics, as the truth of metaphysics has met its desolation. Heidegger argues that metaphysics has been an illusion that sustained reality and is now approaching its end, in place, truth needs to be rethought as the unconcealment of Being as aletheia. In this disclosure of Being, the essence of Being in is factity, thrown-ness, temporality is revealed and the metaphysical past of Being meets its oblivion. However, this so called overcoming of metaphysics becomes repetition of metaphysics in every sense as it designates metaphysics as something to be overcome and destroyed. It thus proceeds entirely within its terms rather than proceeding to new territory. Heidegger's destruction of metaphysics is hence, a repetition of it.