On property and exploitation (original) (raw)
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Karl Marx argued that capitalist economies are necessarily exploitative. Nineteenth century classical liberal political economists agreed that exploitation was rampant, but blamed government grants of privilege rather than capitalism. This chapter argues that while both schools of thought produced genuine insights into exploitation in markets and politics, neither developed a tenable account of what exploitation actually is. Understanding exploitation in terms of the more basic concept of fairness allows us to appreciate when wage labor and government transfers are exploitative, and when they are not. The chapter concludes by arguing that exploitation is probably a permanent feature of a free society because the moral costs of attempting to eliminate it will often prove unacceptable. In particular, it might be impossible to ensure that a government invested with the power to stamp out one form of exploitation does not become a tool for an even more troubling form of exploitation itself.
The limits of property and freedom
The truth is that capitalism has not only multiplied population figures but at the same time improved the people's standard of living in an unprecedented way. Neither economic thinking nor historical experience suggest that any other social system could be as beneficial to the masses as capitalism. The results speak for themselves. The market economy needs no apologists and propagandists. It can apply to itself the words of Sir Christopher Wren's epitaph in St. Paul's: Si monumentum requiris, circumspice.
A Discussion of Benjamin Ferguson's Account of Exploitation
Benjamin Ferguson (Ferguson 2013) recently proposed an account of exploitation that is based on Hillel Steiner's libertarian account of Exploitation (Steiner 1984, 1987). In this paper, I argue that Ferguson's account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for exploitation due to the libertarian framework that underlies his account. An additional claim is that Ferguson's account of exploitation is faced with a trilemma: It is either an account of the concept of exploitation, or an account of a libertarian conception of exploitation, or an account of a non-libertarian conception of exploitation. In the first case, it does provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for exploitation. In the second case, the amendments that Ferguson makes to Steiner's account make it inconsistent with libertarianism. In the third case, Ferguson fails to spell out the conceptual framework that underlies his account.
The Origins, Nature, and Content of the Right to Property: Five Economic Solitudes
The thesis of this article is that the now extensive contemporary literature on the economics of property rights has generated more heat than light. Economists have invoked at least five distinct theories of ownership or property rights in their work. Unfortunately, authors frequently fail to acknowledge the existence of competing theories of property rights that stand as conceptual rivals to the theory that they, often implicitly, invoke. Nowhere is this problem more evident than in the literature on regulatory takings, a literature that has a justifiable reputation for its inconsistent conclusions. Other fields in which theories of property rights play an important role include intellectual property, the economics of contracts, competition analysis and policy, externalities, and the economics of information. This article compares and evaluates five competing theories of property rights that have been advanced and used by economists: classical liberalism, utilitarianism, legal positivism, pragmatism, and modern libertarianism. These theories present divergent accounts of the origin and the nature of ownership claims. They also conceptualize the evolution of ownership institutions as well as ownership patterns quite differently. There are also important differences in incentives that exist under institutional regimes based on each theory.
Intrinsic limitations of property rights
Journal of Business Ethics, 1995
° Many people take for granted an absolute conception of property rights. According to this conception, if I own a piece of property I have a moral right, to do with it as I please, irrespective of the needs of others. This paper articulates an argument against this conception of propert 5' rights. First, it shows that there are many possible conceptions of property rights, and that there are significant differences among the models of ownership which have prevailed in different societies. Then, it argues that there are decisive grounds to refuse to grant that property owners have a moral right to exercise absolute control over their property, and that ownership implies not only rights but also duties and limits.
Social Theory and Practice (revise and resubmit)
Defining "exploitation" as a transaction-specific and ahistorical concept irrespective of its structural context has led to the common notion among applied philosophers that structural injustices are irrelevant to a theory of exploitation. However, this position frequently obfuscates the fact that background injustices make it easier for exploiters to take wrongful advantage of another party. This paper aims to argue that structural injustices can have a causal influence on the exploitative terms of transaction without the structural injustice itself being the wrong-making feature of exploitation. I furthermore hold that causal contribution of background factors to exploitation are at least one factor in determining who is responsible for addressing the problem of exploitation.
Do Property Rights Presuppose Scarcity?
Journal of Business Ethics
There is a common view, dating back at least to Hume, that property rights presuppose scarcity. This paper is a critical examination of that thesis. In addition to questioning the thesis, the paper highlights the need to divorce the debate over this thesis from the debate over Intellectual Property (IP) rights (the area where it is most frequently applied). I begin by laying out the thesis’ major line of defense. In brief, the argument is that (1) property rights are legitimate only when necessary, (2) necessary only to avoid injury resulting from one party’s use or possession of a good over others’, and (3) that such injury is possible only where there is scarcity. While I accept (1) (at least for the sake of argument), I argue that each of three prominent theories of the justification of property rights cast doubt on (2) and (3). As it turns out, at the theoretical level, there are a number of different ways of dealing with this conflict. However, I argue, no matter which theoretical path one takes, it turns out that the practical implications of the relationship between property rights and scarcity have been woefully misconstrued. Finally, I recount an independent argument for the thesis under consideration and argue that, whether or not it is successful against IP, it does not extend as an argument against ownership of non-scarce goods in general. This serves to further highlight the need to distinguish arguments for the thesis under consideration from arguments against IP.