Book review: Character as Moral Fiction, Mark Alfano (CUP, 2013) (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
2021
The article focuses on acurrent debate in contemporary ethics between socalled situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this assumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observation they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral psychology. In the first part of the article, Ipresent the conceptions of virtue and moral character developed in response to the situationist critique. Ishow to which degree these conceptions differ from the classical, socalled global approach in virtue ethics. In the second part, based on the latest empirical studies in social and cognitive psychology, Iargue, against the situationist objection, that the classical notion of virtue meets the requirement of empirical adequacy. Imainly resort to the interacti...
Re-Evaluating the Situationist Challenge to Virtue Epistemology
The situationist challenge to virtue theory has recently been extended so that it applies not just to virtue ethics but also to virtue epistemology. Focussing on the most developed version of the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology⎯offered in recent work by Mark Alfano, and applied in different ways to responsibilist and reliabilist virtue epistemology⎯it is argued that this critique of virtue epistemology is ultimately unsuccessful. In particular, it is claimed that the crucial distinction that needs to be marked is not between responsibilist and reliabilist renderings of virtue epistemology, but rather between modest and robust construals of this position. It is shown that the situationist challenge to virtue epistemology at best only impacts on robust virtue epistemology, but since robust virtue epistemology can be shown on independent grounds to be untenable this is not in itself a cause for concern. Moreover, not only is the empirical data appealed to by Alfano in his situationist critique of virtue epistemology compatible with the more plausible modest rendering of virtue epistemology, but it actually lends additional support to the view over its robust counterpart. It is thus concluded that virtue epistemology, at least when properly understood, has nothing to fear from the empirical data offered by situationists against virtue theory.
The aim of this thesis is to argue that Aristotelian virtue ethics can effectively respond to the situationist challenge. This challenge posits that evidence from social psychology illustrates that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. It is argued that the rarity response strategy allows virtue ethicists to adequately answer the situationist critique. This does not mean that situationism is to be ignored though, as it can make contributions to character development and character education, and should therefore be utilised by virtue ethicists. To make this argument, the thesis will proceed as follows: Chapter One provides background on the situationist challenge and the debate it has created, and identifies two main forms of situationist argument – the Rarity Challenge and the Realism Challenge. Both types of challenge need to be addressed by virtue ethicists if situationism is to be effectively countered. Chapter Two focuses on the Rarity Challenge and argues that the Descriptive Rarity Response (DRR) can answer this challenge. Chapter Three then shows that the DRR account is also unthreatened by Realism Challenges. It is argued that a close reading of both the situationist arguments and the empirical evidence from social psychology reveals that the Realism Challenge to the DRR fails. This does not mean that situationism should be ignored by virtue ethicists though, as it can provide valuable insights into character development and character education. Some examples of these insights are then discussed in Chapter Four. The thesis concludes by maintaining the viability and importance of virtue ethical approaches, while also encouraging empirical engagement and interdisciplinary collaboration between virtue ethicists and psychologists.
To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.
VIRTUE IS RARE: A SAGE FOR THE SITUATIONIST
John Doris's critique of virtue ethics points to a potential challenge for virtue ethics, namely, how virtue theory can remain generally applicable in spite of the fact that virtue is rare. This seems to point to an underlying assumption of virtue ethics, which takes for granted moral education and the possibility of moral development while accepting the rarity of those who become wholly virtuous. Virtue is rare, but the difficulties that emerge from Doris's critique are not a result from the rarity of virtue, but rather from a misunderstanding of virtue theory, and moral cultivation. It is my contention that Doris does not recognize the value virtue theory places in both the manifestation of virtue and the possibility of moral success in certain stages of moral cultivation. Utilizing the Confucian virtue theory of Mengzi, I will demonstrate how his theory puts to rest the objections Doris puts forward by invoking the rarity of virtue, as Mengzi promotes a theory that has as its foundation a description of behavioral moral virtues, while maintaining the rarity of the sage. I certify that the Abstract is a correct representation of the content of this thesis _______________________________________ ___________________ Chair, Thesis Committee Date v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First and foremost this paper is dedicated to my beautiful wife Tabitha and my two kids Achilles and Alexis. I choose to follow my dreams so that you three will not be afraid to follow yours. Next I would like to thank my entire committee Dr. Abrol Fairweather, Dr. Mohammad Azadpur, and Dr. Justin Tiwald. No words can express how fortunate I am to learn from such esteemed mentors. Finally I would like to thank my father Rodney Puniwai, for he has taught me the meaning of moral excellence. His example and the results of his efforts are the very reasons that I argue for the existence of such virtue.
Article Dispositions and Skills: An Argument for Virtue Ethics against Situationism
Virtue ethics faces a critique from the situationism regarding the its emphasis on robust and stable dispositions that supposedly determine one's behavior. According to situationists, virtuous dispositions fall short of the expected 1.0 correlation between virtue possession and behavior manifestation, as evidenced by the results of social psychology experiments which show that situational factors can determine one's behavior more than dispositions can. John Doris, the situationists' champion, recommends that we abandon our efforts in cultivating virtue in favor of honing our situational sensitivity. This essay responds to the critique by showing that the expected correlation between dispositions and behavior rests on a conceptual confusion surrounding the word "disposition." In order to avoid this confusion and to recover ancient Greek insights on virtue, the essay proposes that we view virtue as analogous to a skill that also involves intellectual and motivational structures, not merely dispositions. The skill analogy implies that we should not give up on cultivating virtue, as virtue is not static but constantly developing with experience.
ON VIRTUE ETHICS AND SITUATIONISM
Filocracia, 2015
In consideration of the works of Doris, Annas, Kamtekar, and Adams, the paper intends to examine the moral claims of virtue ethics and situationism in relation to and towards the conception of moral identity, autonomy, and authority of reflection. These conceptions would serve as groundwork for the ethical subject to approach situations and circumstances in her life. This would lead to a form of self-actualization ethics.