Sh. Paronyan, A. Rostomyan, "On the Interrelation between the Rational and Emotional Minds in Speech" (original) (raw)
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The word emotions is a composed term. The roots of this word may be found in latin, the verb emoveo, emovere, emovi, emotum. This verb is a composed word, the main theme is relating about the actions of moving from, or towards. We are speaking about a movement. 1 Originally, this verb was used regarding the transfer from a place to another. From this point of view, we may affirm that the emotions are leaving one condition towards another, or a disruption of the previous state of mind. This is why the emotions are being understood to be an internal movement which may disrupt intentionally or without intention, contributing to the complex changes of the body, of the attitudes and behavior.2 The emotions are a sudden disruption process, which is rather a conclusion of a psychological situation, and determined by it. It is being signalized by the changes produced in the smooth muscles, in the glands and in the behavior.3 But still, the emotions are responsible for many phenomena. These phenomena may be described by the use of the term " affective processes ". These affective processes are including the feelings of pleasure and trouble which are linked with the smell, taste, touch stimulators, colors, sound and other forms of sensory stimulation. Also these affective processes are including the negative feeling of starvation, thirst, pain, fatigue, but also the positive feelings of the body which are appearing when the above mentioned states are being fulfilled. The emotions are also linked with the actions taken regarding the need of eating, drinking, sleeping, aversion, indignation etc. The emotions are linked with all aspects regarding the sentiments of morality, aesthetics, religious, intellectual and social factors. They are being based on the previous experiments and education. The emotions are responsible for maintaining the moods of happiness, excitement, depression, anxiety, sadness etc; but also the feelings of fear, laugh, crying, sexual excitement, embarrassment, shame, suffering etc. the affective processes, known as emotions are responsible for the individual temperaments. Although the temperaments are relatively steady, they may modify during the lifetime, being under the influence of the growth, education, environment, and even by the health situation. Of course, we may not set boundaries for the emotions and the processes they are generated. The boundaries are limitless regarding the affective processes. The emotions may be interpreted from the exogenous perspective which affirms that the human develops and adapts to the reality through the reproductions of the world and the endogenous perspective pointing that the measure of the things is given by the subjective world of the human.4 The endogenous perspective seems to be the best for the social-biological frame, in which the processes of evolution and adaptation represents the main clues of the responsibility of forming the emotions, and the social-cultural perspective, where the emotions are dominating the diagrams of given culture and societies. The endogenous perspective seems to dominate the interpretations of the phenomenological and existential psychology. The modern cognitive theory of emotions is rather trying to link these two extreme points. Regarding the interpretations of the emotions, we have the physiological psychology, which emphasizes the importance of the physiological foundations and the phenomenological psychology, which underlines the importance of the interior experience.5 Accordingly to the physiological psychology all the affective processes should be described with the physiological categories. Some affirm that the emotions are physiological states of the body. The second, that is the phenomenological psychology, states that the structure which makes possible the identification of the brain structures and the intermediary paths between the
Between the thin lines of psychology, philosophy and end even cognitive linguistics, neurology, neuroanthropology and robotics, the concept of embodied cognition 1 has received a lot of attention in recent research. From the perspective of grounded cognition, our perception and concepts of the world are deeply connected to our bodily experiences, our tastes, color, texture, shape, and even fear and anger. Against a Cartesian duality, the notion of embodiment denotes a unified, close relation between brain functions and the body. Contrary to the early modal theories rendering that emotions are not separate from cognition, the emergence of embodied cognition posits that our perception and understanding of emotions is closely related to our physical experiences. Recent views in the field of cognitive linguistics, and especially cognitive semantics, place embodiment at the center of importance for "mind" sciences, as language meanings are "embodied" and thus expressed between interlocutors through their bodily experiences . The importance of embodiment and sensory-motor functions is further highlighted in terms of creating a link between high and low cognition, namely perception and language processing and comprehension respectively, as the latter stimulates the motor system (Jirak et al, 2010). Simply put, from the perspective of cognitive science, embodiment is defined as the influence of the body on language and thought, and generally, on the mind .
The Cambridge Handbook of Sociopragmatics, 2020
This chapter presents a sociopragmatic approach to the study of affect and emotion, taking into account the fact that human emotions are conceptualized and linguistically expressed by means of speech acts within different and various affective practices. Key theories addressing the topic from a linguistic and discourse-pragmatic perspective are outlined and critically discussed, arguing for the need to broaden the scope of research towards a more complex, multidisciplinary and multidimensional analysis of emotion. Thus, the main findings of approaches such as those of functional linguistics, cognitive linguistics, social and cultural theories, and sensory pragmatics are also outlined. The relationship between emotion and other discursive phenomena such as stancetaking, (im)politeness, swearing, humor or irony is highlighted, as is the relationship between emotion and evaluation. Finally, an analysis of a videotaped narrative of personal experience is presented, emphasizing the importance of both deconstructing the different elements of discursive emotion and formulating appropriate research questions, in order to shed light on the crucial sociopragmatic aspects of affective relational practices.
The Preliminary Material of my New Book LANGUAGE AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURES OF EMOTION
This book examines linguistic expressions of emotion in intensional contexts and offers a formally elegant account of the relationship between language and emotion. The author presents a compelling case for the view that there exist, contrary to popular belief, logical universals at the intersection of language and emotive content. This book shows that emotive structures in the mind that are widely assumed to be not only subjectively or socio-culturally variable but also irrelevant to a general theory of cognition offer an unusually suitable ground for a formal theory of emotive representations, allowing for surprising logical and cognitive consequences for a theory of cognition. Challenging mainstream assumptions in cognitive science and in linguistics, this book will appeal to linguists, philosophers of the mind, linguistic anthropologists, psychologists and cognitive scientists of all persuasions.
A Cognitive Study of Emotion Concept in English and Indonesian Language
Gema Febriansyah
The concept of emotion is one expression that shows how sense works in the language. In this case, the language is like to have a container that can hold these emotions. Container metaphor will enable us to see how some of the language we use to talk about the emotions has the meaning it has. Metaphorical expressions are widely used in everyday language. The container metaphor making sense of certain linguistic expressions. This paper aims to examine how metaphorical expressions of emotion are employed in English and Indonesian through the image-schema. Specifically, there are two research problem that I want to discussed in this paper, that are how the emotion concept is represented as a container metaphors in English and Indonesian language and whether container metaphor exist in both language. The theory that used in this paper is the concept of emotions as proposed by Kövecses (1990) and also the support theory that I used is about conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). The analysis emotive metaphorical expressions of emotions were analysed according to these metaphorical mappings. This study certainly indicates that English and Indonesia share many metaphorical expressions of emotion that is based on the general body experience. This paper also concludes that various differences in meanings are associated with the metaphorical expressions of the English and Indonesian Language, which are relate to specific different cultural modes in English and Indonesian.
Expression emotion and conversation
1. This paper is an exploration of the place that the expression of emotion, and, in particular, the linguistic expression of emotion, has in our lives; and of the connection of that with the place that emotion has in our lives. In this it is, I believe, continuous with much of the valuable work on the emotions of the last 30 years or so that gives a central place to the rational, or cognitive, dimensions of emotion, and, with that, to the verbal articulation of emotion. A few introductory remarks may help in placing the particular concerns of my own discussion. Emotion does not sit easily within the traditional mind/body divide: the divide that, at least on standard readings, finds its purest articulation in Descartes, but that, I believe, continues to have a powerful, and undesirable, grip on much philosophical thinking. In The Passions of the Soul Descartes presents a detailed and fascinating placing of emotion within a view of the real self as a unified, rational, mind or soul lodged within the body: the former being the seat of consciousness, the latter an external and alien force to be struggled against in my attempts to think clearly and to act as I should. An emotion, say of fear, being a state of consciousness, is a condition of the soul. It is, however, a condition of the soul that is largely determined by bodily forces, and, as such, is characteristically an obstacle to clear thinking. It is, then, bodily processes that generate the feeling and make it resistant to alteration by rational thought. Further, it is those same bodily processes that are directly – that is to say, not by way of the emotion-responsible for what we normally, mistakenly, think of as the behavioural, the bodily, 'manifestations of emotion': that are responsible, for example, for the tremor that we hear in his voice or the transformation that we see in his face. One way to characterize my aim in this paper is to say that I hope to clarify the relation between these two strands in Descartes' thinking: the radical lack of connection between emotion and behavioural manifestations, and the idea that to experience a situation through an emotion is to experience it in a confused way. Within more recent philosophy the difficulty in placing emotion within a traditional mind-body divide finds its clearest expression in the topic's almost total neglect within discussion of huge swathes of the central concerns of the Anglo-American tradition: in the idea that the topic of emotion is one that can be left to a few specialists who happen to be interested in that kind of thing. Indeed, I am inclined to suggest that the neglect of the topic is one of the central manifestations of the continuing grip of Cartesianism. However that may be, I hope to suggest that illumination is to be gained from giving the emotions a more central place in philosophy; and, in particular, in our philosophical thinking about our relations with others, and, with that, in our philosophical thinking language. I will make one further introductory comment, which relates to that last point. It is pretty universally accepted that there are certain emotions that can only be ascribed to a being that possesses language. While the point has a number of dimensions I will focus on its application to possible objects of emotion. Thus, it will be generally agreed that it makes no sense to suppose that a dog might hope that it will be sunny next Thursday, or feel depressed about the result of the election. Now we can ask: how does the possession, or lack of it, of language bear on the possibility of ascribing