What is Behavior? And So What? (original) (raw)

WHAT IS BEHAVIOR? AND WHY IS IT NOT REDUCIBLE TO BIOLOGICAL STATES OF AFFAIRS

This article addresses two longstanding issues in the field of psychology: (1) that of lacking an adequate explication of what is arguably our central concept as a science of behavior, that of "behavior" itself; and (2) that of whether behavior, and especially human behavior, is wholly explicable in terms of, and so reducible to, biological states of affairs, and thus whether the claim from certain quarters that the science of psychology will be superseded by that of biology can be justified. In response to the first issue, a conceptual formulation of behavior is provided; in response to the second, building upon this formulation, I argue that behavior per se is neither explicable in terms of, nor is it reducible to, biological states of affairs. Implications for the science of psychology, including its very survival, are drawn throughout.

On defining behavior: Some notes

Behavior & Philosophy, 2014

This paper attempts to suggest some conceptual preliminaries to a definition of behavior. I begin by distinguishing some different senses of the notion, with emphasis upon that of behavior as the occurrence of an organism's action or reaction. Subsequently, I provide a brief survey of different types of definition, and try to pick out those among them that can in principle be suitable for the notion of behavior taken in that sense as well as for theoretical concerns. Then, I offer a list of desiderata for a definition thereof framed in any of the types picked out. Finally, I illustrate how the distinctions here established can help the detection of conceptual difficulties in definitions of behavior (in that sense of the concept) found in the literature and, more generally, how they can help determine what behavior consists of and what it does not.

Handbook of behaviorism

1999

W. O'Donohue and R.F. Kitchener, Introduction: The Behaviorisms. E.K. Morris and J.T. Todd, Watsonian Behaviorism. L.J. Hays and D.W. Fredericks, Interbehaviorism and Interbehavioral Psychology. N.K. Innis, Edward C. Tolman's Purposive Behaviorism. M.E. Rashotte and A. Amsel, Clark L. Hull's Behaviorism. J. Ringen, Radical Behaviorism: B.F. Skinner's Philosophy of Science. S.W. Bijou, Empirical Behaviorism. H. Rachlin, Teleological Behaviorism. J.E.R. Staddon, Theoretical Behaviorism. W. Timberlake, Biological Behaviorism. E.V. Gifford and S.C. Hayes, Functional Contextualism: A Pragmatic Philosophy for Behavioral Science. D. Bloor, Wittgenstein's Behaviorism. U.T. Place, Ryle's Behaviorism. R.F. Kitchener, Logical Behaviorism. R.E. Gibson, Quine's Behaviorism. Subject Index.

The Myriads of Behavior Science

Much like Earth or Life sciences, behavioral sciences cover a gamut of disciplines concerning the study of behavior. The range of sciences included leads to consider them an interdisciplinary hub or collective term for disciplines focused on the description, explanation, and prediction of behavioral phenomena. I discuss whether behavior analysis can be a promising candidate for becoming a “core network” for the behavioral sciences although this may lead to reject some of the common assumptions in favor of a philosophy of science that better suits this purpose.

Behaviorology: The Natural Science of Behavior

Behaviorology is a natural science that investigates the genetic, physical, and cultural variables that determine behavior, both human and nonhuman. It fills the gap between biology and the materialistic study of sociocultural phenomena. Its basic unit of analysis is the contingent relations between actions and events that follow those actions (i.e., consequences). Like evolutionary biology, the paradigm of behaviorology is selectionistic: certain consequences select (reinforce) behavior. Behaviorologists, in support of their scientific claims, point to a large body of behavioral engineering research having proven efficacy: applied behavior analysis.