A Theory of Pre-Litigation Settlement and Patent Assertion Entities (original) (raw)
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I dedicate this dissertation to my wonderful family, Sedigheh, Amir, Hori and my lovely wife, Farnaz. Thank you for always being there for me. Without your love and support I would not be here today. I would like to thank my committee members for all of the valuable comments and suggestions. Especially, I am deeply grateful to my advisor Professor William Latham for his guidance and advice. v TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES .
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