Nuclear Security in 21st Century: Testing Theory of Deterrence (original) (raw)

Disarmament and arms limitation

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Abstract

We are in the arena of most complexity than the world ever experienced. The strategic setting of the 21st century is very unusual from the threats faced during the Cold War. The risk of a nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia has significantly diminished; other risks - terrorism, cyber war, climate change - have grown. But those risks may have also nuclear dimension. Again there are several state to state tensions across the world like South Korea-North Korea, Iran-Israel, Iran-US. These tensions may escalate to nuclear height. So it is pretty sure that nuclear threats did not end with the Cold War.

Today, there are 433 nuclear reactors in operation around the world and the IAEA projects that an additional 90 will approach online by 2030. It is possible to make the nuclear power plants to nuclear weapon building plants within a short time-frame and can make the nuclear weapon holders’ list larger which can significantly increase vulnerability derived from unwise step regarding use of it or safety of preserving it. Again there can be nuclear disaster like Chernobyl disaster (1986) or Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (2011). So a nuclear disaster is likely to happen both intentionally or unintentionally.

In assessing relevance of nuclear weapon both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.

Deterrence, the reason behind retaining nuclear weapon, will not work against any nonstate entities even to failed states, or in the situations where the probability of attack is very high or in a situation of war where one party is about to be looser. The potential effects of nuclear weapons are so devastating that relying on the risky theory of deterrence is irresponsible hence peace through nuclear balancing is obsolete.

Table of Contents

CONTENTS PAGE
NO.
Introduction
Understanding the nuclear weapons threat
Who has the nuclear weapon?
Risk associated with Atomic-weapon
Legitimacy of nuclear weapon
Questioning legitimacy of nuclear weapon
Dangerous trends of nuclear security:
nuclear power expansion & growth
Window of opportunity reflected from quote
Steps to a Safer World
Conclusion
Table 1: Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in
the World
Table 2: World Countries with Nuclear
Weapons Stockpiles
Figure1: Projections of Nuclear Generation
Capacity Worldwide: 2020-30
Figure 2: Increase in Nuclear Power Capacity
and Generation 1971-2006

Introduction

Nuclear threats did not end with the Cold War. The strategic setting of the 21 st century is very unusual from the threats faced during the Cold War. The risk of a nuclear war between the U.S. and Russia has significantly diminished; other risks - terrorism, cyber war, climate change have grown. But those risks may have also nuclear dimension. Again there are several state to state tensions across the world like South Korea-North Korea, Iran-Israel, Iran-US. These tensions may escalate to nuclear height in anytime. So, today’s nuclear threats come in possible all shapes.

Today, there are 433 nuclear reactors in operation around the world and the IAEA projects that an additional 90 will approach online by 2030. It is possible to make the nuclear power plants to nuclear weapon building plants within a short time-frame and can make the nuclear weapon holders’ list larger which can significantly increase vulnerability derived from unwise step regarding use of it or safety of preserving it. Again there can be nuclear disaster like Chernobyl disaster (1986) or Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (2011). So a nuclear disaster is likely to happen both intentionally or unintentionally.

Understanding the nuclear weapons threat

While it has been more than twenty years since the end of the Cold War, the existence of thousands of nuclear weapons continues to pose a serious global threat. The likelihood of a nuclear war between the United States and Russia has decreased, but the continued presence of large stockpiles makes the
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a persistent risk. Many of the countries with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as India and Pakistan, are actively engaged in regional conflicts, making the possibility of regional nuclear war a concern. North Korea illicitly acquired nuclear weapons, and other countries, including Iran and Syria, have violated their nuclear Safeguards commitments and are suspected of covertly pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities. In the post-9/11 world, the potential for catastrophic nuclear terrorism is also a serious threat. A number of efforts by governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations are underway to attempt to mitigate the nuclear threat-but significantly reducing the risk of nuclear weapons use will require the sustained longterm commitment of the entire international community.

Who has the nuclear weapon?

Nine countries are known or widely considered to possess nuclear weapons: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is estimated these nine countries collectively hold over 20,500 nuclear warheads. 1{ }^{1} The United States and Russia possess approximately 95%95 \% of the world’s nuclear weapons. 2{ }^{2} While the possibility of intentional nuclear war has greatly

[1]

  1. 1{ }^{1} Shannon N. Kile, Vitaly Fedchenko, Bharath Gopalaswamy and Hans M. Kristensen, “World Nuclear Forces,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2011: Armaments, Disarmament, and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 320-359.
    2{ }^{2} Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 2010, pp. 77-83. ↩︎

decreased since the end of the Cold War, ongoing regional tensions between nucleararmed countries such as India and Pakistan pose a continued risk in this regard. Furthermore, the continued existence of large deployed nuclear arsenals in many of the nuclear possessing states poses risks of accidental or unauthorized use. However, disarmament progress is not historically unprecedented. South Africa voluntarily disclosed and dismantled its nuclear weapons program, and following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine voluntarily transferred the Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories to Russia and joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

Risk associated with Atomic-weapon

While debate on the nature and severity of risks associated with nuclear energy will always remain, it is easy to define a set of risks that are almost universally acknowledged. These include:

  1. Nuclear warfare between states
  2. Continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear materials to states and non-state actors
  3. Terrorists or non-state actor acquisition or use nuclear weapons or nuclear materials
  4. Terrorists or non-state actors attack on a nuclear facility
  5. Loss or diversion of nuclear weapons or materials by a state to unauthorized uses.

The fact that there is a strong consensus on the existence of these risks is evidence that we remain in an era of nuclear insecurity. This becomes even clearer when we note that most major trends influencing the probability of these
risks continue to run in a negative direction. The noticeable trends are as following:

  1. Global quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials are increasing
  2. The number of nuclear armed or nuclear weapon-capable states is expanding
  3. Terrorist and non-state actor interest in nuclear capabilities is rising
  4. Nuclear technologies are spreading to areas of the world that lack political and economic stability
  5. Global institutions created to address the risks of nuclear energy use are under stress. Their legitimacy and, capabilities are increasingly challenged. (mainly to the NPT, IAEA and nuclear export controls)

The continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of the most pressing security issues of our time, yet the empirically-based study of international nuclear history remains in its infancy.

Legitimacy of nuclear weapon

Most of the peace proponents and liberal theorists suggest elimination of nuclear weapon. But the realist theorists prescribe to retain and to create nuclear-weapon. Only recently, in Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (March, 2012) most of the world leaders have announced to eliminate nuclear weapon. Just after few months (in August, 2012) Kenneth N. Waltz 3{ }^{3} an important strategic analyst of this time has published an article namely ‘Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: nuclear balancing would mean stability’ in Foreign Affairs Magazine supporting nuclear

[1]

  1. 3{ }^{3} Kenneth N. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. ↩︎

Iran. So it is the deterrence theory that is giving legitimacy to retain nuclear weapon and even test the nuclear weapon in present time to make deterrence credible and effective. Deterrence theorists argue that nuclear weapon has not been produced for war value rather for its deterrence value as use of it would cause mutual extinction. This deterrence deterred the Cold War from becoming a hot war, India-Pakistan was confined in limited war. But liberal theorists do not want to talk about the deterrence theory rather they desire to bring the risk associated with nuclear weapon and explain the situation cold war not to be turned as a hot war sheer as luck not anything else.

Questioning legitimacy of nuclear weapon

In assessing relevance of nuclear weapon both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.

Any hypothesis on nuclear politics is very much controversial and subjected to criticize by the opponents. Let’s take an inquisitive look on some points, although one or two are regarded as highly controversial.
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This statement is called revolutionary and transformational. Revolutionary in a sense that it refutes the long believed deterrence theory which theoretically asserts that it has the ability to deter aggression. And transformational in a sense that it will lead to a nuclear weapon free international system and security environment would be better.
Nuclear deterrence is hazardous as there is a plausibility of acquiring nuclear weapon of International terrorists’ organizations, and there is evidence of such claim.

Nuclear deterrence is increasingly hazardous because:

  1. The existence of nuclear weapons and directly weapons-usable nuclear materials present opportunities for terrorists to acquire the means to conduct a nuclear attack.
  2. Nuclear deterrence motivates nuclear proliferation. Continued embrace of nuclear weapons as a central element of national defense capabilities by some states encourage others to rely upon or to seek nuclear weapons. (example, U.S.-China, India-Pakistan)
  3. Regions in which new nuclear-armed states are emerging are unstable.
  4. Recent nuclear proliferants lack the financial, technical and institutional resources to keep nuclear weapons and materials secure.
  5. Emerging nuclear-armed states share disputed borders, have limited experience with nuclear weapons safety and security and have vulnerable early warning and nuclear weapon control capabilities

Nuclear deterrence is increasingly ineffective because:

  1. The conditions that required mutual deterrence during the Cold War have changed. There are no major conflicts among leading states. sates defines its security in terms of the elimination of failure of rival states with the exception of Iran’s rhetoric towards Israel .
  2. Terrorist organizations are not sufficiently deterred from attacks by the threat of nuclear retaliation, nor would such retaliation be wise or credible for cases in which a national government was not directly involved in an attack.
  3. Nuclear deterrence carries with it an unacceptable level of failure, with catastrophic consequences.
  4. In the 21st 21^{\text {st }} century nuclear deterrence is subject to the same criticism leveled at arms control a decade ago “where it is necessary it’s impossible and where it’s possible it is unnecessary.”

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This is true because of two main dynamics of international affairs. The first dynamic can be called “loose coupling”. One nation may acquire nuclear arms because of a threat from a neighboring or regional rival, but that acquisition motivates proliferation by states other than the intended target of deterrence. Any state within the range of nuclear strikes will likely feel a need for its own nuclear deterrent.

An example of loose coupling is that while India does not formulate its nuclear force requirements by evaluating U.S. nuclear posture, it certainly does assess Chinese nuclear forces and doctrine when making nuclear-force structure decisions. Correspondingly, China’s nuclear forces are shaped by U.S. nuclear doctrine and capabilities. In this way, nuclear decisions taken mainly within the context of a traditional nuclear dyad such as the United States and Russia or India and Pakistan cast influence on states outside of that dyad. Iran’s growing nuclear capabilities will likely motivate proliferation not only in Israel but also in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Syria and other regional states. It should come as no surprise if one of the first actions a future independent Iraq will take is to revitalize its nuclear capabilities.

Proliferation anywhere can also undermine the consensus within multilateral coalitions to implement strategies to counter proliferating states. This is best illustrated by the growing acceptance of India’s nuclear arsenal. Why should other states join nonproliferation initiatives and restrain their own nuclear ambitions when states such as India, Pakistan Israel and North Korea seem to be paying no price for proliferation. Indeed these states are the most unencumbered nuclear, states; they retain arsenals without even the obligation of the P5 within the NPT to work towards their elimination. Certainly this dynamic lowers Iran’s calculation of the cost of proliferation.

The third point is that the “NPT is in danger of collapsing under the weight of its own internal contradictions.”

The NPT cannot sustain itself in its present form with 184 states forswearing nuclear weapons and 5 permitted to retain them. It suffers from multiple crises. This has created a sense of inequality and “have” and “have not”. Experts opine dual standards of anything cannot sustain and history also does not agree with it.

Dangerous trends of nuclear security: nuclear power expansion & growth

The list of the current elements of the nuclear security regime is long, and in many ways impressive. The problem is that it is not comprehensive, cohesive, and current given the evolution of nuclear threats and challenges in the 21st 21^{\text {st }} century. That threat has gone through many evolutions from the superpower arms race, to rogue regimes, to loose nukes, to nuclear terrorism. Today, the threat is all of those issues as well as the expansion of fissile material stockpiles and nuclear reactors in volatile regions.

The twin risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation are high on the list of threats confronting the world’s major powers. The stakes are enormous: depending on circumstances, a single nuclear weapon exploded by a terrorist organization in a major city could cause hundreds of thousands of immediate deaths and untold suffering to many others from injuries, radiation poisoning, and economic deprivation. All major powers are vulnerable to this danger; Beijing, Delhi, Moscow, Washington, and cities in Western Europe are all plausible targets.

The 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review and National Security Strategy (NSS) identified nuclear terrorism as the greatest and most urgent threat facing the United States. 4{ }^{4} One reason is that Osama bin Laden had stated that he considers it to be a religious duty to obtain nuclear weapons, and there is some evidence that al-Qaeda has pursued such a capability. 5{ }^{5} However, not all countries accept the priority of the danger posed by nuclear terrorism. Some consider it to be an obsession of developed nations and a problem primarily for the nuclear weapons states. But this is an incorrect reading of the danger. A man/group/organization with such a desire is a potential terrorist. And in maintain perfect security, a potential terrorist is a terrorist.

The larger amounts of nuclear material in weapons states may increase security vulnerabilities, but they also have the most developed security systems and guard forces. It is important to recognize that even small amounts of material in any country, if not

[1]

  1. 4{ }^{4} Nuclear Posture Review, US Department of Defense, April 2010,
    http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20po sture%20review%20report.pdf; National Security Strategy, The White House, May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\_viewer/ national_security_strategy.pdf (Accessed on February 4, 2013)
    5{ }^{5} Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/al-qaeda-wmdthreat.pdf. (Accessed on February 5, 2013) ↩︎

adequately protected, are a danger. Some developing countries also see the intensified international political focus on nuclear material security and the NSS process as a potential means of impeding their access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and as a result remain skeptical.

The major concern about nuclear terrorism is the potential access of terrorists to fissile and high intensity radiological material. There is a very large stockpile of fissile material around the globe-rough estimates put it at 1,440 tons of HEU and 495 tons of plutonium. 6{ }^{6} About half the world’s fissile material is in military stockpiles and the rest is in civilian stockpiles.

The largest fissile material stockpiles are in the United States and Russia. 7{ }^{7} But much also exists in Britain, France, China, and Japan. And the security for nuclear materials around the globe is uneven, particularly in the civilian sector. This security vulnerability becomes even more acute when the material and security problems are in dangerous neighborhoods of the world, where nations possessing the material do not have strong governance. For example, 10 tons of HEU is used in civilian applications in nonnuclear weapon states with the largest stockpiles in Belarus, Ukraine, and South Africa. 8{ }^{8}

Nuclear smuggling is one window into the threat and it is a reality. According to the IAEA, there have been 1,600 cases of illicit nuclear

[1]trafficking since 1993. 9{ }^{9} There have been 18 cases of the theft or loss of HEU or plutonium. 10{ }^{10} None of the HEU that was recovered was reported missing from the facility from which it disappeared. 11{ }^{11} There have also been at least three cases of holding radiological sources for ransom. 12{ }^{12}

In addition, two teams of armed men attacked a South African site that contained hundreds of kilograms of HEU. 13{ }^{13} Terrorists have been seen on reconnaissance missions near a Russian nuclear weapon storage site. 14{ }^{14}

Compounding the danger posed by the existing stockpiles of fissile materials is the anticipated growth of nuclear facilities and power around the globe-but in particular in historically unstable regions. This expansion cannot be ignored and needs to be addressed in a clear and creative way. The growth of nuclear power is a global reality and the regime for protecting

[2]

  1. 6{ }^{6} “Global Fissile Material Report 2011,” International Panel on Fissile Materials (2011): 2, 3. http://www.ipfmlibrary.org/gfmr11.pdf. (Accessed on February 4, 2013)
    7{ }^{7} Ibid.
    8{ }^{8} Ibid., 9; “Securing the Bomb 2010,” 44. ↩︎
  2. 9{ }^{9} Tim Andrews, “Strengthening Global Nuclear Security: The Role of the IAEA,” speech given at the Nuclear Security Conference, King’s College London, February 18, 2010.
    10{ }^{10} Conversations with IAEA officials, 2010. In: Luongo, Kenneth N. (2012) Nuclear Security Governance for the 21st Century: Assessment and Action Plan, US-Korea Institute : USA .
    11{ }^{11} Ibid.
    12{ }^{12} Ibid.
    13{ }^{13} Michael Wines, “Break-In at Nuclear Site Baffles South Africa,” The New York Times, November 15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/15/world/africa/15jobur g.html. (Accessed on February 6, 2013)
    14{ }^{14} Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism: How Serious a Threat to Russia?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, September/October 2004, http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_2010021 7_5906. php. (Accessed on February 4, 2013) ↩︎

these materials and facilities needs to evolve with this reality. The accident at Fukushima, in addition to highlighting the global impact of an accident at a nuclear power plant, has distorted the once clear line between nuclear safety and nuclear security. Although the accident was caused by nature, the radiation release and the way in which the reactors were affected were indistinguishable from an act of terrorism.

Today, there are 433 nuclear reactors in operation around the world and the IAEA projects that an additional 90 will come online by 2030. The Fukushima accident is expected to potentially slow nuclear power growth, but not stop it. 15{ }^{15} One area of significant growth is expected to be in countries that already have operating nuclear plants, particularly in the Far
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East. 16{ }^{16}

[1]In January 2012, China was generating 1.8 percent of its
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electricity from 16 nuclear reactors. 17{ }^{17} An additional 29 reactors are currently under construction out of a total of 51 that are planned. Japan typically generates 29.2 percent of its electricity from more than 50 nuclear reactors. 18{ }^{18} Two of 10 planned reactors have been under construction, but Japan’s nuclear future is being reconsidered in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident in March 2010. Currently, only two of its reactors are in service. 19{ }^{19} In the Republic of Korea (ROK), 34.6 percent of its electricity is generated by 26 reactors. 20{ }^{20} At the start of 2013, four planned reactors were under construction.

The ROK wants to become one of the world’s top three nuclear reactor exporters by 2030 through securing 400400\400 400 billion worth of nuclear energy-related contracts and exporting 80
pub.iaea.org/ MTCD/Publications/PDF/RDS1_31.pdf. (Accessed on February 4, 2013)
17{ }^{17} “World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements,” World Nuclear Association, January 1, 2012, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html. (Accessed on February 10, 2013)
18{ }^{18} Ibid.
19{ }^{19} “Japan nuclear reactor operating rate hits record low 6.1%6.1 \% in February,” The Mainichi Daily News, March 10, 2012,
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20120310p2g00m 0dm021000c.html (Accessed on February 10, 2013)
20{ }^{20} Another Japanese Nuclear Reactor Suspended," Times Live, January 25, 2012, http://www.timeslive.co.za/ scitech/2012/01/25/another-japanese-nuclear-reactorsuspended. (Accessed on February 10, 2013)

  1. 15{ }^{15} “IAEA Projects Slower Nuclear Growth After Fukushima,” IAEA General Conference News, September 22, 2011,
    http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/2011/nuclgrowth.ht ml. (Accessed on February 4, 2013)
    16{ }^{16} The IAEA classifies the following countries at the “Far East”: Cambodia, China, DPRK, Japan, ROK, Lao, Macau (China), Mongolia, Philippines, Taiwan (China), and Vietnam. See: “Energy, Electricity and Nuclear Power Estimates for the Period up to 2050,” Reference Data Series 1, 2011 Edition, IAEA, http://www- ↩︎

reactors. In 2009, 67 percent of South Korea’s plant building deals were in the Middle East. 21{ }^{21}

The Middle East is a region with very little nuclear infrastructure but potentially significant future growth in nuclear power. At least half a dozen nations are contemplating nuclear reactor construction with several already moving forward. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has completed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States, and the US is in the process of negotiating similar agreements with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In December 2009, South Korea secured a contract to supply the UAE with four light water reactors (LWR) by 2030. South Korea also won a contract to supply Jordan with its first 5 MW nuclear research reactor in December 2009. 22{ }^{22} Jordan has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with more than 10 countries in preparation for purchasing its first nuclear power reactor that it wants to be operational by 2020. Iran’s Bushehr ( 915 MWe ) reactor became operational in May 2011, was connected to the grid in September 2011, and began commercial operation in January 2012. 23{ }^{23} Turkey is also interested in building nuclear power reactors, and the ROK

[1]has offered to build them. 24{ }^{24} An MOU was signed by Turkey and the ROK in June 2010. In May 2008, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the US and Turkey entered force.

The expansion of nuclear infrastructure and materials in historically volatile regions like the Middle East in an age of radical terrorism heightens the need to construct higher and more robust protective barriers. This will require governments to think more creatively about the evolution of the governance structures for nuclear safety and security. But, it also requires the nuclear energy industry to accept more responsibility for the protection of its products. In this regard, a significant portion of the nuclear energy industry has taken an important voluntary step in accepting the Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct. This is a common set of guidelines that major nuclear exporters have agreed to apply when considering sales of reactors and other technologies. The principles create common standards of practice including committing suppliers to ensure that purchasers of nuclear technologies have adequate security procedures in place. 25{ }^{25}

[2]

  1. 21{ }^{21} Christian Oliver and Robin Wigglesworth, “S Koreans build big Middle East presence,” Financial Times, July 4, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/50a7ec64-8794-11df-9f37-00144feabdc0.html (Accessed on February 10, 2013)
    22 “Jordan moving forward to develop nuclear power,” Global Arab Network, July 6, 2010, http://www.english.globalarabnetwork.com/20100706646 9/Energy/jordan-moving-forward-to-develop-nuclearpower.html (Accessed on February 10, 2013)
    23 “Nuclear Energy in Iran,” World Nuclear Association, January 2012, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf119\_nucleariran.html (Accessed on February 10, 2013) ↩︎
  2. 24 “Nuclear Power in Turkey,” World Nuclear Association, December 2011, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf128-nuclear power in turkey.html. (Accessed on February 10, 2013)
    25 “World’s leading nuclear power companies adopt principles of conduct,” Nuclear Power Plant Exporters’ Principles of Conduct press release, September 15, 2011, on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website,
    http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/special/misc/n ppe/principles-press-release.pdf. (Accessed on February 1, 2013) ↩︎

Again the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries poses greater dangers. An exchange between warring nations involving tens of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic, likely killing millions in the near term and many more over a longer period of time. Nor would the effects be limited to the immediate battlefield. Over time, the consequences would spread as radioactive debris was carried into the atmosphere; the ill effects on the health of farflung populations would endure for generations.

Despite the enormity of these risks, national leaders have been unwilling to take the necessary steps to deal with nuclear weapons. Perhaps, leaders prefer the known risks of the current situation to the unknown, but imagined, risks of a future without nuclear weapons. Psychologists teach us that people typically prefer known present risks to an uncertain future. 26{ }^{26}

Yet in the absence of extraordinary efforts to contain and reverse proliferation, we face a deteriorating nuclear order. In addition to the five declared nuclear weapon states that existed when the landmark Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was signed in 1968-China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States-the world has now seen the emergence of four more nuclear-armed nations: India and Israel in the 1970s, Pakistan in the 1980s, and North Korea in the past few years,

[1]with Iran a possible 10th member of the club in a few years.

True, there have been some accomplishments, particularly South Africa’s decision in 1979 to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, the Clinton administration’s successful initiative to persuade Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to return to Russia the nuclear weapons left on their soil following the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the Bush administration’s success in persuading Libya to give up its fledgling nuclear-weapon program in 2004. On the whole, however, the trend has been negative. And the reactions to the latest two additions to the nuclear club are likely to be staggering. In East Asia, it is hard to believe that Japan and South Korea will remain non-weapon states indefinitely unless North Korea gives up its newfound weapon capabilities; both are technically capable of producing nuclear weapons relatively quickly. The situation in the Middle East is worse: a dozen states are already exploring civilian nuclear technologies-the first step toward a weapons capability-in response to the Iranian program.

Table 1: Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in the World 27{ }^{27}

Country Continent(s) Military Bases With Active Nuclear Weapons
Russia Asia / Europe 48
United States North America 15
China Asia 8−148-14
Pakistan Asia 8
France Europe 7
India Asia 5

27
http://www.blatantworld.com/feature/the world/nuclear_ weapons stockpiles.html (Accessed on February 9, 2013)

  1. 26{ }^{26} Paul Slovic and Elke U. Weber, “Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events” (paper presented at the conference Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World, Palisades, NY, April 12-13, 2002), 10, 21 September 2009, www.ldeo.columbia.edu/chrr/documents/meetings/roundt able/white papers/slovic wp.pdf. (Accessed on February 1, 2013) ↩︎
Israel Asia 4
United Kingdom Europe 4
Italy Europe 2
Belgium Europe 1
Germany Europe 1
Netherlands Europe 1
Turkey Asia / Europe 1

Table 2: World Countries with Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles 20{ }^{20}

Country Continent First tests Operational Warheads Total Warheads
Russia Asia / Europe 1949 4,650 12,000
United States North America 1945 2,468 9,600
France Europe 1960 ∼300\sim 300 300
China Asia 1964 ∼180\sim 180 240
United Kingdom Europe 1952 <160<160 225
Israel Asia 1979* unknown 80
Pakistan Asia 1998 unknown 70−9070-90
India Asia 1974 unknown 60−8060-80
North Korea Asia 2006* unknown <10<10
*unverified
World ∼7,700\sim 7,700 ∼22,600\sim 22,600

The size of Russia’s arsenal has dropped by 1,000 warheads, from a total of 13,000 last year, but this drop is slightly deceiving when you consider that it’s ‘operational warheads’ total only dropped by 68. The United States is going in the opposite direction, with 200 new warheads added to it’s total of 9,400 last year. Otherwise, there does not appear to be any other changes, apart from the third obvious one; the United Kingdom has also grown their arsenal, by 40 warheads, to 225 in total. It appears that

[1]western powers are moving away from any form of a speedy disarmament.

In short, there could be a proliferation cascade within a few years as additional states in the Middle East and East Asia react to the new nuclear powers. As the dam breaks, additional countries are likely to re-evaluate their own situations and to secure its security it can pursue nuclear way. And with each new national center of weapons and weapon-grade nuclear materials, the risk that nuclear capabilities might wittingly or unwittingly pass into the hands of terrorists grows. Different from US-USSR enmity, generations-long history of enmity and bloodshed, if war broke out between such countries, the chance of deterring nuclear use would be very uncertain and likely to do so in the future.

Nor can the United States extend the protection of its own deterrent to nations in the Middle East, the heart of proliferation concerns. The credibility of US extended deterrence even to long-standing allies in East Asia and Western Europe has often been questioned. Would the United States really be willing to sacrifice New York for Hamburg, Los Angeles for Tokyo?

Indeed, the more one thinks about the likely cascade of nuclear proliferation to come, the more dangerous the situation appears. Scenarios resulting in the use of nuclear weapons by two nuclear-armed Korean states require little imagination. But let us think farther afield. Imagine a war in Lebanon between a nucleararmed Israel on one side and Syria and Hezbollah on the other, aided by a nucleararmed Iran. If victory were close at hand for one side, would the potential loser be more likely to capitulate or to resort to a nuclear strike? Even worse from a US perspective, imagine a

  1. 20{ }^{20} http://www.blatantworld.com/feature/the\_world/nuclear
    weapons stockpiles.html (Accessed on February 10, 2013) ↩︎

scenario in which the current Pakistani government were overthrown by a radical Islamist movement allied with al-Qaeda that then acquired Pakistan’s arsenal of as many as 200 nuclear weapons. How long would it be before nuclear weapons were detonated in US cities? The world’s leaders must take forceful actions to prevent such catastrophes.

Window of opportunity reflected from quote

The Japanese Diet reaffirmed its long-held support for this goal in a June 2009 resolution stating, “Japan, as the sole country to have suffered nuclear attacks, has the responsibility to take the lead in a campaign toward nuclear disarmament.” 29{ }^{29}

The former Russian president and current prime minister, Vladimir Putin said, “If those who made the atomic bomb and used it are ready to abandon it, along with-I hope-other nuclear powers that officially or unofficially possess it, we will of course welcome and facilitate this process in every possible way.” 30{ }^{30}

President Obama stated during his seminal Prague speech on nuclear disarmament, achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world is a long-term goal that might not be achievable in his lifetime, but that doesn’t minimize the

[1]necessity of taking interim steps to reduce the likelihood of nuclear proliferation. 31{ }^{31}

India’s most well known strategist, K. Subrahmanyan, has written similarly, “India should attempt to regain its earlier reputation as a champion of a nuclear weapon free world.” 32{ }^{32}

In a sign of widespread global support, in December 2008, more than 100 leaders from 23 countries formed the group Global Zero to initiate a worldwide campaign to advocate that the nuclear-weapon states negotiate a treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons with a firm deadline. In June 2009, the group issued an Action Plan under which the goal could be accomplished by 2025.332025 .{ }^{33}

The challenge is to translate this enthusiastic rhetoric and vision into the practical steps necessary to move decisively toward elimination of all nuclear weapons from all nations within a reasonable period of time.

Steps to a safer world

Multilateral negotiations on legally-binding nuclear disarmament measures have proven difficult, as demonstrated by the 15-year

[2]

  1. 29 “Lower House Approves Resolution Urging Nuclear Arms Reductions, Disarmament,” The Mianichi Daily News, June 16, 2009, http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20090616p2a00m0 na014000c.html. (Accessed on February 7, 2013)
    30{ }^{30} “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier,” June 10, 2009, Government of the Russian Federation, 21 September 2009, http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/3039.html. (Accessed on February 7, 2013) ↩︎
  2. 31 “The-Obama-Disarmament-Paradox: A rebuttal,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 24 February 2010, http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/the-obama-disarmament-paradox (Accessed on February 7, 2013)
    32{ }^{32} K. Subrahmanyan, “When Hawks Turn Moral,” Indian Express, January 21, 2008
    33{ }^{33} Gordon Corera, “Group Seeks Nuclear Weapons Ban,” BBC News, December 10, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7774584.stm ; Global Zero Commission, Global Zero Action Plan, 29 June 2009, http://globalzero.org/files/pdf/gzap 3.0/pdf. (Accessed on February 7, 2013) ↩︎

stalemate at the Conference on Disarmament. However, there has been some positive progress in the disarmament sphere, with renewed U.S.Russia bilateral arms reductions occurring under the New START Treaty, and signs of greater political commitment to the disarmament goal by the United States and others in the international community. In 2007, four senior U.S. statesmen - George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn - set forth the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal. 34{ }^{34} The op-ed and subsequent related work lent renewed momentum to nuclear disarmament debates in the United States and other parts of the world. While U.S. President Barack Obama remains committed to maintaining the U.S. nuclear arsenal in the interim, he appears to share the “four horsemen’s” long-term disarmament goal, stating in his famous April 2009 Prague Speech, “today, I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.” 35{ }^{35}

The Nuclear Security Project does more than just call for a world without nuclear weapons; it tackles the challenging process for getting there. In their 36{ }^{36} Wall Street Journal op-eds, the four

[1]principals outlined the urgent and practical steps:

  1. Work with leaders of countries with nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.
  2. Discard Cold War posture of deployed nuclear weapons for U.S. and Russian forces to reduce the danger of accidental, mistaken or unauthorized launch.
  3. Substantially reduce nuclear forces in all countries that possess them.
  4. Eliminate short-range battlefield nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed.
  5. Adopt a process to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into effect.
  6. Secure all nuclear weapons and materials globally to the highest possible standards.
  7. Develop a new international system to manage the risks associated with producing fuel for nuclear power.
  8. Halt the production globally of plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons purposes; phase out the use of HEU in civil commerce and remove weapons-usable uranium from research facilities around the world and render it safe.
  9. Redouble efforts to resolve regional conflicts that give rise to new nuclear powers.
  10. Strengthen verification and enforcement capabilities.

As a part of gaining nuclear security, two Nuclear Security Summits have been held till 2012- one in Washington (2010) and the last is in Seoul (2012). But in these summits nuclear powers are committing to cut down their nuclear warheads slightly, not for disarmament. And in real there is no probability of nuclear

  1. 34{ }^{34} George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007.
    35{ }^{35} The White House: Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Barack Obama,” Hradcany Square: Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April 2009, www.whitehouse.gov.
    36{ }^{36} George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn (Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.) ↩︎

disarmament in near future although most of the people of the world aspire.

Conclusion

Today, nuclear weapons are the world’s greatest threat. We have lived with the danger of nuclear weapons hanging over our heads for more than sixty years. Though they have only been used during wartime twice, we have come too close to nuclear war too often. Today, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons stand at the ready, many on hair trigger alert, threatening the lives of hundreds of millions of people and quite possibly the future of civilization itself. As long as imperfect human beings are in charge of nuclear weapons, the continued existence of these weapons offers too many possibilities for accident or miscalculation. These weapons make us less, not more, secure. If it is not possible to eliminate for deterrence purpose or any other cause, world leaders should make it clear that nuclear weapons will remain unused-either by governments or by extremist organizations. The choice is clear.

If nuclear weapon deters probability of war and nuclear balancing means stability 37{ }^{37}, I want to say with similar and one step forwarding tone with Kenneth N. Waltz, let Iran and other states build nuclear weapon whoever desire to make it. Why we are running after this nation to stop its nuclear program. We were lucky to avoid nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. Some argue deterrence did not save us; it was luck. In any level of ethnic conflict, interstate conflict, or in intervention, probability of nuclear weapon use increases at very high

[1]peace. When U.S. led invasion in Iraq happened it was a high risk of war, the world was in serious danger. The same may happen when U.S led invasion in Libya to assassinate Gaddafi happened. If the authorities had nuclear weapon, biological weapon or any sort of WMD, they would use it for their survival. Again Deterrence will not work against any non-state entities even to failed states, or in the situations where the probability of attack is very high or in a situation of war where one party is about to be looser. The potential effects of nuclear weapons are so devastating that relying on the risky theory of deterrence is irresponsible; hence peace through nuclear balancing is obsolete.

  1. 37{ }^{37} Kenneth N. Waltz, Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability, Foreign Affairs, Volume 91, Number 4, July / August 2012. ↩︎

Bibliography

Tim Andrews, “Strengthening Global Nuclear Security: The Role of the IAEA,” speech given at the Nuclear Security Conference, King’s College London, February 18, 2010.