Nuclear Security in 21st Century: Testing Theory of Deterrence (original) (raw)
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Journal for Studies in Management and Planning Nuclear Deterrence: More Nukes for Stable Peace
Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity-a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. It was widely believed that nuclear weapons were an important factor in maintaining the "long peace" between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. India had sighted it's not so friendly neighbour China as a reason for its nuclearisation. While Pakistan in turn sighted threat from India for going nuclear. Is nuclear deterrence oblique encouragement for nuclear proliferation? Moreover, deterrence in the twenty-first century may be far more difficult than it was in the past, and having the right mix of nuclear capabilities to deal with the new challenges will be crucial. New nuclear powers, characteristics of rivalry, are considered unlikely to maintain stable deterrence. This paper attempts to address the question that has nuclear deterrence theory led to more nuclearisation. And whether it is actually relevant in maintaining stability especially in contemporary scenario?
Critically analyse the nuclear deterrence theory.
Given their overwhelming destructive power, why are nuclear weapons sometimes argued to be a stabilizing force? This has been justified by the theory of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence hypothesizes that if a nation armed with nuclear weapons threatens nuclear retaliation, other countries will refrain from initiating a military attack against it. 1 The dawn of the nuclear age began at Hiroshima, as nuclear weapons threatened to destroy cities. 2 During the Cold War, nuclear deterrence preserved the peace between the two superpowers by making the prospect of total war irrational. There were economic warfare and proxy battles, for example in Afghanistan 3 , but no direct war was recorded. However, during the 1962 Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union came close to nuclear war over the Soviet Union's placement of nuclear weapons in Cuba, and a potential nuclear conflict was therefore narrowly avoided 4 . Since 1945, however, there has never been a nuclear war; not even a single use of a weapon in anger. 5 But will nuclear deterrence ever come close to failing? Diverging views have emerged concerning the theory -some scholars welcome the proliferation of nuclear weapons while others see it as a threat and try to prevent it. This essay will look at the realist perspective, followed by the bureaucratic politics (organizational) theory's point of view, and both will be backed by the stances of political scientists and game theorists such as Iklé, Schelling, Mearsheimer, Bull, Lavoy, Ward. Ultimately however, proliferation of nuclear weapons will only exacerbate the relations between states. Renewed tensions between Russia and the West (with proxies in Syria
Is " Nuclear Deterrence " still a relevant strategy for the 21 st Century
The problem with the current nuclear deterrence, is that the attitude surrounding its basic ideology is still based on a post-war era of inflated egos between entire nations, taking only into account who has the biggest and best. Technology and political landscapes have changed to a point where theories and practices from nearly half a decade ago, are no longer as poignant as they should be. The 21st Century has seen the development of contested and troublesome behaviour. Iran and North Korea’s quests for nuclear capability, US protection of Israel’s desire to maintain their offensive rhetoric surrounding Iran as well as UK and US apparent decrease in hardware whilst adamantly renewing and upgrading their weapons systems, are all examples of problems facing the global community in the 21st Century. The only trouble being, this generation of deterrence theory has the added complications of hybrid warfare, meaning no longer can states instantly identify their attackers. Moreover, their attackers are not the uniformed armies of another nation, they are terror cells, state-sponsored terrorism, lone wolf attackers, cyber attackers and non-uniformed military groups. Developments in cyber warfare as well as the ever-expanding market for private military and security contractors are two examples of the complexity of modern hybrid warfare which cannot be allowed to be compatible with a traditional deterrence theory. This essay will focus on why with the rise of uncertainty-promoting hybrid warfare, nuclear deterrence against conventional nation-nation attacks as well as a deterrent against other aggressive or undesirable actions in general, are both flawed.
2008
Another major conclusion of this study is that although nuclear weapons could have destabilizing consequences in certain situations, on net they have reinforced national security and regional stability in Asia. It is possible to argue that fledgling and small nuclear arsenals would be more vulnerable to preventive attacks; that the related strategic compulsion for early use may lead to early launch postures and crisis situations; that limited war under nuclear conditions to alter or restore the political status quo can intensify tensions and carry the risk of escalation to major war; that inadequate command, control, and safety measures could result in accidents; and that nuclear facilities and material may be vulnerable to terrorist attacks. These are legitimate concerns, but thus far nuclear weapons have not undermined national security and regional stability in Asia. Instead, they have ameliorated national security concerns, strengthened the status quo, increased deterrence domin...
How Reliable is Nuclear Deterrence?
, 2020
Nuclear weapons can serve as a reliable deterrence of war among nations to a great extent, but with an exception of its own. This answer effectively assesses the extent of reliability of the "Nuclear Deterrence Strategy" and its exceptions in today's much-nuclearized world. In doing so, it critically analyses the notion of deterrence, the credibility of existential threat, the balance of terror, the possibility of limited nuclear war, and the presence of multiples nuclear powers and their subsequent impacts on the reliability of nuclear deterrence. To begin with, the notion of nuclear deterrence arises from the basic idea of using nuclear weapons without not actually using them, rather than creating a delicate amount of terror against an adversary by way of signalling a great risk of retaliation or mutually assured destruction that abolishes further combat readiness (second-strike capability) of both sides. Such form of 'Nuclear Deterrence Strategy' was the most effective way of the Soviet Union's aggression until the time where the Soviet's' themselves has developed enough nuclear weapons of their own. After the Soviet's became nuclear powers, the strategy of 'Nuclear Deterrence' has prevented major military confrontations between the two global nuclear powers even where the Cold War tension reaches its maximum height. However, such notion of deterrence significantly depends on the credibility of the existential threat against the interest of the actors; the balance of terror that the actors could entail with their respective threats; the possibility of limited nuclear war which neutralizes the detrimental idea of nuclear alienation; and the presence of multiples nuclear powers and the risks thereof.
THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
The Nonproliferation Review, 2008
Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity*a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.