Core Seminar in Knowledge and Conceptual Processes Psychology 507 Emory University Fall 2007 (original) (raw)
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Dealing with Concepts: From Cognitive Psychology to Knowledge Representation
Concept representation is still an open problem in the field of ontology engineering and, more generally, of knowledge representation. In particular, the issue of representing "non classical" concepts, i.e. concepts that cannot be defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, remains unresolved. In this paper we review empirical evidence from cognitive psychology, according to which concept representation is not a unitary phenomenon. On this basis, we sketch some proposals for concept representation, taking into account suggestions from psychological research. In particular, it seems that human beings employ both prototype-based and exemplar-based representations in order to represent non classical concepts. We suggest that a similar, hybrid prototype-exemplar based approach could also prove useful in the field of knowledge representation technology. Finally, we propose conceptual spaces as a suitable framework for developing some aspects of this proposal.
Psychological Models of Concepts: Introduction
2006
The first half of this two-part volume is concerned with our current understanding of how people conceptualise the world around them. In this introductory chapter, we shall present a brief outline of different approaches that have been proposed in answer to the fundamental questions: what are concepts, and how do people understand, represent and use them? The models presented here are mainly derived from cognitive psychology, although the chapter by Michalski offers a machine learning perspective, while that of Sutcliffe offers a more philosophical critique of current psychological work. Within this book, the general questions to be asked are: What is the place of concepts in current theories of knowledge representation, and what theory of concepts best accounts for how people understand the world around them?
Concepts are usually described as the fundamental constituents of human thought, and new methods of studying the brain, including neuroimaging and neuropsychological perspectives are changing the discourse regarding how concepts are represented in the brain. A primer to brain architecture is provided to explain the location and functions of the different components of the forebrain. Following from Kiefer and Pulvermuller, three dimensions shaping the theorization of conceptual representation are explored, along with the emergent models, with different proposals for the nature of conceptual representation. Further, the semantic hub argument is explored along with the crucial problem of information embodying content, and probable solutions to both.
2011
Confronting the Obstacles and Paradoxes Inherent in Pursuing a Scientific Understanding of the Building Blocks of Human Thought This thesis confronts a fundamental shortcoming in cognitive science research: a failure to be explicit about the theory of concepts underlying cognitive science research and a resulting failure to justify that theory philosophically or otherwise. It demonstrates how most contemporary debates over theories of concepts divide over whether concepts are best understood as (mental) representations or as non-representational abilities. It concludes that there can be no single correct ontology, and that both perspectives are logically necessary. It details three critical distinctions that are frequently neglected: between concepts as we possess and employ them non-reflectively, and concepts as we reflect upon them; between the private (subjective) and public (inter-subjective) aspects of concepts; and between concepts as approached from a realist versus anti-realist perspective. Metaphysical starting points fundamentally shape conclusions. The main contribution of this thesis is a pragmatic, meticulously detailed, and distinctive account of concepts in terms of their essential nature, core properties, and context of application. This is done within the framework of Peter Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces theory of concepts, which is offered as a bridging account, best able to tie existing theories together into one framework. A set of extensions to conceptual spaces theory, called the unified conceptual space theory, are offered as a means of pushing Gärdenfors' theory in a more algorithmically amenable and empirically testable direction. The unified conceptual space theory describes how all of an agent's many different conceptual spaces, as described by Gärdenfors, are mapped together into one unified space of spaces, and how an analogous process happens at the societal level. The unified conceptual space theory is put to work offering a distinctive account of the co-emergence of concepts and experience out of a circularly causal process. Finally, an experimental application of the theory is presented, in the form of a simple computer program. Preface The bulk of chapters Six and Seven has been published in modified form in (Parthemore and Morse, 2010). That paper was produced as an integral part of the present thesis research. The content of these chapters is solely my own. Portions of chapters One and Five are part of another (single-author) paper that is being published as Parthemore (2011). v
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science
Cognitive linguistics has emerged in the last twenty-five years as a powerful approach to the study of language, conceptual systems, human cognition, and general meaning construction.
Symbolic, Conceptual and Subconceptual Representations
Human and Machine Perception, 1997
Cognitive science aims at understanding how information is represented and processed in different kinds of agents, biological as well as artificial. The research has two overarching goals. One is explanatory: By studying the cognitive activities of humans and other animals, one formulates theories of different kinds of cognition. The theories are tested either by experiments or by computer simulations. The other goal is constructive: By building artifacts like chess-playing programs, robots, animats, etc, one attempts to construct systems that can solve various cognitive tasks. For both kinds of goals, a key problem is how the information used by the cognitive system is to be modelled in an appropriate way.
Concept acquisition and the perception of meaning
Contemporary Educational Psychology, 1979
The assumptions underlying the classification rule-learning description of concept acquisition are critically examined. It is argued that categorizing is an outcome of perceiving an entity's meaning, and that neither natural pattern recognition nor comprehension requires that persons must first abstract common features from concept exemplars. An alternative characterization of what it means to have a concept is proposed. The theoretical framework derives from Nelson's functional primacy hypothesis and Gibson's position that knowledge of the world is a product of direct perception. The focus of the discussion ranges from metatheoretical issues to practical implications.
Concepts and meaning: Introduction to the special issue on conceptual representation
Language and Cognitive Processes, 2003
Conceptual representation is arguably the most important cognitive function in humans. It stands at the centre of the information processing flow, with input from perceptual modules of differing kinds, and is centrally involved in memory, speech, planning, decision-making, actions, inductive inferences and much more besides.
The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science
2012
Cognitive science is a cross-disciplinary enterprise devoted to understanding the nature of the mind. In recent years, investigators in psychology, the neurosciences, artificial intelligence, philosophy and a host of other disciplines have come to appreciate how much they can learn from one another about the various dimensions of cognition. The result has been the emergence of one of the most exciting and fruitful areas of interdisciplinary research in the history of science. This volume of original essays surveys foundational, ...