Causing death or allowing to die? Developments in the law. (original) (raw)
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It has long been thought that by using morphine to alleviate the pain of a dying patient, a doctor runs the risk of causing his death. In all countries this kind of killing is explicitly or silently permitted by the law. That permission is usually explained by appealing to the doctrine of double effect: If the use of morphine shortens life, that is only an unintended side effect. The paper evaluates this view, finding it flawed beyond repair and proposing an alternative explanation. It is not the intention of the doctor that counts, but the availability of an "objective" palliative justification.
DEATH, DYING AND EUTHANASIA IN MEDICAL LAW
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Mortal Responsibilities: Bioethics and Medical-Assisted Dying
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A culture of dying characterized by end-of-life care provided by strangers in institutional settings and diminished personal control of the dying process has been a catalyst for the increasing prevalence of legalized physician-assisted dying in the United States and medically-assisted dying in Canada. The moral logic of the right to die that supports patient refusals of life-extending medical treatments has been expanded by some scholarly arguments to provide ethical legitimation for hastening patient deaths either through physician-prescribed medications or direct physician administration of a lethal medication. The concept of medical-assisted dying increases the role and power of physicians in ending life and allows patients who are not terminally ill, or who have lost decision-making capacity, or who are suffering from a irremediable medical condition to have access to medical procedures to hasten death. This extended moral logic can be countered by ethical objections regarding t...
Clinical Medicine, Journal of the Royal College of …, 2003
When is it lawful and ethical to withhold or withdraw treatment and tube feeding? In recent years, the courts have handed down important decisions and medical bodies have issued professional guidelines on withholding and withdrawing treatment and tube feeding. A major criticism of these decisions and guidelines has been that while they prohibit the intentional hastening of a patient's life by an act ('active euthanasia'), they permit the intentional hastening of a patient's death by omission ('passive euthanasia'); and they prohibit actively assisting suicide, but permit passively assisting suicide. By focusing on the landmark decision of the Law Lords in the Tony Bland case, and on the guidelines on withholding and withdrawing treatment and tube feeding issued by the British Medical Association, this paper considers whether this criticism is sound, and concludes that it is.
Physician-assisted suicide (PAS) presents one of the greatest contemporary challenges to the medical profession's ethical responsibilities. Professor Baroness Llandaff commented UK law on physician assisted suicide possesses “stern face and a kind heart” , regrettably however, it still retains an “irrational mind and an unpredictable will.” This essay is not a debate on whether PAS is ‘right or wrong,’ but whether the consequences of a reform in the law, would be better or worse than the status quo. It will focus on four main issues. The ambiguity and inadequacy of current UK law with regards to PAS. Whether the law as it stands results in unnecessary suffering. Examination and rebuttal of the main arguments against a reform in the law. Finally if a reform is needed, what form would it take?
The aim of this research is to reply to some of the most important moral question: Is it " good " to hasten the patient's death? In a situation of terminal illness the principle of proportionality seems too biased in favor of clinical data, but at the same time, the criterion of terminal represents a clinical condition which is necessary, but not sufficient to determine whether to withdraw or to withhold treatment. " Terminal " acquires a predominant position in the definition of the principle of proportionality: one wonders whether and under which conditions its definition is taken for granted. " Terminal " seems to be a diagnosis that offers certain guarantees, but which must not to be considered as final, since it can violate the patient's right to autonomy. The question regarding good actions is substantial when one takes part in a relationship with a patient at the end of his life.