Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System (original) (raw)

Program on Science and Global Security

Faculty and researchers in PS&GS teach science and security courses and policy workshops for Princeton undergraduate and graduate students. Students with undergraduate or master's degrees in science or engineering can pursue PhDs with PS&GS by applying to the Woodrow Wilson School's Science, Technology and Environmental Policy (STEP) Program. Scott Kemp is the first such student. PS&GS also has a fellowship program that enables Princeton science or engineering graduate students to carry out a science and security research project with us while they are pursuing PhDs in their home departments. This fellowship program, initially sponsored by the MacArthur Foundation, provides for one half support for two years for tuition and summer stipends. Babur Habib, an electrical-engineering PhD student, has successfully completed this program as our first fellow. Khosrow Allaf Akbari, an astrophysics PhD student, is our second fellow. Science & Global Security is edited by Feiveson with support from PS&GS. For many science and security researchers, it is the only venue for peer-reviewed publication of technical security studies. It has become an essential institution in the field of sciencebased security studies. It is published in Russian and Chinese, as well as in English and articles are posted to our web site following one year after initial publication in English and immediately in Russian and Chinese respectively.

2016 - Security & Defence Agenda Next steps in missile defence SDA roundtable - Andreu Ginestet

Security & Defence Agenda Next steps in missile defence SDA roundtable, 2012

Find the document published at the ETH Zürich, Switzerland here: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD\_Draft%20Report\_16102012.pdf My contribution to the nuclear debate presents 3 possible concepts for complexity evolution, which make understood that what is at a stake right now is the evolution of complexity. The use of missiles in any war scenario has very little, and if any, very bad effects on reality, which I strongly recommend to not to look for. The official results of the conference were published under the following document, which you can find at the ETH Zürich file archive: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154318/MD\_Draft%20Report\_16102012.pdf The official report does not resolve the dilemma that was discussed in Brussels. It reveals a one-sided and partial perspective and does not uncover the risks at which Europe was. The debate was more difficult than the report tells and the report fails to describe the Russian position as well as the reality of the debate. A real report cannot be published. I miss a peace perspective in the report.

The Continuing Debate on National Missile Defenses

Physics Today, 2000

Concerns about "emerging missile states" have spurred development of a system to defend the US from small-scale ballistic missile attacks. But the planned system could be compromised by simple countermeasures, and the security costs of deployment could be high.

Center for Technology and National Security Policy

2006

This paper examines the idea of creating an American-led extended deterrence regime in the Middle East to address potential Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles. It does not focus on how to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed power. Instead it addresses how the U.S. Government can act to deter Iran in a future setting where it already possesses these weapons and is trying to employ them to geopolitical advantage. Developing a coherent strategy can lessen the risk that the United States will be surprised, compelled to improvise, and unable to lead effectively in the Middle East and elsewhere. Even as the Administration employs diplomacy, sanctions, and multilateral cooperation to derail Iran from the nuclear path, it should also develop a clear sense of how it will react if, as is possible, Iran emerges as a nuclear power, led by a radical government with a menacing foreign policy. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently stated that Iran should consider the consequences of a U.S. "defense umbrella over the region." This paper explores many of the issues related to such an umbrella. Key questions arise regarding an extended deterrence regime. What Iranian threats would this regime try to deter? Who would it protect, and how would it protect them? How much deterrence is possible, and how much is enough? What shape would a deterrence regime take, how would it operate, and would it be effective? What options are available? This paper addresses these and related questions. Its intent is to illuminate issues and options, not to advocate any single approach.

Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland

2007

Ballistic missiles and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons operate using sim-ilar technological means but not with the same level of technology or en-gineering maturity. ASATs require more sophisticated systems engineering and integration requirements to adapt to the challenges posed by an ASAT intercept. The main difficulties arise from the requirements for detection in space and the high closing velocities needed to execute an ASAT inter-cept [1]. These difficulties have been underestimated after the recent Chinese ASAT test by those who have suggested that other nations could in the near-future master this technology gap and convert their primitive ballistic missile capabilities into an effective ASAT weapons capability. This report examines whether Iran could use its modest missile capability to project a viable ASAT threat to US Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) satellites. The study suggests that, even if Iran has an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM), it would not be easily able to le...