Protection of Commercial Satellite Communications Infrastructure (original) (raw)
Related papers
Protecting Our Military Space Systems
1988
OVER THE LAST 25 years the United States has become increasingly dependent on space-based systems to support its military forces, and this trend is likely to continue for some time. Satellite systems have become an integral part of nuclear deterrence by providing strategic warning of an attack, tactical warning of missile launches, reliable communications between command authorities and nuclear forces, and nuclear explosion detection. Satellites also aid in conventional war-fighting by providing accurate reconnaissance, intelligence, weather, and navigation information. Current and future anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon technologies are capable of preventing many of our space systems from carrying out their missions, thereby possibly decreasing the stability of nuclear deterrence and weakening the effectiveness of conventional forces. This paper evaluates a broad range of policy options that could help to protect our space assets. It is found that although unilateral measures could go a long way toward safeguarding satellite systems, bilateral agreements are also necessary if we are to guard against the full range of ASAT threats without generating dangerous instabilities. WHICH SATELLITES TO PROTECT? Not all satellites are equally important to our national security. The United States currently performs four basic types of military missions with satellites that are of interest here: i Communications. About a dozen satellites, grouped in four satellite systems, are used for military and diplomatic communications. Except for two satellites that relay messages to the polar regions, all U.S. military communication satellites are in geostationary orbit (GSO) 36,000 km above the surface of the earth. ii In addition to the systems already in use, an advanced, inter-service satellite communications system called MILSTAR Navigation. The U.S. has two military navigation satellite systems: Transit and NAVSTAR. Transit, which travels in low earth orbit (LEO) at an altitude of about 1,000 km, was developed to aid in the navigation of Polaris submarines. The much newer NAVSTAR system, when complete, will consist of 18 satellites 20,000 km above the earth. Radio signals emitted from the navigation satellites can be used by special receivers on the earth to obtain very accurate position and velocity information. Meteorology. Two DMSP (Defense Meteorological Satellite Program) satellites in LEO process visible and infrared images of the earth to provide information on cloud cover, temperature, and precipitation worldwide. Reconnaissance and surveillance. Under this broad category are grouped several systems that observe electromagnetic signals reflected or emitted from objects on earth. These systems serve different missions: attack warning, nuclear burst detection, photoreconnaissance, and electronic surveillance. Attack warning is provided by three DSP (Defense Support Program) satellites in GSO that detect the infrared emissions of missiles as they are launched. Sensors on two dozen satellites, including those in the NAVSTAR system, can detect and locate nuclear explosions. Photoreconnaissance and electronic surveillance are highly classified programs, but it can be said that a small number of photoreconnaissance satellites travel in LEO, sometimes at altitudes less than 200 km, to obtain high-resolution photographs for use in treaty verification and intelligence. The Soviet Union uses satellites to perform the same missions, but there are three important differences between U.S. and Soviet satellite systems that should be noted here: (a) Soviet satellites have shorter lifetimes, (b) the U.S.S.R. has more single-purpose satellites, and (c) the Soviets have a large number of satellites in Molniya (highly-elliptical) orbits instead of in GSO. The first two factors combine to give the U.S.S.R. a launch rate five times greater iii and a total constellation size nearly twice as great iv as the U.S. This does not mean, however, that the U.S.S.R. has an advantage over the U.S. in space capability. Although it may be true that the Soviets can reconstitute satellite systems more quickly in the event of their destruction by ASATs, it is not clear how valuable this would be in an actual conflict (see below).
Syllabi: Space Security in the 21st Century, spring 2015
2015
This course is designed to explore the security dimensions of space from a policy, regulatory and technical perspective, with an emphasis on the irresponsible or disruptive actions of some space-faring nations in this domain. The course is prepared from the perspective of strategic studies and is consistent with other courses from this security--minded vantage point.
THE UNITED STATES SPACE FORCE IN THE AMERICAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe, 2020
It is often being argued that Russia, China, and other unfriendly nations are developing a wide range of counter-space systems that are able to degrade the U.S. capabilities in space. Among the other measures to address this problem, the separate service has recently been created within the U.S. military, the United States Space Force. It is tasked to combine space-related capabilities to form a unifi ed and so more eff ective service than the existing ones scattered across the armed forces. This article depicts and assesses the primary rationale behind the decision to create USSF, against the broad background of the United States security strategy with particular attention to the role of outer space in it. We will, therefore, fi rstly describe in brief the role of outer space in the security strategy of the United States. Secondly, we will present the current state and mission of the U.S. Space Force and its perspectives. And fi nally, we will address some controversies related to the creation of the new military branch.
Satellite Communications US policy considerations
Regulatory decisions have controlled the possible technical alternatives in the use of artificial satellites, for both domestic and international telecommunications. since the enactment by the US Congress of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. At the same time, advancements in technology have caused satellite systems to play a larger role in telecommunications. An updating of the 1934 Communications Act would allow for a more definitive statement of national satellite policy and for a revised regulatory standard. This article reviews some of the principle factors which have influenced communications satellite policy, and offers additional issues for consideration that can affect the development of communications satellite markets, systems and services.
Space as a New Category of Threats to National Security
Safety & Defense
The scientific considerations presented in this paper concern threats to national security arising from the activity in outer space. The objective of this analysis is to identify these dangers and to propose solutions to minimize them. The theoretical research methods employed in this study are: synthesis, analysis, abstracting and generalization. In the course of the analysis, several modern threats were established, including anti-satellite and hypersonic weapons. Another important sphere discussed in the paper is the cyber security of satellite/communication devices and systems operating in space. With respect to satellite systems, the EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft was presented as one of the concepts developed with the capability of disrupting their operation. The results from the conducted study emphasize the need to create a Space Domain Awareness (SDA) system, which is substantiated by the indication of natural threats that must beminimized, namely space debris, ...
Security in Outer Space: Rising Stakes for Europe
Yearbook on Space Policy, 2019
The ecosystem of the space sector has shifted drastically over the past decades with new technical concepts and business endeavours building on a changing institutional and economic environment. Now a pillar of the modern economy and society, the global space infrastructure enables key services across vital sectors and directly supports public actions to address economic, societal, environmental and security issues at a national and global level. This ever-growing use of space-based data and services by a variety of public and private actors/users has created a virtually invisible dependence on space technologies, which closely relates to Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). As the use of space applications becomes more pervasive, brings more benefits and becomes part of the business-as-usual routine, dependence on space infrastructure intensifies, which creates new vulnerabilities for the economy and society at large.
The United States Defense Space Strategy of 2020
The United States Defense Space Strategy of 2020, 2020
The United States has been beefing up an effort in the space-related security realm for some time now. Organizational changes have been made with more pending, and the conceptual work with regard to space activities is also quickening its pace. The notion of space becoming a "warfighting domain" is being repeated more and more often within the American security establishment. It is not, however, exactly clear what exactly does "space warfare" mean.
Research Policy, 2008
Policy makers seek to identify an institutional framework that facilitates the commercialization of publicly funded R&D, while simultaneously addressing innovation market failure. In the space industry, the formation of such a framework is complicated by national security considerations and the fact that numerous sovereign nations are often included in the commercialization process. This paper analyses how multi-public partnerships with industry can promote commercially viable space programs, resolve market failures, and address transatlantic security concerns. The benefits and policy implications of the formation of such transatlantic multi-public-private partnerships (TMP 3) are illustrated based on a case study of the design of a major European public-private project in the space industry: the Galileo space-based navigation system.
Critical Space Infrastructures
Critical Space Infrastructures, 2019
This chapter provides the basics of space as a critical infrastructure including elements of key resources and assets. Critical space infrastructure (CSI) is presented as a set of interdependent system-of-systems encompassing workforce, environment, facilities and multidirectional interactions essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, whose destruction or disruption would have a significant impact in a given state. Topics of orbits are also discussed in the context of critical infrastructures. 2.1 The Basics of CSI Space systems have become key enablers for a wide variety of commercial, scientific and military applications. The rapid growth of their capabilities has offset some of the size of the required investment and new developments promise an even greater reduction in the cost of space infrastructure. As such, some of the extant space systems have become deeply embedded in the functioning of advanced societies, supporting economies, lifestyles and governance processes. The increasing dependence on certain space systems places them firmly in the area of critical infrastructure, whose disruption or destruction would generate lasting damage. This inclusion into critical infrastructure theory is even more warranted as space systems have become a technological backbone for existing recognized critical infrastructures, such as energy, transportation, administration and others. Specifically, Booz and Company suggest that 'satellites will and must be an integral part of the future communications ecosystem' (Acker et al. 2011). The increasing use of satellites is also depicted in Fig. 2.1. The reliance of infrastructure systems-of-systems on space-based command, coordination and control capabilities during normal functioning, but especially during emergency and crisis situation management processes, means that space systems fulfil the requirements for critical status. We propose to include space systems into the existing critical infrastructure protection framework, while also underlining the key differences between "terrestrial" infrastructures and extra-atmospheric ones. The geographic and economic realities of space systems also call for a different approach