Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework (original) (raw)
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A Comparative Critique of Irish Neutrality in the 'Unneutral' discourse
This article takes a comparative, empirical look at the practice of Irish neutrality during World War II. It critiques a model of neutrality presented in a thesis on Irish neutrality called Unneutral Ireland, consisting of factors derived from an analysis of three states regarded as well-established European neutrals—Austria, Sweden and Switzerland—that reflect the practice of neutrality. That model focused on the rights and duties of neutrality; the recognition of Ireland’s status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; and freedom of decision and action. This present article focuses on the factors flowing from these latter obligations that are cited in an analysis of the practice of Irish neutrality in the Unneutral thesis as proof of Ireland’s ‘unneutral’ status, i.e. ideology; involvement in economic sanctions; partiality; the practice of Irish citizens joining the British army; and post-World War II factors such as Ireland’s EEC membership. In this article, Ireland’s practice of neutrality is evaluated against the practice of other European neutral states—Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland (and also Norway’s truncated practice of neutrality)—vis-à-vis the above variables. The article also deals with the perennial myths that crop up in ‘unneutral’ discourses on Irish neutrality, for example, the oftcited incidence of de Valera’s alleged visit to the German legation in Ireland to sign a book of condolences on Hitler’s death; and the suggestions of a British government offer of a deal on Northern Ireland in exchange for Ireland dropping its neutral stance and supporting the Allies in World War II. The article concludes that the practice of Irish neutrality is equivalent to or superior to the practice of other European neutral states, thus undermining the dominant discourse that Ireland’s neutrality is a myth and that Ireland is ‘unneutral’.
A comparative critique of the practice of Irish neutrality in the'unneutral'discourse
Irish Studies in International Affairs, 2008
This article takes a comparative, empirical look at the practice of Irish neutrality during the World War II. It critiques a model of neutrality presented in a thesis on Irish neutrality called Unneutral Ireland, consisting of factors derived from an analysis of three states regarded as well-established European neutrals, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland that reflect the practice of neutrality. That model focused on the rights and duties of neutrality; the recognition of Ireland's status by belligerents and others; the disavowal of external help; and the freedom of decision and action. This present article focuses on the factors flowing from these latter obligations that are cited in an analysis of the practice of Irish neutrality, in the Unneutral thesis as proof of Ireland's 'unneutral' status, i.e. ideology; involvement in economic sanctions; partiality; the practice of Irish citizens joining the British army; and post-World War II factors such as Ireland's EEC membership. In this article, Ireland's practice of neutrality is evaluated against the practice of other European neutral states-Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and Finland (including Norway's truncated practice of neutrality)-visà-vis the above variables. This article also deals with the perennial myths that crop up in 'unneutral' discourses on Irish neutrality, for example, the oft-cited incidence of de Valera's alleged visit to the German legation in Ireland to sign a book of condolences on Hitler's death and the suggestions of a British government offer of a deal on Northern Ireland in exchange for Ireland dropping its neutral stance and supporting the Allies in World War II. The article concludes that the practice of Irish neutrality is equivalent to or superior to the practice of other European neutral states, thus undermining the dominant discourse that Ireland's neutrality is a myth and that Ireland is 'unneutral'.
Ireland on the world stage, 2002
After decades of disillusionment, the people and government of the Republic of Ireland (hereafter, ‘Ireland’) have begun to reassess their role and identity in the international system. The Irish state is no longer exclusively defined through its position (mental and geographic) as an “island behind an island.” While a shared and complex history may always make relationships with Ireland’s nearest neighbour problematic, the pursuit of, or flight from, British norms is a decreasing feature of debates in public policy. In its stead is a greater self confidence, an attempt to reach out to other European and small state models and a general ambition to orient the state and its society outwards towards all azimuths rather than eastwards. All of this has a bearing on how the Irish see themselves in the wider world. On the one hand this has been welcomed as an overdue normalisation of Irish society. The increasing ‘cosmopolitanism’ and internationalisation of Irish culture, secularisation of its society and the ‘Europeanisation’ of Irish public policy making are three of the most widely (and often positively) cited features of this development. At the same time, however, notes of caution have also been sounded. Rapid economic growth and a cultural predisposition towards holding authority in contempt has, it is argued, made Irish society more selfish, less open and less sensitive to the plight of those marginalised at home and abroad.
Neutrality is often linked in the field of international relations with negative connotations. States that engage in the war effort tend to perceive other international actors with a certain amount of distrust, especially those actors that do not decide to engage in a similar way, but that actually seem to profit from the war that does not concern them directly. In the history of World War II there were also cases of neutrality which were assessed negatively. Out of the group of countries which do not take pride in the fact that they remained neutral during World War II, there comes a very distinctive actor of international relationsthe Irish Free State. This particular country, although it declared neutrality already in the very first days of the conflict, does not feel ashamed of the decision taken by the then leaders of Irish society -Éamon de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party.
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Irish membership of NATO or any European defence organisation arouses deep hostility in a substantial section of the Irish public. This arises from a popular perception that the Irish state maintained a fastidious and unpartisan neutrality during the Second World War. However, of necessity Irish neutrality was biased towards the Allies. The Irish government only maintained a scrupulous façade of diplomatic and military neutrality. This served to conceal substantial material subsistence to Britain and the United States. Ironically, the de Valera government's appearance of meticulous neutrality not only served to deceive the Third Reich but also the Irish population and Allied opinion. This allowed the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, to repeatedly claim that Irish neutrality was a danger to Britain knowing full well that Irish neutrality protected Britain's flank, benefited the British war economy and facilitated substantial Irish recruitment to the British armed forces. MI5 told him so. What was even more tragic was that the illusion of Irish wartime neutrality was used to justify unreflective postwar Irish neutrality and badly damaged Ireland's reputation in the Free World.
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