Modal Meinongianism, Russell's Paradox, and the Language/Metalanguage Distinction (original) (raw)

Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory: a Reply to Bueno and Zalta -- Australasian Journal of Logic

Australasian Journal of Logic, 2020

We reply to arguments by Otávio Bueno and Edward Zalta ('Object Theory and Modal Meinongianism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017) against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalized to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the for-mer's resorting to an apparatus of worlds for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction between two kinds of predi-cation, exemplification and encoding. We argue that the distinction has fewer supporters than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there's a reason why the notion of encoding has been found baffling by some.

Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory

The Australasian Journal of Logic, 2020

We reply to arguments by Otávio Bueno and Edward Zalta ('Object Theory and Modal Meinongianism', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2017) against Modal Meinongianism, including that it presupposes, but cannot maintain, a unique denotation for names of fictional characters, and that it is not generalized to higher-order objects. We individuate the crucial difference between Modal Meinongianism and Object Theory in the former's resorting to an apparatus of worlds for the representational purposes for which the latter resorts to a distinction between two kinds of predication, exemplification and encoding. We argue that the distinction has fewer supporters than Bueno and Zalta want, and that there's a reason why the notion of encoding has been found baffling by some.

Modal Meinongianism and Characterization - Grazer Philosophische Studien

Grazer Philosophische Studien

In this paper we reply to arguments of Kroon (“Characterization and Existence in Modal Meinongianism”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 86, 23-34) to the effect that Modal Meinongianism cannot do justice to Meinongian claims such as that the golden mountain is golden, and that it does not exist.

Modal Meinongianism and Actuality - HumanaMente

HumanaMente: Special Issue "Meinong Strikes Back"., 2013

Modal Meinongianism is the most recent neo-Meinongian theory. Its main innovation consists in a Comprehension Principle which, unlike other neo-Meinongian approaches, seemingly avoids limitations on the properties that can characterize objects. However, in a recent paper A. Sauchelli has raised an objection against modal Meinongianism, to the effect that properties and relations involving reference to worlds at which they are instantiated, and specifically to the actual world or parts thereof, force a limitation of its Comprehension Principle. The theory, thus, is no better off than other neo-Meinongian views in this respect. This article shows that the notion part of actuality in Sauchelli’s paper is ambiguous from the modal Meinongian viewpoint. Accordingly, his objection splits into two, depending on its disambiguation. It is then explained how neither interpretation forces modal Meinongianism to limit its Comprehension Principle. A third problem connected to Sauchelli’s objection(s) is addressed: how to account for our felicitously referring to nonexistent objects via descriptions that embed reference to properties not actually instantiated by the objects. Overall, the replies to these difficulties provide good insights into the workings of the new Meinongian theory.

Meinong’s Version of the Description Theory

Russell: the Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies, 27 (2007), No. 1 (Summer 2007), 73-85, 2007

About 1904 Meinong formulated his most famous idea: there are no empty (non-referential) terms. Russell also did not accept non-referential singular terms, but in "On Denoting" he claimed that all singular terms that are apparently empty could be explained away as apparent singular terms. However, if we take a more careful look at both theories, the picture becomes more complex. It is well known that Russell's concept of a genuine proper name is very technical; but this is also true of Meinong. Also, according to Meinong we can refer "directly" only to a very special category of ontologically simple objects. However, a very important diTerence is that, in the domain of Meinongian objects, a plurality of objects always corresponds to each description. Thus, if Meinong were right, there could be no deWnite descriptions. If we narrow the domain of reference to existent objects, we can secure the uniqueness of the reference object by specifying a collection of predicates that is contingently satisWed by only one (existing) object. But if we operate in the domain of all possible objects, we have to specify all properties that are had by the object in question. It turns out that such a "Leibnizian" speciWcation amounts to the complete description of a possible world.

From the Meinongian Point of View

Logic and Logical Philosophy, 2022

In this paper, I discuss one of Peter van Inwagen's charges against the Meinongian thesis, which states that some objects do not exist. The charges aimed to show that the thesis either leads to a contradiction or that it is obscure. Both consequences support the opposite Quinean thesis, which states that every object exists. As opposed to the former, the latter ought to be consistent and clear. I argue why there is no contradiction in the Meinongian thesis and why the Quinean thesis is not clear.