Wielders of Supranational Power? The Administrative Behaviour of the Heads of European Union Agencies (original) (raw)

Determinants of Autonomy of European Union Agencies

soc.kuleuven.be

Trends to specialization and structural disaggregation are transforming the landscape of the public sector, characterized by a number of bodies -the public agencies -operating in a relatively autonomous way from the core government (ministries or departments).

EU Executive Governance: Agencies and Procedures

EU Executive Governance: Agencies and Procedures, 2019

Which administrative procedures are followed by EU agencies? Which are the implications flowing from the principles of good administration, access and participation , for those agencies? Do their procedures strengthen their legitimacy without impairing the timeliness of administrative regulation and hence its effectiveness? This book offers an in-depth analysis of the extension of procedural constraints imposed on EU agencies and addresses the vital question of the role of procedural instruments in contributing to agencies' input and output legitimacy. The volume focuses in particular on some of the newest EU agencies, which are entrusted with binding (or quasi-binding) powers. The chosen fields of investigation are those of electronic communications, energy, aviation safety, banking and financial regulation. Moreover, two cross cutting issues have been selected: the use of soft law by agencies and their internal remedies, through appeals and other instruments.

Agencies in the institutional landscape of the European Union

2015

The institutions of the European Union delegate parts of their duties and competences to independent entities which they create. While early attempts at delegation were censured by the Court, European governance is currently experiencing an unprecedented proliferation of agencies in all areas of EU law. Neither the absence of explicit provision in the Treaties nor the implications for the institutional balance have impeded the process to agencification of the European public administration. The making and implementation of EU law has been significantly determined by agencies and recently the European judiciary overturned the anti-delegation dogma of the past and recognised the need for expert input into the process of making modern legislation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the position of agencies within the institutional landscape of the European Union focusing on three parameters: first, to define the notion of agency and explain the expansion of agencies; second, to verify the conditions that need to be met in order for the delegation of powers to be compatible with the principles of EU law; and third, to define the requirements for the independence and accountability of agencies. Key words EU agencies; EU law; EU public administration; delegated powers; institutional balance; legal basis; independency; accountability; European Securities and Markets Authority; Meroni, Romano.

Controlling EU agencies: an introduction

2020

Brenninkmeijer, Mazur, Randma-Liiv and St. Aubyn (n 14). 48 Craig (n 3). 49 Chamon (2016) (n 5). 50 Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with certain tasks in the management of Community Programmes. 51 These are the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT), European Centre for the Development

Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account

European Law Journal, 2007

This article addresses problems of accountability in relation to two specific kinds of administrative actors in the EU system of multilevel governance, namely comitology committees and EU-level agencies. With regard to both sets of actors, the accountability issue is often framed in terms of delegation from a principal to an agent. This article explores the delegation of powers discourse and the question whether this framing adequately covers accountability forums and mechanisms that are emerging as a matter of legal and institutional practice. The latter sub-constitutional level is particularly relevant given the high degree of institutionalisation of both categories of administrative actors. Using these two categories of administrative actors as case studies, this article suggests that a delegation model of accountability in a democratic sense is not adequate and only captures part of emerging practice. A looser conceptual framing, understanding public accountability as a process in which power is checked and balanced by various actors, fits better within a more constitutional perspective on holding EU executive power to account.

The information phase of accountability: The role of management boards in European Union agencies

International Review of Administrative Sciences, 2020

The creation of European Union agencies has prompted normative and theoretical discussions about their accountability and democratic legitimacy. This study examines the extent to which different features concerning the institutional design of agencies incentivize information provision on their performance. To do so, it measures four aspects for which their governing bodies are expected to provide information: governance decisions, policy performance, financial issues, and interactions with stakeholders. Using a new data set of informative statements included in 199 annual activity reports of 29 agencies during the period 2010–2016, this study demonstrates that formal accountability positively affects information provision on governance and policy issues, and that the establishment of scientific bodies within agencies improves information provision on governance aspects, policy performance and their interactions with stakeholders. Finally, this article finds that agencies that perfor...