The Grand Strategic Thought of Colin S. Gray (original) (raw)
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The Reluctant Theorist: Colin Gray and the Theory of Strategy
Infinity Journal , 2014
Colin Gray is a reluctant theorist. He is acutely aware of the achievements of the great strategic thinkers that he admires and that the objectives he set for Ce Strategy Bridge might in fact turn out to be a bridge too far. Unlike many of his contemporaries, he recognizes that he can only follow in the footsteps of Carl Von Clausewitz, which to his mind turns any efort to trump the Prussian philosopher into a fool's errand. Anyone who is familiar with Gray's work also knows that he is adept at identifying the ]aws in competing eQorts to update, enhance or modify the insights oQered by the great theorists he embraces. He is in fact an expert at highlighting how logical ]aws, an inattention to historical detail or a focus on one element of strategy at the expense of other critical considerations, stymie such eQorts. One cannot escape the impression that Gray senses that the eQort to develop a general theory of strategy comes dangerously close to heresy and that heretics can be torched for their eQorts. Armed with only his intellect and a mastery of the literature, he has burned a few himself.
In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America’s military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors—the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.
Fall 2014 | 472 Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations
Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy. his article deals with grand strategy, a subject that the last decade of conflict suggests remains highly relevant to students of strategic studies. Some have questioned the need for grand strategy at all; others lament the lack of one in America. 1 Other scholars argue that the United States has lost the art of developing grand strategy and needs to regain its strategic competence.
2018
This book addresses the ‘blank sheet of paper’ problem. When given a blank sheet of paper and asked to imagine a new grand strategy or to revise or even critique an existing one where should you start? There is no other book that answers this question. There are many books and articles on the history of specific grand strategies and numerous others that advocate a particular grand strategy that a specific nation – usually America – should adopt. None however, take an approach that can be easily applied to new and emerging grand strategy problems of any country or organization. Illustrating this, the book’s case studies examine various grand strategies of a uniquely diverse range of countries and organizations to reveal why they succeeded - or not. The book is deliberately designed to allow busy people to understand and apply grand strategy to solve complex, real world problems. Drawing on recent studies in cognition, and integrating contemporary international relations theories, the book develops a lucid and structured way for us to think better about grand strategy.(https://www.amazon.com/Grand-Strategy-Peter-Layton/dp/0648279308 ... .... ..... BOOK REVIEWS “Peter Layton’s work [represents] a new wave in the conceptualisation of grand strategy… [He] has made a valuable contribution to the grand strategic literature by avoiding the usual policy prescription [approach] in favour of elucidating how a policymaker may think about conceptualising and then practising grand strategy. The focus on how to think rather than on what…grand strategy to pursue is undoubtedly and ultimately a far more productive perspective on grand strategy. For those interested in improving the practice of grand strategy or foreign policy, this is a highly recommended work.” --- Lukas Milevski, author of The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought, reviewing the book in The RUSI Journal, July 2018: https://doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2018.1494922 ... ... ... "It is unlikely that any single book will ever fully crack the code in this field, however, Grand Strategy is a truly admirable, compact, and highly readable contribution, displaying a deft and capable heft of Occam’s Razor. Layton meets the reader on familiar theoretical grounds but then pushes them toward new corners of the field, all while avoiding the temptation of telling them exactly how to get to their destination. This is a guide for exploring strategic vistas in a world of constantly shifting summit heights, not directions to a single, static, and mostly mythical grand strategy peak." Lt. Col. Dave Lyle, USAF in SSQ: Strategic Studies Quarterly, 26 December 2018, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/SSQ/Book-Reviews/Article/1721212/grand-strategy/
Security & Defence Quarterly, 2021
Strategy is a category of growing importance in contemporary scientific debate. “Strategy” as a concept is derived from military thought, but it has become popular in many areas of expertise in recent decades. This term can be found in professional literature in the field of military science, political studies, psychology, economics and management. It is therefore worth taking a look at a book that explains the classical understanding of this concept. The book reviewed here is positioned in the area of strategic studies and war and conflict studies. The review will look at the structure and content of this publication, as well as assess its usefulness in scholarly and didactic practice.
2021
Strategy is a category of growing importance in contemporary scientific debate. “Strategy” as a concept is derived from military thought, but it has become popular in many areas of expertise in recent decades. This term can be found in professional literature in the field of military science, political studies, psychology, economics and management. It is therefore worth taking a look at a book that explains the classical understanding of this concept. The book reviewed here is positioned in the area of strategic studies and war and conflict studies. The review will look at the structure and content of this publication, as well as assess its usefulness in scholarly and didactic practice.
Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of “Grand Strategy,” forthcoming in Security Studies
The questions of how to define grand strategy and whether it “exists” continue to vex the study of grand strategy, despite the ever-increasing popularity of the term. Scholars broadly agree that grand strategy refers to “something” that has the characteristics of being long-term in scope, related to the state’s highest priorities, and concerned with all spheres of statecraft (military, diplomatic, and economic). The precise entity or phenomenon that manifests these characteristics is less clear, indicating deficiencies in the methods used by scholars – usually implicitly – to define and operationalize concepts. This article traces the intellectual history and contemporary usage of the concept of grand strategy to identify the phenomenon or object to which the concept refers. This analysis demonstrates that there is no single concept of grand strategy. Instead, there are three, which are labelled “grand plans,” “grand principles,” and “grand behavior,” respectively. Each concept provides distinct, valuable framework for research and policy prescription.