Institutions, business and the state in Russia (original) (raw)
Related papers
The chapter analyses the effects of rent dependence and Putin’s rent redistribution system on small and medium-sized enterprises, ‘the new private sector’ in the Russian economy. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are used to analyse the institutions supporting the market economy and it is argued that when a dominant part of the economy is ruled by the management of oil rents to secure the power of the regime, the role of market-oriented institutions becomes limited. The chapter also analyses the effects of the present restrictions on voice and civil society for institutional development and concludes that there is little hope for ‘reform from below’ of the system.
The Problems of Development of Economic Institutions in Russia
Asian Social Science, 2014
Delayed payments of wages, defaults, hostile takeovers of privatized companies and similar actions caused a lot of problems in economic system of Russia. Notwithstanding the every effort taken by the government, the new model of economic management was inefficient until a cluster of complementary institutions was formed. Analysis of transformation processes in the Russian economy shows that the evolution of economic institutions has since the early 90s been a complicated, often inconsistent process, mainly directed towards internalization of informal institutions, import of institutions and restoration of institutions. The paper examines the evolution of economic institutions in Russia since the beginning of market reforms. The authors reveled the close relationship and direct correlation between the effectiveness of Russian economic reforms and forming the new economic institutions.
Prospects of liberalization for S&T policies in Russia: institutional analysis
2010
The objective of the paper is to define the trajectory of economic institutional reforms in Russia as a framework of S&T policies. The methodology of this research is based upon the institutional matrices theory (Кирдина, 2001;. The hypothesis claims that the "institutional nature" of Russia defines its prospects of liberalization and needs the active implementation of liberal market institutions policy only within a framework of modernization of redistributive state economic system. Modern S&T policy in Russia demonstrates the implications of such kind of development. The new institutional form of State Corporation that is non-profit organization under government regulation has been widely developed for last 3 years. The main sphere of State Corporations activity is high-tech development. The share of State Corporations in the state budget is more than 20% and it is constantly increasing. -ideological interrelations embodying important social ideas and values. Each sphere is regulated by a corresponding set of basic institutions. These basic institutions are the subject of the analysis. Institutions permanently reproduce the staples of social relations in different civilizations and historical periods. Basic institutions integrate a society into one 'whole' that is developing, sometimes with conflicts and at other times with harmony, sometimes with competition and at other times with cooperation. Institutions have a dual natural-artificial character. On the one hand, institutions manifest self-organizational principles in a society as a co-extensive natural-social system. On the other hand, institutions are the result of purposeful human reflection with regard to relevant laws and rules; they emerge and are shaped as 'human-made' entities. Aggregations of interrelated basic economic, political and ideological institutions are defined as institutional matrices. Historical observations and empirical research as well as mathematical modelling and a broad philosophical approach provide a ground for our hypothesis about two particular types of institutional matrices existing around the world. Namely, we call the two types X-matrices and Y-matrices and compare the unique identities of each one. These matrices differ in a set of basic institutions forming them (see Image 1).
Rules for Followers: Institutional Theory and the New Politics of Economic Backwardness in Russia
Politics & Society, 2000
I investigate contemporary Russia's real, but shallow success in implementing two borrowed capitalist institutions—a monetary system and the joint-stock company. Even though money and shares of stock in Russia are exchanged in voluntary transactions, they fail to play the legal roles ordinarily expected of them, resulting in weak corporate governance and nonmonetary (barter) exchange. Via a criticism of game-theoretic approaches to institutions in the New Institutional Economics, I argue that the roots of this shallow marketization lie in the distinct social foundations of the transactional and legal roles of money and corporate stock. Arguments drawn from sociological institutionalism then illuminate why Russia displays this limited isomorphism to authoritative international models of market institutions. The article concludes by discussing implications for a third body of institutional theory, historical institutionalism, and the possible broader relevance of the pattern of sh...
Market Reforms in Russia - Problems and Prospects
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2000
The author analyses the economic reforms that have been implemented in Russia since 1991. In his opinion initial attempts to introduce market reforms by applying the shock therapy and forced-pace privatisation of state-owned enterprises caused high political and social costs to the Russia's fragile democracy. Therefore the radical reform policy was temporarily suspended, while the transition to a market economy was proceeded inconsistently and often unevenly. After the acute financial crisis took place in August 1998 the reform policy has been given new impetus. In the last few years substantial progress has been made in the process of privatisation, implementation of reforms in the financial sphere, energy sector, in the approach to the agriculture, in the employment policy, in making changes of the tax and pension systems. All these changes contributed to attaining the sustainable economic growth. The author concludes that for the persisting crisis in a number of areas, the future of the Russian market reforms still remains largely uncertain. Today's Russia between 1922 and 1991 was the largest and most populous constituent republic of the Soviet Union. It declared its sovereignty on 12 June 1990 and on 8 December 1991 became a founding member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In the United Nations, Russia took the seat of the USSR on 24 December 1991, and with the latter's dissolution the next day turned into a full-fledged sovereign state. In April 1992, it joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), in June the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (IBRD), and in November 1998 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). From July 1991 to December 1999, Russia's president was Boris Yeltsin, whose wide-ranging authority was further enhanced by the constitution adopted in December 1993. 2 The contradictory character of market reforms in the nineties can be attributed not to a little extent to the emergence of the so-called 'family', i.e. the elite around Yeltsin, and to the struggle for the redistribution of power and wealth. Yeltsin's heir, Vladimir Putin, who took over the presidency on 31 December 1999, has recently been trying to achieve change increasingly relying on his secret service, military and business associates in the formation of his political course vis-à-vis the 'family'. However, the situation is complicated by the fact that in the Russian Federation the government must, in the course of centralisation, consider the interests of regional elites, too. The present article is to analyse the economic processes of the past decade with the objective of giving a more or less comprehensive picture about the principal directions of market reforms, the situation in Russia's economy and the challenges it is now facing.
Fifteen Years of Economic Reform in Russia
OECD Economics Department Working Papers, 2005
Fifteen years of economic reform in Russia: what has been achieved? What remains to be done? The paper provides an overview of the course of economic reform and the performance of the Russian economy since the early 1990s and an analysis of the structural reform challenges ahead. It assesses the contribution of institutional and structural reforms to economic performance over the period, before turning to the question of where further structural reforms could make the biggest contribution to improved performance. Three major conclusions emerge. First, there is still a great deal to be done to strengthen the basic institutions of the market economy. While the Russian authorities have embarked on some impressive-and often technically complex-'second-generation' reforms, many 'first-generation' reforms have yet to be completed. Secondly, the central challenges of Russia's second decade of reform are primarily concerned with reforming state institutions. Thirdly, the pursuit of reforms across a broad front could enable Russia to profit from complementarities that exist among various strands of reform.
Two Decades of Russian Business and Management Research: An Institutional Theory Perspective
Academy of Management Perspectives, 2011
Business and management in Russia have undergone substantial change during the past two decades as the country has transitioned from the centrally planned Soviet system to a more market-oriented economy. Russia has not been given as much attention as BRIC nations such as India and China in either academic research or the popular business press, despite its being a global energy giant and major natural resource player as well as a member of the G8 economic powers. We analyze research on Russian business and management published over the past two decades, draw implications for Russia's future in the global economic community, and offer directions for future research. Our basic conclusion is that Russian managers have relied excessively on informal institutions, including personal networks, to conduct business due to the void created by the weak legitimacy of the country's formal institutions. A major implication is that by continuing to rely on informal institutions in the context of a formal institutional void, Russia may well fall short of becoming a fully participating member of the global economic community, and may remain for some time as an unbalanced, corruption-ridden, natural resource-based economy.
Journal of Comparative Economics, 2001
This is largely a microeconomic book about the transition in Russia, as reflected in the title. It consists of three parts of similar size. The first part discusses enterprise behavior and incentives in the old planned economy, and the second treats the same topics in the transition period, while the last part offers policy suggestions. The authors' declared aim is "to promote a competitive market economy and a Western-style democracy in Russia" (p. ix). Given that one of the authors is a leading Russian politician, the book is rather different from what one would expect. It is not a broad story of political economy but a technical microeconomic book, focusing on enterprise behavior. The text is well written, clearly structured, and sophisticated, with substantial mathematical modeling. The first part analyzes the planned economy, especially with regard to innovation and producers' incentives, and appears both superfluous and not very original. Somewhat surprisingly, Braguinsky and Yavlinsky argue that both tsarism and Stalinism were characterized by a social contract: "The Bolsheviks (especially under Stalin) reintroduced almost all the elements of the old social contract...even de facto serfdom" (p. 193). In the 1990's, on the contrary, "almost no signs of any positive trends can be discerned across the spectrum" (p. 7). The main contribution of the book is its analysis of the incentives and behavior of producers in the Russian transition economy, contained in Chapters 5 and 6. The authors argue that enterprises in Russia represent two very different modes of operation. Some enterprises seek profits in a parallel economy characterized by illegality and rent seeking, while others seek profits in competitive markets. Braguinsky and Yavlinsky consider the parallel economy an inheritance of the old planned economy, but they also put the onus on rent seeking in the natural resource sector by new oligarchs. The chief thesis of the book is that these two economies are separated from one another in a strict dichotomy and a highly inelastic segmentation. A switch from the parallel economy into competitive markets involves many one-time costs, ranging from investments in marketing and product development to the relinquishing of tax evasion and the cutting of ties to organized crime. Some forms of rent seeking are described and these alternative enterprise behaviors are modeled sensibly.