G.F Stout and Russell’s Earliest Account of Judgement (original) (raw)

Judgement and Truth in Early Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, 2013

Abstract

Although both Frege and early Russell adhere to the thesis that propositions are logical entities independent of acts of thought and language, each defends a different variant of logical realism. For Frege, the Gedanke is on the level of sense (Sinn), and insofar as we are allowed to speak of parts of the Gedanke, these parts are all on the level of sense, too. Mont Blanc with all its snow-fields is not a part of the Gedanke that Mont Blanc is more than 4000 metres high (Frege 1904). For Russell, propositions are objective complexes, and Mont Blanc, notwithstanding all its snow-fields, is part of the corresponding proposition (Russell 1904a). If the object about which we judge could not be a constituent of the proposition, we would never know something about the object, Russell adds as an explanation. Russell’s propositions are not only constituted in a different way, they also partly fulfill different functions, as will be shown in this paper. For Frege, the Gedanke functions as: (1) judgemental content, and may also function as the content of a yes/no question, so that judgements and questions may share their content; the Gedanke does not function, though, as the content of open questions, wishes, and orders. (2) bearer of truth or falsity: it is precisely the objectivity of the Gedanke that guarantees the objectivity of its truth-value; (3) meaning of the declarative sentence; (4) because of (1), Fregean propositions also function as epistemic contents. The Gedanke is an epistemic notion: the proposition that the morningstar is the morningstar differs from the proposition that the morningstar is the eveningstar, because knowing the one to be true does not imply knowing the other to be true. (5) Another important difference with Russell’s proposition consists in the fact that the Gedanke allows for different analyses by means of the saturated/unsaturated distinction. The unity of the proposition is for Frege an ultimate fact, and therefore not in need of explanation.

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