Scopes in Discourse (original) (raw)
Related papers
Weak Familiarity and Anaphoric Accessibility in Dynamic Semantics
The accessibility constraints imposed on anaphora by dynamic theories of discourse are too strong because they rule out many perfectly felicitous cases. Several attempts have been made by previous authors to rectify this situation using various tactics. This paper proposes a more viable approach that involves replacing Heim's notion of familiarity with a generalized variant due to Roberts. This approach is formalized in hyperintensional dynamic semantics, and a fragment is laid out that successfully deals with some problematic examples.
Discourse anaphora, accessibility, and modal subordination
Dynamic theories of discourse interpretation seek to describe and explain antecedent- anaphor relations with the help of discourse referents. In a dynamic framework, it is the function of indefinite expressions to introduce new discourse referents, whilst anaphoric expressions serve to retrieve them. Dynamic theories provide a simple and intuitively appealing solution to a variety of problems. For instance, they explain how it is possible for an indefinite expression to bind a pronoun that isn’t c-commanded by it, and they impose accessibility constraints on the interpretation of pronouns that, by large, seem to be adequate. However, it has been known for a long time that dynamic theories encounter problems with what I call “piggyback anaphora”: anaphoric links that are enabled by the fact that the anaphoric expression sits in the scope of an expression that quantifies over the same range of entities as the expression whose scope contains the intended antecedent. I argue that the key to solving this problem lies in the fact that this type of anaphora involves a form of bridging.
Sense and reference in dynamic semantics
1994
The dynamic approach to semantic interpretation (Kamp 1980; Heim 1982; Barwise 1987; Rooth 1987; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1992) provides a framework in which a proform can be related to an antecedent across sentence boundaries. While this approach has been very fruitful, it has been limited in two important ways. First, only anaphora involving NP's has been considered.
Binding on the fly: cross-sentential anaphora in variable-free semantics / 2003
Combinatory logic (Curry and Feys 1958) is a " variable-free " alternative to the lambda calculus. The two have the same expressive power but build their expressions differently. " Variable-free " semantics is, more precisely, " free of variable binding " : it has no operation like abstraction that turns a free variable into a bound one; it uses combinators—operations on functions—instead. For the general linguistic motivation of this approach, see the works of Steedman, Szabolcsi, and Jacobson, among others. The standard view in linguistics is that reflexive and personal pronouns are free variables that get bound by an antecedent through some coindexing mechanism. In variable free semantics the same task is performed by some combinator that identifies two arguments of the function it operates on (a duplicator). This combinator may be built into the lexical semantics of the pronoun, into that of the antecedent, or it may be a free-floating operation applicable to predicates or larger chunks of texts, i.e. a type-shifter. This note is concerned with the case of cross-sentential anaphora. It adopts Hepple's and Jacobson's interpretation of pronouns as identity maps and asks how this can be extended to the cross-sentential case, assuming the dynamic semantic view of anaphora. It first outlines the possibility of interpreting indefinites that antecede non-c-commanded pronouns as existential quantifiers enriched with a duplicator. Then it argues that it is preferable to use the duplicator as a type-shifter that applies " on the fly ". The proposal has consequences for two central ingredients of the classical dynamic semantic treatment: it does away with abstraction over assignments and with treating indefinites as inherently existentially quantified. However, cross-sentential anaphora remains a matter of binding, and the idea of propositions as context change potentials is retained.
Ambiguities in Intensional Contexts, 1980
This paper presents some possible germs of a theory of intentionality, scope of quantified expressions, specificity, etc., and their representation in grammar. A reclassification of a set of well-known phenomena is offered, based on the introduction of a new primitive concept, 'snapping' NP. The introduction of this new concept results in a reduction in the total number of primitive semantic notions (Section 4). Assuming a form of representation involving what we will call 'scope-reversal' rules for these phenomena, it is furthermore shown, contrary to what most current theories assume, that their semantic description will take a 'split' or 'branching' form (Section 2-4). We fmally (Section 6) argue that these scope-reversing rules, if adopted, do not belong to the syntactic part of a grammar of the languages considered (English and Norwegian). Bya 'scope-reversal' rule we will understand a process relating a structure schematically like (Ia) to a semantically 'disambiguated' representation like (Ib):
Anaphora and Discourse Semantics
2001
We argue in this paper that many common adverbial phrases generally taken to be discourse connectives signalling discourse relations between adjacent discourse units are instead anaphors. We do this by (i) demonstrating their behavioral similarity with more common anaphors (pronouns and definite NPs); (ii) presenting a general framework for understanding anaphora into which they nicely fit; (iii) showing the interpretational benefits of understanding discourse adverbials as anaphors; and (iv) sketching out a lexicalised grammar that facilitates discourse interpretation as a product of compositional rules, anaphor resolution and inference. Comments University of Pennsylvania Institute for Research in Cognitive Science Technical Report No. IRCS-01-13. At the time of publication, the author, Bonnie L. Webber, was affiliated with the University of Edinburgh. Currently, July 2007, she is a faculty member in the Department of Engineering at the University of Pennsylvania. This technical r...
Hyperintensional Dynamic Semantics
We present a dynamic semantic theory formalized in higher order logic that synthesizes aspects of de Groote's continuation-based dynamics and Pollard's hyperintensional semantics. In this theory, we rely on an enriched notion of discourse context inspired by the work of Heim and Roberts. We show how to use this enriched context to improve on de Groote's treatment of English definite anaphora by modeling it as presupposition fulfillment.
2007
It has been argued that some scope ambiguities are not really structural: the underlying phrase structure is ambiguous, and no further structure can be independently motivated. Assuming this, with a simple case of quantifier scoping as illustration, we look at the consequences for semantics, and in particular for the principle of compositionality. I observe that attempts to save the usual version of compositionality by revising the notion of meaning (in particular by taking the new meaning to be the set of old meanings) are not guaranteed to work. My main claim is that if one accepts instead a relational semantics, where structured as well as lexical * Jens Allwood is a linguist with very broad philosophical interests. We have been colleagues for an inordinate number of years, and still meet regularly to talk about linguistic and philosophical matters. In the context of the present paper, I recall that Jens was one of the first to introduce Montague Grammar in Sweden, in the 70's. I think he would agree with my claim that Montague's treatment of scope ambiguity is not wholly convincing. Since those early days, however, our approaches to our common interest-language-have increasingly diverged, and I am afraid he might not agree with much else I say here. But then, Jens rarely agrees with much of what anyone says. 2 expressions are allowed to have more than one meaning, the compositionality principle can be adapted without loss of explanatory power.