Reconceptualizing divided government (original) (raw)
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Polarization and gridlock in parliamentary regimes
The Legislative Scholar, 2018
In presidential regimes, gridlock-the inability to enact policy change despite elite or mass demands-derives from the combination of fixed terms and the interdependency of the separately elected legislative and executive branches. The potential consequences of this have been examined extensively in a comparative context, inspired by Linz's (1990) work on the potential for regime-threatening paralysis in presidentialism. Most scholarly work on gridlock focuses on the US case, where the combination of a weak president, divided government, supermajority rules, and centralized agenda control make gridlock a persistent phenomenon (Binder 2004). As the causes of gridlock in the US depend on the policy preferences of elites, party polarization in the US Congress has restricted cooperation between parties and exacerbated the consequences of gridlock (Barber and McCarty 2015). In what follows, we discuss the possibilities for gridlock in parliamentary regimes and discuss the role of elite polarization in relation to this. We then use the Swedish case as an empirical example.
Losing Control: The Intraparty Consequences of Divided Government
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 2001
Divided government scholarship focuses either on evaluating divided government's correlation to legislative gridlock or on its tendency toward interparty squabbling. I argue that one overlooked aspect of divided government is its impact on intraparty dynamics: Divided government offers the controlling congressional party incentives to raise controversial issues to damage the coherence of the president's party. Revealing the tensions within the president's party serves to embarrass the president, increase the electoral chances of the majority party in Congress, and ultimately shift public policy. This phenomenon can be understood through Riker's theory of heresthetic. The contemporary debates between President Clinton and the Republican-controlled Congress over abortion and gay rights provide ample evidence that this theory of divided government is compelling and warrants further consideration.
Split-ticket voting and divided government: Intentional choices or unintended consequences
1995
Explanations of divided government have focused on the differences between the Democratic and Republican parties as the reason for partisan paterns of divided government. Yet the literature on split-ticket voting emphasizes the declining importance of parties in shaping vote choice. This dissertation investigates the apparent inconsistency and proposes an institutional resources model of splitticket voting and divided government. The institutional resources model argues that changes in the presidency and congress in the face of declining parties is responsible for the United States experience with divided government. Using survey data and aggregate election returns the dissertation tests the dominant explanations of divided government against the institutional resources model. It concludes by argueing that partisan patterns of divided government are less the result of differences in the parties today but rather the different historical circumstances of the two parties. particularly in the South. as institutional politics supplanted party politics.
Pathologies or Progress? Evaluating the effects of Divided Government and Party Volatility
Japanese Journal of Political Science, 2008
A vast body of literature emphasizes that successful political development relies on stable and united political parties that underpin clear and responsive policymaking. By this perspective, divided government and party volatility represent pathologies that imperil political accountability and development. Indeed, studies contend that divided government – where different parties control the executive and legislative branches of government – lead to policy deadlock while party volatility – characterized by frequent party splits, solo switches, mergers, dissolutions or the establishment of new parties – confounds representation and accountability. Clearly, each on its own is seen as a considerable threat to political performance and democratic development; the confluence of the two points virtually to an inevitable political doom.
The Effects of Legislative Institutions and Party Discipline on Policy Stability
한국정치학회보, 2013
The objective of this article is to present a theory that analyzes the effects of legislative institutions and party discipline on policy stability. In this article, I generalize Krehbiel's (1998) U.S. lawmaking model by reformulating it within the veto player framework. A major finding of this article is that legislative institutions have differential effects on policy stability depending on party discipline, and that party discipline also has differential effects depending on legislative institutions. This article also yields two important results. First, the cause of non-differential lawmaking across government types in the U.S. Congress is not party indiscipline but legislative institutions that provide both the governing and opposition parties with symmetric veto powers. Second, gridlock not only occurs but increases under a unified government with a disciplined majority under the U.S. legislative rules.
Legislative Studies Quarterly, 2016
We claim that, in presidential democracies, the effect of increasing fragmentation on government spending should be conditional on polarization, defined as the ideological distance between the government's party and other parties in Congress. We build a model where this result follows from negotiations between the legislature and an independent government seeking the approval of its initiatives-as in presidential democracies. Using crosscountry data over time, we test the empirical validity of our claim finding that, in presidential democracies, there is indeed a positive effect of fragmentation only when polarization is sufficiently high. The same is not true for parliamentary democracies. I need to engage in give-and-take, build consensus, and engage in negotiations without sacrificing principles.
Irresponsible parties, responsible voters? Legislative gridlock and collective accountability
PLOS ONE, 2020
Legislative gridlock is a failure of one of the key functions of government: to pass legislation. Can voters counter such political dysfunction? This paper examines whether and how voters hold politicians accountable for gridlock. We focus on the passage of the government budget, the central task of any legislature, and define a legislature to experience budgetary gridlock if it fails to pass the budget on time. We argue, based on evidence from twenty years of budget enactment data, that voters hold state legislators accountable for budget gridlock in US state governments, with gridlocked incumbents losing their seat more often than incumbents passing budgets on time. Based on established theories of party organization in American politics, we develop three competing theoretical hypotheses to guide our understanding of the observed patterns of retrospective voting. We find strong support for collective electoral accountability with voters punishing incumbent members of state legislature majority parties.
Getting their way, or getting in the way? Presidents and party unity in legislative voting
2002
Scholars disagree on what effect, if any, presidential versus parliamentary government has on political parties. In this paper, I measure unity in parties on legislative votes for parties and coalitions in 20 legislative chambers in 18 countries. I then estimate the effects of both regime type and membership in government on parties on legislative voting unity. I find that presidentialism undermines party unity. Furthermore, within presidential systems, parties that control the presidency, and parties allied with the government, do not win any more than do opposition parties, and their losses are more apt to result from breakdowns in legislative voting unity.