M. Marion, 'Phenomenological Language, Thoughts and Operations in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus', in R. E. Auxier & L. E. Kahn (eds.), The Philosophy of Jaakko Hintikka, Library of Living Philosophers, LaSalle Ill., Open Court, 2006, 413-430. (original) (raw)
Related papers
The Contemporary Significance of Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy
2014
In his post-Tractatus work on natural language use, Wittgenstein defended the notion of what he dubbed the autonomy of grammar. According to this thought, grammar – or semantics, in a more recent idiom – is essentially autonomous from metaphysical considerations, and is not answerable to the nature of things. The argument has several related incarnations in Wittgenstein’s post-Tractatus writings, and has given rise to a number of important insights, both critical and constructive. In this paper I will argue for a potential connection between Wittgenstein’s autonomy argument and some more recent internalist arguments for the autonomy of semantics. My main motivation for establishing this connection comes from the fact that the later Wittgenstein’s comments on grammar and meaning stand in opposition to some of the core assumptions of semantic externalism.
Some Remarks on Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Method
The article discusses the problem of the unity of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is demonstrated that Wittgenstein applied two methods of study. Changes in his philosophy are correlated with modifications in his method of thinking and investigation. In his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the only correct method is logical proposition analysis. In the early 1930s, he transformed his philosophy into a phenomenological description of experience, defining its aim as the development of phenomenological language. After 1933, Wittgenstein recognised the grammatical dimension of language and created tools of grammatical analysis. He introduced the notions of language-games and life forms. His philosophy turned into morphology and a description of human language practice.
Wittgenstein’s Phenomenological Relevance: An Overview and Alternative
I have two goals in this essay, which divide the essay into two sections. First, I will attempt a brief overview of the contributions to this discussion of Spiegelberg, Gier, the Hintikkas, and Monk; second, I will attempt to make my own contribution to the discussion. What I hope becomes clear in the first section is that the cohesiveness of this discussion through the years is largely a function of each commentator’s attempt to define when it was that Wittgenstein could be said to be doing a phenomenology, or being a phenomenologist. For Spiegelberg and Grier, the dates are 1929 to the end of his life; for the Hintikka’s, Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist from start to finish; and Monk argues that Wittgenstein did little more than flirt with phenomenology between February and October 1929. Moreover, phenomenology as a philosophical practice is generally over-defined throughout this debate—with the exception, perhaps, of Spiegelberg—either by reducing it to Husserlian methodology, or finding some other apparently essential core from which a particular understanding of phenomenology stems. In the second section, I will argue that early Wittgenstein, in particular the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, can, and indeed ought, to be considered phenomenologically. I do not mean here to ally myself with the strong position taken by the Hintikkas. Rather, I hope first to broaden the view of what phenomenology as a philosophical practice is. By positioning myself within this practice, I then make a claim that is more appropriate to phenomenology: that while Wittgenstein’s philosophy may not have been, in his own regard, phenomenological at every or any significant part of his career, but that engaging Wittgenstein’s philosophy phenomenologically is productive both to the study of Wittgenstein and to any philosophy that calls itself phenomenological. To do this, I will call particularly upon a relatively recent, although obscure, contribution to this debate from Jose Ruiz Fernandez, as well as the interpretive work of Jan Zwicky, to add my own contribution regarding the phenomenological importance of Wittgenstein’s Tractarian sensitivity to silence.
Philosophical Investigations, 2017
Abstract The Editors’ Preface to the fourth edition of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is disparaging of the earlier editorial efforts of G. E. M. Anscombe and Rush Rhees and in particular of their inclusion and titling of the material in “Part II”. I argue, on both historical and philosophical grounds, that the Editors have failed to refute the editorial decisions of Rhees and Anscombe – a failure born both of a neglect of the historical circumstances and Wittgenstein’s own expressed hopes and intentions for his writings, and of a myopic understanding of his philosophy. Wittgenstein’s legacy has not been well served by their interventions, which should be undone in future editions. Further evidence from the diaries of Maurice Drury that Wittgenstein intended the material in "Part II" to be included in his book is presented in the supplemetary paper 'On Reinstating “Part I” and “Part II” to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations – A Supplementary Note'.
The idea that Wittgenstein developed a phenomenological project during the so-called "intermediate period" is certainly not new. As soon as 1968, Spiegelberg published a paper in the American Philosophical Quarterly 2 giving the general outlines of the project as it appears in the Philosophische Bemerkungen, showing its limits, comparing it with different "phenomenologies", and asking some questions that had to wait a long time before we could deal with them properly. Why did phenomenological problems emerge exactly when Wittgenstein was abandoning some of the main ideas of the Tractatus? What is the difference between the phenomenology of the Bemerkungen, and what Wittgenstein says about the same subject in the Big Typescript? What is the place of his 1929 paper on logical form in his "phenomenology"? It was only with the publication of the first volumes of the Wiener Ausgabe in 1994-5 that the pieces of the historical puzzle began to fit into place. A landmark was Kienzler (1997) whose third chapter made intensive use of the manuscripts, giving a much richer outline of the main phases of this "phenomenological period". But the decisive step was given with the publication of Engelmann , which is the most comprehensive description of the "intermediate period" we have to this date. It would be impossible to exaggerate the debt I have to Mauro Engelmann's book. We certainly disagree on some important aspects -first and foremost, on our reading of the Tractatus -but at some points, I will simply invite the reader to consult Engelmann's book for details about this or that issue.
1982
Master's thesis for Dept. of Philosophy, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada. Its main goal is to shed light on the nature of philosophy from the point of view of the 'later' Wittgenstein. The work on which Kowalsky focuses primarily is Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Kowalsky argues that in Wittgenstein's final view philosophy properly so-called seeks to retrieve the everyday, 'common-sense understanding' of things in the world; and at the same time to expose the basic conceptual errors at the root of all ways of doing philosophy (e.g., logical positivism) which cast doubt on or undermine that common-sense understanding. Kowalsky suggests that Wittgenstein's idea of 'grammatical' investigation resembles to some extent Husserlian phenomenology, including its concept of 'eidetic science.' In the third and final chapter of the thesis, Kowalsky calls into question the view, put forward by Stanley Rosen among others, that the later Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy is radically conventionalist or historicist.
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality , 2021
The Late Wittgenstein and Late Husserl on Language and its Role in the Constitution of Reality This article investigates the role of language in the constitution of reality in E. Husserl’s phenomenology and L. Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. I have discovered some resemblances and differences in their ideas and concepts on language and its role in the constitution of reality, and how their ideas complement each other in a few as- pects. We can find common features in such concepts as ‘languages-games’, ‘forms of life’, ‘picture of the world’, and the ‘community of monads’, ‘life–world’. Both philosophers are in their late periods interested in the same problems (intersubjective world, values, meanings, beliefs, culture) but from different points of view. Husserl suggested we “Return to the things themselves!” while Wittgenstein called us “Back to solid ground!”. These philosophies represent two ways to our living world: from consciousness and from language. Wittgenstein told us that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life. It is what we do and who we are and what gives meaning to our life. The problem of intersubjectivity and understanding of others is central for both Wittgenstein and Husserl. Wittgenstein said: I cannot understand a lion’s language because I do not know what his world is like. I do fail in understanding because I cannot get in its mind. Husserl, in Logical Investigations, considers language as something purely external in relation to meaning. This understanding of language can be called instrumental. In his analysis, Husserl seeks to study the language with a predetermined goal: to completely subordinate it to the idea of ‘pure science’ and to distinguish the language of theory from language natural. It should become a suit- able expression tool without introducing any distortion. The role of language in phenomenological work, Husserl believes, should be minimal and generally be reduced to ‘pure expression’.