The EU Democratisation of The Southern Neighbours Since the “Arab Spring”: An Inherently Inadequate Approach (original) (raw)
The EU and the Southern Neighbors in the Wake of the Arab Spring The Democracy-Security Dilemma
2013
For more than two decades, the European Union (EU) has increasingly been using soft power to consolidate democracy, spread human rights and market economy principles to its neighbors (east and south) in addition to maintaining security and stability on its expanding borders. While economic cooperation, security and immigration areas were the most advanced in the relations with the neighbors (mainly southern), the story with respect to democratization was a failure. Since the Barcelona Process in 1995, many agreements, summits and policies between the EU and the MENA took place showing a combination of external EU territorilization and functionalism at work. However, functionalism was more dominant as the focus of the EU was on security at the expense of spreading European democratic values and human rights. The EU has used democracy promotion as a tool and not as a goal with respect to the southern neighbors. So the question this chapter seeks to answer is: With the Arab Spring even...
The EU and the Southern Neighbors: The Democracy-Security Dilemma
For more than two decades, the European Union (EU) has increasingly been using soft power to consolidate democracy, spread human rights and market economy principles to its neighbors (east and south) in addition to maintaining security and stability on its expanding borders. While economic cooperation, security and immigration areas were the most advanced in the relations with the neighbors (mainly southern), the story with respect to democratization was a failure. Since the Barcelona Process in 1995, many agreements, summits and policies between the EU and the MENA took place showing a combination of external EU territorilization and functionalism at work. However, functionalism was more dominant as the focus of the EU was on security at the expense of spreading European democratic values and human rights. The EU has used democracy promotion as a tool and not as a goal with respect to the southern neighbors. So the question this chapter seeks to answer is: With the Arab Spring events, is there a change in the EU democratization attitude regarding the MENA region to support a democratic change that will bring the neigbhbors closer to the EU norms and values? To answer this question, the paper argues that despite the Arab Spring revolts; the EU continues to pursue an interest-based realist approach to maintain stability and security on its southern borders.
Focusing on the Euro-Mediterranean relations since the early 1990s, this paper investigates in how far the EU has been able to shape its relations with third countries according to its democracy promotion policy. The paper traces the evolution of the EU’s provisions for democracy promotion and compares the implementation of political dialogue and democracy assistance with seven (semi-)authoritarian regimes (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia) since the early 1990s. A clear regional trend to more intensive cooperation lends credibility to the claim that the EU possesses a certain agenda setting power in international relations. A systematic comparison across countries and over time explores the explanatory power of interdependence, political liberalisation, and statehood for the remaining country variation. The paper finds that the degree of political liberalisation in target countries is the most important scope condition for cooperation in the field of democracy promotion and points to the need of further investigating (domestic) factors to account for the EU’s differential ‘normative power’ in international relations.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the challenges that are emerging from a "changing neighborhood" have opened a new policy window for the EU and called for a policy reassessment regarding the Southern side of the Mediterranean. The Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity and the "more for more" logic tried to accomplish this by contributing to the definition of a new framework in EU-Mediterranean relations that could go beyond the inconsistencies of the past. At this stage, a fundamental question has emerged: to what extent has the EU undertaken a real "paradigmatic policy change"? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by investigating, through the lens of the policy cycle, the much-praised renewal of the EU approach in light of the Arab uprisings. Assuming that processes matter in shaping outcomes, the policy cycle is adopted to investigate the "black box" of the EU approach in all its phases-from agenda setting to implementation-in order to understand to what extent the new "item" on the EU agenda called for a real policy reassessment. Thus, the paper is divided into two parts. The first one, which considers the Arab uprisings as a watershed in the EU approach, presents a comparative analysis of all the policy phases before and after the events, assessing the elements of continuity and discontinuity with the past. Drawing on these results, the second part proposes suggestions to overcome the policy "incrementalism" that seems to emerge as a constant feature of the EU approach in the area. The Mediterranean entered the EU agenda regularly when specific strategic interests and the fear of new challenges with their related uncertainty made it a priority. The visibility of the problem is, indeed, of high importance for a new policy window to be opened. In the post cold war international context of the early 1990s, the low democratic and economic performance of the Mediterranean countries could no longer be neglected and the need to deal with security concerns, such as migration and Islamic terrorism, directed the EU's attention towards the area (Bicchi, 2007). The EMP emerged from these trends and, with its three baskets committed to promote peace, stability and prosperity, mentioned democracy promotion for the first time with the explicit assent of the Mediterranean nonmembers (Bicchi, 2009). In the early 2000s, the need to "eradicate the root causes of terrorism" (Tocci and Cassarino, 2011), exacerbated by 9/11 events and the EU's enlargement which created new borders and new, close neighbors, made the Mediterranean a high issue on EU agenda again. This time, the priority "not to import instability" (Solana, 2003) became the main policy paradigm eventually reflected in the bilateral and pragmatic approach of the ENP (Panebianco 2008; 2010). Security, stability and strategic concerns, therefore, were the main yardsticks that influenced how the EU perceived and "framed" the "Mediterranean issue". Certainly, the way a policy problem is defined is essential as it reveals the actors' perceptions and their different competing paradigms necessary when framing the issue. The aforementioned dilemma, stability vs. democracy, embodies this competition of different paradigms. The definition of the problem, anyway, is unstable. It can change during the process according to changing standards and perceptions (Dente, 2011). Similarly, if, during the 1990s, the "democracy promotion paradigm" was considered suitable to address the Mediterranean in a manner consistent with the EU normative concerns, the turn of the new century also marked a "stability turn" in the name of the status quo rather than of a change that could be uncertain. The UfM, with its "depoliticizing" (Bicchi, 2011) focus on low politics issues, further contributed to this reframing. All these considerations are clearly evident in the EU decisional processes. Consistent with the idea of the policy cycle as a continuum (Barrett and Fudge 1981), the strategic inputs of the agenda inevitably flow in the decision-making, eventually determining the policy content and outputs. Despite their rhetoric, the EU policy initiatives in the Mediterranean were deeply influenced by Member States' interests gradually trumping any normative goal sponsored by the Communitarian institutions. After all, in the EU "weakly institutionalized supranational decision-making structure" (Forster and Wallace, 1996), any normative discourse supported by Communitarian institutions is constrained by the intergovernmental channels of action prescribed by the Treaties. If the Commission is in charge of the implementation, Member States in the European and ministerial composition of the Council are responsible, respectively, in the provision of guidelines and the endorsement of final policy choices. Consistent with this decision-making structure, the reframing of the "Mediterranean" in terms of stability and strategic concerns shaped the content of the EU initiatives in the region. While the European Council (2004) endorsed the European Security Strategy as a "key framework for policy formulation", the Council of the EU (2007) stressed the EU's clear strategic imperative to foster stability through values merely defined as "rule of law and human rights". Stability, therefore, became the EU policy rationale that affected the policy content in terms of prudent changes, which resulted in small adjustments to the status quo (Lindblom 1959; 1979). Indeed, from the EMP to the ENP to the UfM, the substance remained the same. The new policy frameworks, the shift from regionalism to bilateralism and the principles of differentiation Politics finds its sources not only in power but also in uncertainty (Heclo, 1974 quoted in Dente 2011:12). This means that uncertainty entails a fundamental paradox. While it can push for a safer path in name of stability, it can also open a new policy window, paving the way for change. The Arab Spring and the uncertainty of its outcomes, indeed, opened a new policy window for the EU, representing an important opportunity to rethink its MENA policies. Analytically speaking, we could say that the Arab Spring is what Dente (2011) calls the "right moment". The time when actors' goals and perceptions are changed by an external event and there is the need to deal with problems that are "urgent and not to be postponed" (ibid). Similarly, the Arab uprisings now call for a paradigm shift and the need "to do something for the Mediterranean" (Bicchi, 2007). When, in October 2010, Commissioner Füle and High Representative Ashton wondered what ENP vision within a 10-15 year horizon could be, they were far from knowing that the Arab awakening was a "latent time bomb" (Dery, 1997) and that change was at the doorstep. Indeed, the Arab awakening changed that horizon quickly and paved the way for a new policy-making, which was different from merely "muddling through". After all, as suggested by Lustick (1980), the utility of incrementalism is highly reduced when there are thresholds or discontinuities. The Arab Spring is an important discontinuity, an exogenous event that should call for a revision of the status quo, overcoming incrementalism. Is the EU actually seizing "the moment"? A policy cycle analysis of the EU initiatives in the light of the Arab uprisings can address this question. Looking Inside the Black Box after the Arab Spring Despite their visibility, the Arab uprisings entered the EU agenda in a gradual and timid manner. The statement of the High Representative (2011) on the situation in Tunisia, which was released in early January 2010, only a few weeks after Sidi Bouzid revolts, is the first official reaction manifesting concern for the events. While this is a mere condemnation of violence, it was after Ben Ali's departure that the EU recognized "the point of no-return" by affirming the will to "stand side by side with Tunisians" and to support the endeavors to achieve their democratic aspirations 8. The same wait-and-see approach was applied in the case of Egypt. When it became clear that the protests in Tahrir Square were more than an isolated incident, the EU expressed its support to the "legitimate aspirations of the people of Egypt" and called on authorities to proceed with a free and fair election 9. Mubarak's resignation further displayed this cautious mix of spectatorship and actorness (Schumacher, 2011). The crucial presidential decision was merely "welcomed" in a soft-worded statement where the only probable solution for the EU was to remain at the ready "with all its instruments" 10. The events in Libya and Syria entered the EU agenda more rapidly in the wake of the violent repression turning into a civil war. In particular, following Holwett and Ramesh (2003), the Libyan case's entry in the European agenda was marked by both an inside initiation, with French president Sarkozy emerging as a soloist voice in the European chorus and asking for the adoption of sanctions, and an outside initiation in line with the adoption of specific UN Resolutions. However, apart from these cases whose critical consequences could not be neglected, the EU remained a detached observer in other countries, such as Yemen, Algeria or Bahrain, were the protests were silenced. In a similar fashion, the temperate situation in Jordan and Morocco received minor attention, mainly tailored to the top-down processes of reform. Besides these issues, security and migration were other items high on the agenda, displaying the strong link between the European systemic agenda and the domestic ones of its Member States. These multiple issues and the Arab crisis, which was more than a mere one-off event, provided the opportunity for a new approach. Following De Vries (2004), a crisis can be framed as an opportunity or as a threat, as an isolated incident or as a symptom of underlying forces that can open or close a window for reform. After some hesitation, the EU framed the new...
The EU Democratization Efforts in the Middle East and North Africa
For a long time, democratization in third countries has been on the agenda of Western powers such as the European Union (EU). However, while it was more successful with Central and East European countries, democratization has had limited results in countries further east and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The Arab Spring events opened a new reality highlighting the diversity in the region. While some countries liberalized, others were either not affected at all or even strengthened the authoritarian grip of the regime. Even those countries that went through the Arab Spring ended up differently. The current increased political instability in various MENA countries show the inability of the EU and other international actor not only in the democratization process but also in stabilizing the neighbourhood. The only Arab Spring country that seems to be on right track with respect to democratic transition is Tunisia at the moment. This article seeks to answer the following question: Despite the EU democratization policies in the MENA, why have we seen a different outcome in the various countries? Why the democratic support has resulted in a limited success? And do we see a change following the Arab Spring events? Answering these questions, this article argues that the diversity in the outcome is the result of the interaction between Western linkages and domestic politics and the existence of different levels of elite socialization and veto points.
Deepening democracy or stabilization?: European neighborhood policy (ENP) and the “Arab spring”
Is the need for stability pre-empting the need for democratic values? How can the EU cope with two contradictory security requirements: the need to promote democratic norms and to secure geostrategic interests? This paper takes on the security-democracy dilemma in a complex way that transcends the realpolitik frame overshadowing the analysis of the EU’s policy orientation in the Southern Mediterranean while considering its normative role as a fig leaf for security interests. This paper investigates the EU’s foreign policy orientation reflected in the ENP in terms of the two logics of action of consequentialism and appropriateness. Tracing changes at the policy level over time between 2011 and 2015, the paper zooms into the implementation of the “new” ENP in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia to highlight additional variation across countries. Building on a document analysis of the official declarations for the policy-making level and of ENP action plans for the implementation level, the paper argues that local political dynamics and the level of the EU’s threat perception shape the EU’s response to the partner countries.
This article focuses on how the EU has interpreted the Arab uprisings as they unfolded in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since December 2010. EU actors have long acknowledged limits in the EU's strategy towards its southern neighbourhood, which largely bypasses the demands of local populations. The article analyzes the EU's efforts at recreating an 'enhanced' framework of support for political reforms in the south. It concludes that the EU and local partners in the south still have different 'visions' regarding democratic change, which shows the limitations of the EU's understanding of the MENA region.
Journal of Security Strategies, 2019
The literature on traditional and critical security studies mostly point out at a paradigm shift concerning the nature of security threats and challenges either caused or impacted upon by state, non-state, and transnational actors. From a security perspective, the European Union (EU) has been one of the most influential actors in its southern neighborhood covering the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North Africa (MENA) regions particularly due to its active foreign policy influence mechanisms including European Strategy, European Neighborhood Policy, and most recently through its Global Strategy. Nonetheless, the EU foreign policies in the MENA region after the Arab uprisings have not been very successful in terms of promoting social, political, and economic stability and cooperation; and thus, it achieved mixed results instead of integrated outcomes. This paper addresses the difficulties and expectation-capability gaps in the EU’s foreign policies in the Middle East with a particular emphasis on the changing security structure and threats in the post-Arab Spring period. Therefore, this paper aims to assess the effectiveness of the Union’s regional strategies through the evaluation of its policies on volatile regions such as the Middle East.