European Banking Union: Context, Structure, Challenges and Opportunities (original) (raw)
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EU Financial Regulation and Markets Beyond Fragmentation and Differentiation, 2020
The European Banking Union (EBU) has had a complex strategic, political, economic and legal formation, and throughout the current turmoil there has been a special emphasis on preserving its stability and further development. The EBU formally consists of three interconnected pillars applicable to the euro area: (1) the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) that encompasses European Central Bank’s (ECB) direct and indirect prudential supervision; (2) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) that provides for a harmonized resolution framework; and (3) an envisaged safety net in the form of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). A strong incentive for the EBU’s creation originated both from the repercussions of the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. The EBU has experienced constant challenges from its very beginning, including the opposition to any indication of a transfer union, and criticism related to its design. Although progress is recommended on all elements, the most compelling is timely completion of the EDIS. From its inception, the EBU’s main goal has been to break the “vicious circle” between sovereigns and their banks – and that is in the focus of this article. Furthermore, this article explores the structure, achievements and inadequacies of the EBU pillars, and analyses potential threats and opportunities related to this segment of European integration.
The road towards the establishment of the European Banking Union
Munich Personal RePEc Archive No 62463, 2015
The rising delinquencies in the U.S. subprime mortgage market in 2006 and the succeeding collapse in housing prices had a considerably negative impact on the functioning of the European financial systems and the smooth operation of European economies. Indeed, in the Euro-area, what started as a financial crisis escalated to a twin crisis after being doubled by the eruption of a massive sovereign debt crisis in 2010. The lack of an established set of bank supervision and resolution strategies at the Euro-area level, the vicious circle between banks and European nation-states, the threats for the sustainability of the common currency, and the deterioration of the market conditions were the key factors which lately led to the acceleration of the steps towards the creation of a banking union in Europe. The principal aim of the European Banking Union is to shape the necessary legal and institutional framework and provide the authorities with powers and tools to deal with ailing banks in order to prevent the devastating effects that a future shock may have on the financial system, the real economy, and the society. This paper presents the formal reactions of the sovereigns and the European Central Bank to the twin crisis, and critically discusses the key problems and the inherent weaknesses which led to the establishment of a banking union for the Euro-area member states. The structure of the banking union, the various aspects of its operation, and its future prospects are also presented and discussed.
2014
After the adoption of a single monetary policy which commits the European Central Bank to maintaining the euro’s purchasing power and price stability in the Eurozone, the European Union is facing a new, but equally fundamental challenge: the implementation in a relatively short time of the so-called “Banking Union”. Its purpose is twofold: (1) breaking the link between banking and sovereign risk, with the ultimate goal of achieving full protection of EU savers in the event of a crisis; and (2) ensuring uniformity of credit conditions - which are still too fragmented - within the European banking market, to ensure greater EU integration of the financial system. Starting from the communication in which the European Commission stressed the need for a banking union, this paper intends to explore the complex process towards its establishment by looking at the EU institutional mechanisms and the legal aspects. In particular, the analysis will be based on two building blocks: (1) the Singl...
European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been developing a "Single Rulebook" that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A key component of the banking union was the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), which brought banks in the Eurozone under supervision of the European Central Bank (ECB), with day-today assistance from existing national authorities. This case reviews the changes in Eurozone bank regulation and supervision resulting from the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
A banking union for Europe: Making a virtue out of necessity
The Spanish Review of Financial Economics, 2015
Banking union is the most ambitious European project undertaken since the introduction of the single currency. It was launched in the summer of 2012, in order to send the markets a strong signal of unity against a looming financial fragmentation problem that was putting the euro on the ropes. The main goal of banking union is to resume progress towards the single market for financial services and, more broadly, to preserve the single market by restoring the proper functioning of monetary policy in the eurozone through restoring confidence in the European banking sector. This will be achieved through new harmonised banking rules and stronger systems for both banking supervision and resolution, that will be managed at the European level. The EU leaders and co-legislators have been working against the clock to put in place a credible and effective setup in record time, amid intense negotiations (with final deals often closed at the last minute) and very significant concessions by all parties involved (most of which would have been simply unthinkable just a few years ago). Despite the fact that the final setup does not provide for the optimal banking union, we still hold to its extraordinary political value and see its huge potential. By putting Europe back on the right integration path, banking union will restore the momentum towards a genuine economic and monetary union. Nevertheless, in order to put an end to the sovereign/banking loop, further progress in integration is needed including key fiscal, economic and political elements.
Time to address the shortcomings of the banking union
Frankfurt a. M.: Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, 2020
Discussions about the banking union have restarted. Its success so far is limited: national banking sectors are still overwhelmingly exposed to their own countries' economies, cross border banking has not increased and capital and liquidity remain locked within national boundaries. The policy letter highlights that the current debate, centered on sovereign exposures and deposit insurance, misses critical underlying problems in the supervision and resolution frameworks. The ECB supervisors' efforts to facilitate cross-border banking have been hampered by national ringfencing. The resolution framework is not up to its task: limited powers of the SRB, prohibitive access conditions and limited size of the Single Resolution Fund limit its effectiveness. A lack of a coherent European framework for insolvency unlevels the regulatory field and creates incentives to bypass European rules. The new Commission and European Parliament, with the new ECB leadership, provide a unique opportunity to address these shortcomings and make the banking union work.
2013
The financial and economic crisis has hit Europe in its core. While the crisis may not have originated in the European Union, it has laid bare structural weaknesses in the EU’s policy framework. Both public finances and the banking sector have been heavily affected. For a long time, the EU failed to take into account sufficiently the perverse link that existed between the two. Negative evolutions in one field of the crisis often dragged along the other in its downward spiral. In June 2012, in the early hours of a yet another EU Summit, the leaders of the eurozone finally decided to address the link between the banking and sovereign debt crises. Faced with soaring public borrowing costs in Spain and Italy, they decided to allow for the direct European recapitalisation of banks when the Member State itself would no longer be in a position to do so. In exchange, supervision of the banking sector would be lifted to the European level by means of a Single Supervisory Mechanism. The Singl...