From an Epistemology of Understanding to an Ontology of Understanding: Heidegger's Hermeneutical Shift (original) (raw)
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Journal of philosophical research, 2004
Heidegger's perspective on hermeneutics is not uniform but is characterized by the overall move of his thought from his earliest writings to Being and Time and from there to the "turn." In all these transformations, Heidegger's major contribution to hermeneutics remains his constant and persistent contention, illustrated each time through different means and concepts, that understanding and interpretation constitute far broader phenomena than what was believed by the various historical manifestations of hermeneutics. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics has been initiated by this insight; but philosophical hermeneutics will bear and constructively convey Heidegger's legacy, only if it goes beyond the repetition of the transcendental question of the conditions of possibility of understanding, i.e., only if it transforms itself into a hermeneutic philosophy.
Heidegger, Ethics and the Practice of Ontology
2009
The relation between ontology and ethics in Heidegger is embedded in the question of Being and the thinking of ontological difference. For this reason, it does not lend itself easily to the language that we use to describe things, and can appear remote from the more concrete concerns over how we live our lives. While this distance may be regarded as a good reason not to expect much in the way of ethics from Heidegger's work, it is also why attending to the relation between ontology and ethics in Heidegger may challenge our habitual way of thinking about these matters. However, the ambiguity that suffuses the issue of ethics in Heidegger also works the other way around: the pull towards existence as it is lived threatens to displace Heidegger's thought from the deeper reaches of the question of Being. This is why raising the question of ethics with regard to Heidegger is sometimes regarded as a distraction from the more serious business of ontology. Yet it is also why elements of the question may elude the more firmly established framework of Heidegger's thought and for this very reason present themselves as as a challenge to the more usual ontological reading of Heidegger's work.
Heidegger's Topical Hermeneutics: The Sophist Lectures
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 1996
First, I consider Heidegger’s general hermeneutics, his account of truth and interpretation as such; my account, based on both the Sophist course and Being and Time, begins with the phenomenon of the hermeneutic circle and then explains the two crucial dimensions of topicality (Sachlichkeit): fidelity to the things themselves and authentic historicity. Secondly, I consider how the lecture course develops a specific hermeneutics for reading ancient philosophical texts. Finally, I close with an overview of the individual features of Heidegger’s reading of Plato and Aristotle that most illuminate his notion of topicality.
Kom, 2022
In this paper, aligning with the focus international researchers have dedicated to Heidegger's major works in order to contribute to the elucidation of his teachings, our intention is to establish a hypothesis grounded in Heidegger's secondary literature spanning his first, second, and third periods of thought. This will be accomplished through an examination of his speeches, presentations, lectures, correspondences, notes, interviews, and the like. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is aimed at demonstrating that Heidegger's body of work does not constitute a static and definitive delineation of philosophy that commences and concludes in a prescribed manner: instead, it represents a contemplation of the concept of philosophy throughout his entire oeuvre, achieved by engaging in the discourse of philosophy, problematizing metaphysics, and scrutinizing ontology. In this vein, this essay delves into Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and metaphysics during his first period of thought, his comprehension of the problem of metaphysics in his second period of thought, and his interpretation of the interplay between ontology and theology/teologics in his third period of thought. The ultimate objective is to shed light on Heidegger's methodology, which underpins both his initial phenomenology and subsequent thought: the method of posing questions. Specifically, the act of questioning has led to a critique of the obscuring of the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein, a critique that delivers an essential disruption to philosophical thought. Consequently, this underscores the necessity of establishing the foundations for the task of thinking.
Heidegger's Ontology and Phenomenological Method
Heilongjiang People Publishhouse, 2005
This article aims to summarize the main points of the phenomenological method advocated and employed to the question of being by Heidegger, affirm the necessity of the phenomenological method in restating the question of being, and point out its unique significance to Heidegger. After explaining the transcendence of the phenomenological method and analyzing phenomenology's different dimensions, to help us comprehend the phenomenological method, the article enquires about Heidegger''s interpretation of Hegel's phenomenology of spirit, which transforms the connotation of conscious experience.
Phenomenology and Ontology in the Later Heidegger
Heidegger’s later philosophy is marked by two conflicting claims about phenomenology. On the one hand, phenomenology and philosophy generally is tasked with “responding to the claim of what is to be thought” in a novel and unprecedented manner. On the other hand, Heidegger recognizes that there have been earlier attempts at thus doing justice to phenomena; in the ontological commitments of earlier thinkers, Heidegger finds accounts of the “things themselves,” each of which has different implications for what phenomenology should concern itself with. Phenomenology, as Heidegger conceives it, should thus both incorporate the history of philosophy and exceed it, yet it is unclear how these ideas can be reconciled. This chapter calls this problem the “dilemma of the historicity of phenomenology” and identifies different versions of it in Heidegger’s works after 1935/6.