The US Initiative on Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (original) (raw)

Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament

2020

The present international security environment seems less favorable to nuclear disarmament. All the existing mechanisms directed to promote disarmament and arms control are in despair. For example, the dismantlement of the existing arms control treaties between Russia and the West, arrival of newer technologies and renewed arms racing problems between US and Russia, US and China, China and India, India and Pakistan, turmoil in the Middle East and nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula introduced renewed stability challenges for broader nonproliferation mechanisms. Currently, states’ reliance on modernization of deterrent force has increased while their emphasis on disarmament has decreased. Against this backdrop, the US has introduced a new initiative on creating an environment for nuclear disarmament (CEND) which aims at initiating dialogue among states to comprehend the global security context, states’ underlying security concerns, their bilateral threat perceptions and space to g...

New trend and future direction of nuclear disarmament

Osaka University Law Review, 2011

The purpose of this article is to examine the new trend of nuclear disarmament mainly spurred by President Obama's Prague address for a world without nuclear weapons, and to seek the future direction of nuclear disarmament in order to achieve a more peaceful and secure international community. I will examine some proposals that were submitted or decided prior to the Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in May 2010 as well as many proposals submitted at the conference, and then I will examine the content of the final document in detail. Finally, I will try to show what kinds of actions should be taken soon in order to implement the undertakings in the final document as a process toward achieving a world without nuclear weapons.

Setting the Stage for Progress towards Nuclear Disarmament

2018

Recognizing that the current international context is hardly conducive to arms control and disarmament, SIPRI working paper ‘Setting the stage for progress towards nuclear disarmament’ identifies 10 practical steps to revitalize the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the principal normative and legal foundation of the global nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it recognizes the NPT’s inherent compatibility with other disarmament initiatives, most notably the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In addition to restoring a sense of common purpose and addressing ‘old’ nuclear weapon-related risks, the paper highlights ‘new’ risks arising from developments in conventional capabilities and emerging technologies. The overarching objective is to set the stage for future concrete steps and initiatives to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and to eventually eliminate them. The paper was co-authored with Dr Tytti Erästö, Dr Sibylle Bauer, and Shannon N. Kile.

NPT Review Process and Nuclear Disarmament

2008

The purpose of this article is to examine the importance of nuclear disarmament in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process and for international peace and security. In the 21st century, there have been many challenges to the NPT regime, and many measures have been taken to cope with them. However, they are not effective enough. On the other hand, as nuclear deterrence is not reliable anymore, some argue for a world free of nuclear weapons. Based on the analysis of these issues, the author argues for the importance of nuclear disarmament in order to strengthen the NPT regime and build a more peaceful and secure international community, showing practical steps for nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation

Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, 2010

This book examines the current debate on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, notably the international non-proliferation regime and how to implement its disarmament provisions. Discussing the requirements of a new international consensus on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, this book builds on the three pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT): non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It reviews the impact of Cold War and post-Cold War policies on current disarmament initiatives and analyses contemporary proliferation problems: how to deal with the states that never joined the NPT (India, Pakistan and Israel); how states that have been moving towards nuclear weapons have been brought back to non-nuclear-weapon status; and, in particular, how to deal with Iran and North Korea. The analysis centres on the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation in an increasingly multi-centric world involving China and India as well as the US, the European powers and Russia. It concludes with a description and discussion of three different worlds without nuclear weapons and their implications for nuclear-disarmament policies. This book will be of great interest to all students of arms control, strategic studies, war and conflict studies, and IR/security studies in general.

Building a Road to Nuclear Disarmament

2021

This book while comprehending the contemporary global security environment, offers a new roadmap for nuclear disarmament by creating a balance between deterrence supporters and disarmament advocators. The author identifies the divide between competing approaches such as traditional security-centric aspects and humanity-centred disarmament perspectives, tackling the complex question of how to balance some states' compulsions for effective nuclear deterrence with other states' long-term desire for a nuclear-free world. The book explores how new technologies such as cyber and Artificial Intelligence advances are available to more countries than nuclear technology, and could level the playing field for weaker nuclear weapon states. It also looks into the issues which continue to be obstacles in the way of convincing the nuclear weapon states on nuclear disarmament. The author argues that the gap between states' security needs and disarmament aspirations can be bridged by building a new roadmap and creating new security environment. This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars, researchers, policymakers, NGOs and members of the diplomatic community, in the fields of security studies, strategic studies and nuclear policy.

Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament: A Global Debate

American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2010

Shared, But Not Equal Responsibilities Mohamed I. Shaker 40 CHAPTER 8 Shared Responsibilities, Shared Rights Achilles Zaluar 45 CONTRIBUTORS INTRODUCTION The pursuit of nuclear disarmament has been a central component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, starting with the initial signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968. The inclusion under Article VI of the NPT of a commitment to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" reflected the desire of the non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) not to create a regime that would allow nuclear-weapons states (NWS) to retain their weapons in perpetuity. Governments in Washington, Moscow, and London-representing the only three nuclear powers that signed the NPT in 1968-insisted, however, that no precise standards and no time-bound guarantees about when disarmament would be achieved were possible. The interest and emphasis given to nuclear disarmament by the leaders of the nuclear weapons powers have waxed and waned throughout the history of the NPT, and for much of the past decade, many governments in NNWS have complained that the disarmament goal has been given short shrift by those with nuclear weapons. Renewed interest in arms control and restated commitments to the longterm goal of nuclear disarmament have clearly increased over recent years, most dramatically with President Barack Obama's April 2009 speech in Prague. With that change in focus comes an opportunity for the international community to rethink how Article VI of the NPT is traditionally interpreted and to move beyond the cycle of repeated complaints from the "have-nots" that the "haves" are not doing enough to disarm themselves and repeated retorts by the "haves" that they are already taking every step that is realistic or prudent. The promise of a different approach to the commitments made under the NPT forms the basis of the Scott Sagan's valuable article-"Shared Responsibilities for Nuclear Disarmament"-which was the concluding essay in the Fall 2009 special issue of Daedalus that focused on the global nuclear future. Sagan's paper, and its call for rethinking the balance of responsibilities and the relationship between different articles in the NPT, now provides the basis for a series of invited response papers from seven distinguished authors. These international scholars and diplomats present their interpretations of the commitments made under the NPT regime and suggest new ways in which shared responsibilities for nuclear disarmament may or may not be realized in practice. Their contributions serve to expand the discussion that was started by the original Daedalus article-and together they are intended to spark renewed policy debates about how best to pursue global disarmament, debates that will be prominent at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York City and in the years following that important meeting. The distinguished authors in this American Academy of Arts and Sciences Occasional Paper come from a diverse set of countries and reflect a diverse and crosscutting set of perspectives on the disarmament debate. With respect to nuclear arsenals, Scott Sagan (United States) and James Acton (United Kingdom) are from NWS; Harald Müller (Germany), Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mustafa Kibaroglu (Turkey), Yukio Satoh (Japan), Mohamed Shaker (Egypt), and Achilles Zaluar (Brazil) are leading specialists from NNWS. Three of these states-Germany, Turkey, and Japan-are U.S. allies and come under extended nuclear deterrence guarantees; Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Brazil, however, do not. With respect to the use of nuclear energy today, Brazil, Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom all maintain nuclear power plants. Sri Lanka, Egypt, and Turkey are aspirant nuclear energy states and have not yet constructed the power plants that they hope to use in the future. The differences in national perspectives and the differences in individual opinions about appropriate disarmament steps among the authors should not mask a commitment they all share. The contributors to this volume agree that new thinking and continued debate about how best to maintain momentum toward nuclear disarmament is to be welcomed. Only by seeking out, and taking into consideration, a cross section of views can progress toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world continue. We hope that this Occasional Paper may therefore serve as an important contribution to a global disarmament debate that has become increasingly prominent over the past couple of years. This Occasional Paper is part of the American Academy's Global Nuclear Future Initiative, which is guided by the Academy's Committee on International Security Studies. The Initiative examines the safety, security, and nonproliferation implications of the global spread of nuclear energy and is developing pragmatic recommendations for managing the emerging nuclear order. The Global Nuclear Future Initiative is supported by generous grants from Stephen D. Bechtel, Jr.; the S.D. Bechtel Foundation; the Carnegie Corporation of New York; the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation; the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation; the Flora Family Foundation; and the Kavli Foundation. We thank these funders for their support. The Academy is grateful to the principal investigators of the Global Nuclear Future Initiative-Steven E. Miller, Scott D. Sagan, Robert Rosner, and Thomas Isaacs-along with expert members of the project's advisory committee-John W. Rowe, Richard A. Meserve, and Albert Carnesale-for contributing their time, experience, and expertise to the work of the Initiative. We would also like to thank the authors for bringing their knowledge and insight to bear on these important issues.

Nuclear Security and the Three Pillars of the NPT: Identifying a Lasting Relationship

The paper makes a case for how the relationship between the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 'nuclear security' should be defined. It highlights some of the debates surrounding the concept of nuclear security including different perspectives on how it relates to the NPT and the three pillars of peaceful use, non-proliferation and disarmament. The case is made for moving beyond the 'fourth pillar' notion briefly aired in 2009 to alternatively consider nuclear security as a foundation, or basis, for the existing three pillars of the NPT. Each pillar is considered in turn to demonstrate the foundation that nuclear security provides for them all. It is argued that there are clear and fundamental links between nuclear security and peaceful use, non-proliferation and disarmament. Viewing nuclear security as a foundation for the NPT pillars would be highly beneficial in terms of enabling the global expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy and strengthening international nuclear security efforts, as well as providing for greater international confidence in the context of making progress on nuclear disarmament and ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Challenges to the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime

2003

For international peace and security, the international nuclear non-proliferation regime has played an extremely important role. However, the recent state of affairs, including Iraqi and North Korean issues, and a new U. S. nuclear policy under the Bush Administration, reveal several challenges to the regime. In this paper, I examine the development of the situation since the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and address eight specific challenges to the regime. This paper argues that in order to strengthen the regime, it will be necessary to maintain and strengthen international consensus and motivation toward the regime because the regime ultimately depends on the commitment of States to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. K e yw o r d : nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons, NPT, safeguards, security assuarances, nuclear-weapon-free zones TProfessor of International Law and Relations, Osaka School of International Public Policy,Osaka University, ...