Psychosemantics and Representationalism (original) (raw)

Abstract

Psychosemantics is a research program aimed to naturalize meaning, demonstrate how it emerges from natural properties of mental states and processes. The present article explores what seems to be an essence of psychosemantic theories of meaning in order to bring to light their most general problem. It is stated that psychosemantics may give some useful patterns of meaning, but they may become useful as explanations of what mental contents literally mean to a receiving or consuming system, and what the later literally understands from them, only if we abandon the representationalist account of mental contents.

Key takeaways

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1. Psychosemantics aims to naturalize meaning, challenging representationalism in explaining mental content.
2. The dichotomy of atomism and holism presents fundamental challenges in understanding representation and meaning.
3. Misrepresentation poses significant issues for atomism, complicating its claims about meaning determination.
4. Teleosemantics suggests meanings arise from evolutionary functions, yet it struggles with semantic indeterminacy.
5. The text critiques representationalism, advocating for a semantic network independent of external referents.

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References (20)

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FAQs

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What challenges does atomism face in accounting for misrepresentations?add

Atomism struggles to explain misrepresentations, such as when stimuli cause wrong interpretations like frogs detecting non-bug stimuli as bugs. This issue raises questions about how representations can maintain meaning despite incorrect causal links to external referents.

How does teleosemantics address the problem of misrepresentations?add

Teleosemantics presents misrepresentation as a failure of a mechanism’s proper function, illustrating that bug-detectors evolved for detecting bugs may misrepresent a black spot. This theory implies that the survival of creatures depends on the utility of representations in their environment.

What is the main difference between perceptual and conceptual representations in hybrid theories?add

Hybrid theories propose that perceptual representations derive their meaning from external causal links, while conceptual representations gain meaning from internal functional relationships. This distinction attempts to resolve issues inherent in both atomism and holism regarding how meanings are assigned.

How does holism explain the meaning of representations in a semantic network?add

Holism contends that representations hold meanings only within a complex set of interrelated concepts, influenced heavily by context. This interconnectedness allows for a richer understanding of abstract concepts but complicates the identification of singular meanings.

What issues arise from defining meanings at multiple levels of organization?add

The theory suggests that new meanings emerge with higher organizational levels, yet it fails to clarify how specific meanings develop. This ambiguity raises crucial questions about the relationship between levels of organization and the assignment of clear semantic values.