Israel deterring Hamas : tactical successes, strategic challenges (original) (raw)

Israeli Strategic Deterrence Doctrine and Practice

Comparative Strategy, 2020

Israel is a unique country by many criteria, but among the foremost, it is the only country whose neighbors have threatened it for most of its existence with total eradication. Even today when Israel is by far the most powerful military power in the Middle East most of its population views total destruction of the country and genocide of its population as a near-certain outcome of military defeat. Despite Israel’s military advantages, Israel’s defense doctrine views war as a the “no choice option” which carries a heavy social and economic price tag. Therefore, Israeli doctrine relies heavily on projection of deterrence. This is based on “hard” elements such as technological superiority and – not least – the perception of Israel as a non-declared nuclear power, and “soft” elements, such as a broad Israeli consensus regarding the justification and legitimacy of fighting when the Homeland is attacked. Israel’s deterrence doctrine has developed in the face of constant challenges and evolving threat environments. Events over the years have given rise to debates in the Israeli public regarding the “erosion” of Israeli deterrence. However, these debates are replete with fallacies: conflation of conventional, non-conventional (nuclear) and sub-conventional (terrorist) deterrence; the assumption that degradation of deterrence in one area necessarily degrades deterrence in another; and disregarding the linkage between Israel’s nuclear deterrence and the motivation of its enemies to engage in high levels of conventional hostilities. In addition, an understanding of Israeli deterrence doctrine must be based on the distinction between three national situation levels in the context of which deterrence must be achieved: “Routine”, “Emergency” and “War and the role of “compellence” and pre-emption of offensive capabilities of the enemy as an instrument for inducing deterrence (“pre-terrence”). Other aspects that must be addressed include the erosion of deterrence over time after a “deterrence-generating” event (in Israeli strategic parlance “refreshing deterrence”), the role of “red lines”, psychological, ideological and religious factors that are paramount in Israeli doctrine which has always embraced the concepts of “tailored deterrence” and modes of signaling. Ultimately, it is the argument of this article that Israel has succeeded in maintaining strategic deterrence vis-à-vis neighboring states. Deterrence of terrorist organizations however has been based – when it existed – mainly on tactical deterrence through day to day actions which add up to an ever-shifting perception of the object of deterrence regarding Israel’s resolve to act against it. This perception is laden with cultural and psychological overtones and passed through overlapping prisms of history, culture, language, ideological axioms, modes of transmission and reception of information on the “other” and finally, the psyche of the leadership of the party to be deterred, identification of the decision makers with the interests which are threatened and the dynamics of threat assessment within that leadership. Failure of Israeli deterrence has been mainly due to Israeli negligence in transmitting the deterrent message, filters in the enemy leadership that preclude the message from getting through, and influence of the ideological/religious/political Weltanschauung of the enemy leadership. This article attempts to provide an understanding of the evolution of Israel’s deterrence doctrine, its successes and its failures, and, mutatis mutandis, lessons that it can offer to deterrence doctrine in general and to that of the United States in particular.

The Gaza War Strategic Analysis (2008-2009)

One can argue whether the fighting between Israel and Hamas in Gaza is a -war,‖ or should be seen as just one more tragic surge in violence in the decades-long struggle between Israel and the Palestinians. It is, however, the first major armed struggle between Israel and Hamas, as distinguished between Israel and the PLO and Fatah. It also is a case study in how Israeli capabilities have changed since the fighting with Hezbollah in 2006, and in the nature of asymmetric war between states and non-state actors.

Will Hamas Be Better Prepared during its Next Confrontation With Israel? Insights on Hamas' Lessons from Operation Protective Edge

Operation Protective Edge (July 7-August 26, 2014) was the longest and most complex military challenge in a continuing cycle of violence between the State of Israel and Hamas since the organization’s inception in 1987. It is still too early to assess the achievements and the results of the military campaign, which are still not sufficiently clear for either side, and to determine whether Israel succeeded in achieving its primary aim of establishing long-term deterrence. Throughout the campaign, Hamas used all its capabilities, employing numerous types of weaponry and diverse methods of warfare from the outset. These included rocket "re (short-range, medium-range, and long-range) into Israel; the use of underground tunnels to carry out attacks infiltrating into Israeli territory and to support Hamas’ infrastructure throughout the Gaza Strip; the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, also known as drones); maritime infiltration attempts by commando forces; urban warfare; and more. Hamas learns from every confrontation or round of warfare with Israel, effectively implementing the results in its methods of operation during each new round of fighting. Hamas learns first and foremost from its own experience on the battlefield, but also from other terrorist organizations.

Hamas: Charting a New Strategic Course of Action

Unlike in the past, the latest escalation of violence between Hamas and Israel is not another tactical and limited round. It is instead part of a new strategic direction taken by Hamas in an effort to capitalize on the circumstances created by the July 2 murder of a Palestinian youth, apparently by Jewish extremists, in Jerusalem. In so doing, Hamas intends to create a meaningful change in its difficult geopolitical, economic, and intra-Palestinian position. Consequently, it seems that the Israeli offer -"quiet will be answered by quiet" -expressed a misunderstanding of Hamas's aims, and of the change underway in the "internal grammar" of the rules of the game that have characterized previous rounds of Israel-Hamas conflict. Hamas does not desire quiet at the moment because, in the absence of any other option, it views the Israeli escalation -whether in the immediate term, in "Operation Protective Edge," or beyond -as an opportunity to break its diplomatic and economic isolation.

Hamas-Israel War: A Brief Analysis of First Two Phases of War

European Scientific Journal, ESJ

At the end of 2023, the Middle East experienced some new challenges. Among these new challenges, one of the most important of them all is the Hamas-Israel war. After almost four months of war and no end in sight, there are now growing questions about whether Israel will be able to accomplish its stated goals in Gaza. The brutality of the Hamas’s attack on October 7, the extent of the cruel massacre, shocked both the Israeli society and foreign public opinion. To better understand the factors of Hamas's operational success, the strategic surprise attack on Israel from Gaza, on October 7, 2023, needs a thorough analysis to understand all its political, intelligence, and operational failures aspects. It goes without saying that many elements of Hamas's brutal but largely successful attack are still unknown. Taking this into account, this paper focuses on only three elements of the ongoing war. Firstly, based on the qualitative methodology of research, this study evaluates and highlights the political background of the bloodiest attack in modern Israel's history which happened on October 7, 2023. Secondly, using the research methodology of data collection and analysis, this paper seeks to answer the still open-ended question, how was Hamas able to attack a country which operates one of the best intelligence organizations in the world by an extreme surprise? Finally, by using the narrative and historical models of qualitative research and the available data, this paper focuses on assessing the first and second phases of the war. Furthermore, the study formulates conclusions regarding the expected directions of change in the Israeli security system and some aspects of regional security implications of the ongoing Hamas-Israeli conflict. The potential result of the current paper is to present the reasons for the ongoing Gaza conflict based on the historical background. In addition, it provides a primary analysis, based on currently available information, of the first two phases of the obviously protracted Hamas-Israel conflict for the benefit of the community of researchers, scholars, and academics.