Military Strategy: Theory and Concepts (original) (raw)
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Understanding War's Theory: what military theory is, where it fits and who influences it
Australian Army Occasional Paper - Conflict Theory and Strategy, 2018
Many military professionals and academics outline the importance of military theory and the need to study it. Some, like Colin Gray, even highlight how understanding it allows the profession of arms to better adapt in war. Given these wise words, would it not seem important to know ‘what’ military theory is? Is it not significant to know who has shaped it? How do we, as professionals, tell if something is military theory, or just opinion and conjecture? Knowing what military theory is, and what it is not, is vital. It helps identify what writings further our understanding of war and warfare, and guides professional military education and research for future doctrine and training. This work answers the questions of what military theory is, where it sits within the wider context of the study of conflict, and which theorists are key in defining its body of knowledge. The work first defines what military theory is. Military theory is a field of study that seeks to understand the phenomena of war and its links to wider conflict; and provides a framework for the valid creation and dissemination of the knowledge of war and warfare. In other words, military theory is the epistemology of war. This definition highlights that research into military theory is grounded in the philosophy of scientific inquiry and, much like applied history, must use broad scientific methods – using hypothesis and empirical data based in history; not just a single incident, war or technological advancement – to develop its concepts. Understanding this also provides a guide to test whether a new or modern idea is effective ‘military theory’, or merely ‘military notion’. The definition also indicates that the focus of military theory is the development of first principles knowledge about war and warfare. It is this knowledge that allows planners, commanders and senior decision makers to adapt their know-how of war fighting to changing situations, environments and political objectives. It is also this knowledge that can be enhanced through wider study. The analysis of what military theory is, also demonstrates where military theory fits within wider academic disciplines. Although other humanities disciplines like history can support military theory, its focus on applied theory gives it strong links to other applied social sciences like political science, international relations and economics. These other disciplines overlap with military theory, and provide an avenue to potentially advance military theory’s understanding of power, influence and war’s wider links to conflict. Such links assist in broadening the military theory body of knowledge – a body of knowledge that is not codified, but is instead shaped by foundational theorists. Who these foundation theorists are, or who is most influential, is also answered by this work. By analysing the curriculums of staff colleges around the world, this work has identified the top 20 theorists currently accepted as most influential. The analysis also suggests a normalising of military theory across the globe, including a possible convergence between the conceptual Eastern and Western ways of war. Overall, this work provides a definition for military theory and highlights the key theorists that shape our views on it now and into the future. This is supported with guidance that allows us to test future theories. Understanding what military theory is and who shapes it lays the foundation to allow the profession to debate where future advancements in military theory should focus to best support planners, commanders and senior decision makers.
Military strategy was long described as atheoretical-an art that could only be fully comprehended by military genius. This contention is no longer held, as military staffs, comprised of experts and specialists, are able to formulate strategy aided by minitheories of strategy and a process that takes advantage of collective wisdom rather than singular genius. But the mini-theories of strategy remain underdeveloped and an overarching theory of military strategy does not yet exist. In this dissertation I build a grand theory of military strategy, consisting of a simple two-pole, physical and psychologically oriented framework, mini-theories of military strategy, and additionally, concepts of employment that describe conceptual actions that can be employed by military means to achieve military objectives. Mini-theories of military strategy, consisting of the five basic military strategies of extermination, exhaustion, annihilation, intimidation and subversion, are woven together into a coherent military strategy theoretical framework. Additionally, I expose the principles of war as a myth, instead proffering concepts of employment as the actionable elements of strategy, which are used in the conceptual direction of military means to achieve military objectives in support and amplification of the five basic military strategies. The strategies offered are the result of a comprehensive meta-data analysis, hermeneutical analysis, and comparative metaanalysis of the works of past strategy theorists, rather than the case study methodology employed in most military strategy scholarship. This dissertation provides a baseline theory from which further military strategy hypotheses can be generated and tested in order to advance our understanding of military strategy.
On War's Theory - Systems and Military Theory: Congruence Throughout History
Thesis Proposal Review (PhD Milestone), 2016
REPLACED BY FINAL THESIS: https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/handle/1885/260048 Thesis Proposal Review Modern military concepts often use systems theory either as an explicit foundation – as seen in Systemic Operational Design, Network Centric Warfare and Effects Based Operations; or as implied knowledge – as observed in Warden’s Five Rings, Three-Block War, and the Strategic Corporal Effect. This suggests there is an unspoken, and untested, assumption: systems theory has congruence with military theory. In other words, the use of systems in contemporary military concepts assumes there is some overarching theory that connects military and systems ideas into one whole. Such a theory, which is a theory of theory, is known as a meta-theory. However, recent experiences would appear to suggest that systems theories do not form valid operational or strategic theories, the concepts remain within military thought. This paper is the Thesis Proposal document for a Doctorate that seeks to identify if congruence exists between systems and military theory and therefore confirm if a meta-theory exists and what this means for future military theory, training, education and planning. For if the congruence is limited, then the current use of systems thinking paradigms may be very dangerous for future war efforts.
This is another book about war. I spent a goodly number of years doing the research for and writing the monster Physics of War (POW). I say monster on two accounts. First, any book more than 1300 pages in length is monstrous large. Second, the work itself is monstrous in exaggeration. There is not much of a science of war (although quite a bit of science in war,) so calling that earlier work the Physics of War was an exaggeration that enough science was there to merit the name.
Theory of War and Strategy_ US Army College
reviewed the manuscript for Chapter 13 and poses no objection to its publication. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of State.
Military Strategy vs. Military Doctrine
The concepts of military doctrine and military strategy are sometimes wrongly used as if they were the same concept; while the two concepts are related, the student and practitioner of warfare must understand the differences and not confuse them with each other. This article will briefly discuss the two concepts and their relation. The article argues that while doctrine represents the more scientific side of warfare, strategy represents the artistic side. Existing doctrine will almost never meet the requirements for winning the next war; it is through the artistic application of generic peacetime doctrine to the specific strategic and operational context, using doctrine as building blocks for a context specific military strategy, that the military commander outwits and defeats or coerces the adversary and achieves the military objectives.
Thesis (PhD), 2022
Since the 1990s, systems concepts have been used to enhance military theory. Such fusion assumes a strong relationship between systems thinking and military theory. This assumption underpins military concepts such as Effects-Based Operations, which was influential in planning the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars. The military failures in these wars led scholars to criticise systems-based concepts within military theory and practice. Nevertheless, practitioners and academics continue to use systems concepts to inform contemporary military doctrine and education. Such education shapes military professionals’ thinking on how to plan for, and conduct, war. This thesis investigates the relationship between contemporary Western military theory, systems thinking, and their key schools-of-thought. The thesis identifies that the assumed relationship is founded on a belief that the world is made up of systems. This worldview, known as ‘hard systems thinking’, is held by both advocates and critics. There appears to be little consideration of the alternative systems worldview: ‘soft systems thinking’. This second school-of-thought views the world as complex and uses systems as frameworks to enhance understanding. The thesis explains how these systems paradigms have similarities with the two military theory worldviews of ‘war as science’ and ‘war as art’, respectively. Investigating how these schools-of-thought influence systems concepts may help explain when and how to use systems thinking to enhance military theory. The investigation finds a strong relationship between military theory and systems thinking. This relationship is underpinned by the complementary use of both hard and soft systems thinking schools-of-thought. The thesis reviews the works of twelve military writers from across recorded history to find this relationship. The 2003-2011 Iraq War provides an illustrative case study. This case study corroborates the investigation’s findings, and provides initial insight into how paradigms can influence military thinking and practice. The investigation indicates that each level of war preferences a school-of-thought. For example, the strategic level of war prefers soft systems thinking and war as art. Hard systems and war as science thinking are relevant to the tactical level of war. Another finding is that systems thinking, when used appropriately, appears to enhance the explanatory and descriptive power of military theory. The thesis found little support for using systems thinking to reinforce the predictive power of theory. The analysis of the theory-based and Iraq War case studies also sheds initial light on how the paradigms military practitioners hold can influence how they think about and execute war. Where practitioners hold paradigms not aligned with the findings in this thesis, military planning and action may risk strategic failure. The thesis finds that Effects-Based Operations, and similar hard systems concepts, appear inappropriate at the strategic and operational levels of war. Next, the thesis identifies a set of principles that may help guide future military warfighting concept development. Another observation is that pre-war military education may be important in shaping pre-war thinking and in-war adaptation. Further research is likely to shed light on how to reduce the hard systems/war as science bias often seen in military thinking and planning. With the contemporary surge in great power competition, limiting these biases may help reduce the likelihood of great power competition becoming great power war.
Method and Substance in the Military Field
European Journal of Sociology, 2008
This article tries to assess the cognitive merits of various research programmes in the treatment of military issues. It contends that, on such topics more than on others, method influences conceptualization and theory construction. Having noted the infrequent showings of some programmes in the military field, it goes on to demonstrate, based on the literature produced over a century, that the blames laid at positivism's door are especially justified in it. The Weberian/Simmelian tradition has shown more promise. A brief synthetic formulation of its achievements suggests that it alone accords with Clausewitzian thought, and shows sufficient flexibility to account for recent changes which baffle other programmes, or to open avenues of collaboration with promising new approaches (notably, nonlinear dynamics).